

DEMOGRAPHIC DESTINIES

Interviews with Presidents of the Population Association of America

Interviews Referencing Frank H. Hankins PAA President in 1945-46



This series of interviews with Past PAA Presidents was initiated by Anders Lunde
(PAA Historian, 1973 to 1982)

And continued by Jean van der Tak (PAA Historian, 1982 to 1994)

And then by John R. Weeks (PAA Historian, 1994 to present)

With the collaboration of the following members of the PAA History Committee:
David Heer (2004 to 2007), Paul Demeny (2004 to 2012), Dennis Hodgson (2004 to
present), Deborah McFarlane (2004 to 2018), Karen Hardee (2010 to present), Emily
Merchant (2016 to present), and Win Brown (2018 to present)

FRANK H. HANKINS

We do not have an interview with Frank Hankins, who was the ninth PAA President (1945-46). However, as Andy Lunde and Jean van der Tak (VDT) were interviewing other past presidents, they regularly asked questions about those early presidents whom they had been unable to interview. Below are the excerpted comments about Frank Hankins.

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS

Frank Hamilton Hankins was born in Wilkshire, Ohio in 1877, but grew up in Kansas. He graduated from Baker University in Baldwin City, Kansas, in 1901. He was superintendent of schools in Waverly, Kansas, for two years before going to Columbia University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1908. He taught at Clark University from 1906 to 1922, and was head of its Department of Political and Social Science. He then moved to Smith College, where he taught until he retired in 1946, just after serving as PAA President. However, he continued to work professionally in a variety of teaching and research capacities until his death from a heart attack at age 92, in 1970, in New York City.

From Andy Lunde's interview with Frank Notestein in 1973:

LUNDE: Frank Hankins? He was President in 1945-46.

NOTESTEIN: I can't tell you too much about Frank Hankins. I knew him pretty well. He was at Smith College for years. A sociologist--a social biologist, a field that gets more attention now. Of somewhat rightwing persuasion. Articulate, good speaker. Interested in pushing population; interested in the qualitative aspect of population.



Frank Hamilton Hankins 1877-1970

Author(s): Charles H. Page

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fact, when combined with his failing health in later years, probably contributed to his untimely passing from the Lincoln scene of which he had been so much a part, and to which he had given so much.

Dr. Foster is survived by his wife, Ella Mae, who continues his contacts with the school by operating a day-care center for faculty members and Lincoln community members. He is also survived by a son, Laurence, Jr., and a daughter, Mrs. Yvonne Sutherland.

REGINALD MCGHEE
MARTIN OPPENHEIMER
*Lincoln University,
Pennsylvania*

FRANK HAMILTON HANKINS

1877–1970

During his ninety-second year and until the end a man of remarkable vigor, Frank H. Hankins died of a heart attack on January 24 in New York City. This event took from our ranks an eminent sociologist and demographer, distinguished author and lecturer, provocative and influential teacher, ardent proponent of a strictly scientific sociology and concerned humanist, and beloved friend of many members of at least three generations. His "vita," only a part of which can be reported here, merely suggests the magnitude and diversity of Frank Hankins's legacy.

Born in Wilkshire, Ohio, Hankins grew up in Kansas, where he graduated from Baker University in 1901. With his A.B. in hand, he followed the then-familiar pattern of serving as superintendent of schools (in Waverly, Kansas) for two years before entering Columbia University. As a graduate student and fellow in statistics, Hankins was strongly influenced by the philosophy and logic of John Stuart Mill, by the sociology of Giddings (for whom he had lasting admiration), by Spencer and Ward, and by the quantitative work of Quetelet, Galton, and Pearson; his doctoral dissertation, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician* (1908), was an important contribution to the development of empirical sociology.

For sixteen years (1906 to 1922) Hankins was a member of the faculty of Clark University, and from 1908 he was head of its Department of Political and Social Science. Under the presidential leadership of the influential psychologist G. Stanley Hall, Clark University was an important center of research, graduate study, and stimulating scholarly controversy, spurred by the famous visits of Sigmund Freud and Havelock Ellis, such dynamic local figures as the psychiatrist Adolf Meyer, the learned and bombastic Harry Elmer Barnes, and Hankins himself. Among Hankins's students at Clark were Howard Odum, E. Franklin Frazier, and Clifford Kirkpatrick, who were encouraged by their young teacher-colleague to pursue careers as sociologists; that they did so has of course enriched our many-sided field.

Hankins's years at Clark were busy and productive: he contributed substantially to scholarly journals, lectured frequently at other universities, was an active member for several years of the Worcester school committee, studied social conditions in Europe before and after World War I, and in 1921 taught at the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* in Paris. In 1922 Hankins, with Barnes and others, left Clark University, but Hankins returned in 1964 to receive the Doctorate of Humane Letters.

Smith College, where Hankins was professor of sociology

from 1922 to 1946, for most of this period as department chairman, was an exciting and noncloistered campus under the presidency of the nonpareil William Allen Nielson. Hankins's colleagues in history and the social sciences included Barnes, Ray Billington, G. A. Borgese, Merle Curti, Harold Faulkner, Kurt Koffka, Hans Kohn, and Will Orton, as well as such sociologists as Howard Becker, Gladys Bryson, and Kingsley Davis (Hankins built well—in succeeding decades Smith has maintained a cadre of excellent sociologists). In Smith's cosmopolitan setting that offered the same challenge and stimulation as had the earlier Clark, Hankins was a social activist, a leader of his profession, and a renowned and peripatetic teacher. A deeply concerned student of population, he was active on the governing boards of the American Eugenics Society, the Population Reference Bureau, the Euthanasian Society of America, the International Population Union, and the Planned Parenthood Federation; an ardent supporter of individual rights, he was an early member of the American Civil Liberties Union; a confirmed rationalist, he was a long-time contributor to *The Humanist* (in 1960 he was named a "Humanist Pioneer").

In 1930 Hankins was elected the first president of the Eastern Sociological Society; in 1936 he became the first editor of the *American Sociological Review*, and a year later he was elected president of the American Sociological Society; in 1945 he became president of the American Population Association. Hankins taught and lectured widely: at Amherst College (where he subversively introduced sociology under the cloak of "economics"), Columbia, the New School, Berkeley, the Army Center at Biarritz (1945 to 1946), and, following his retirement from Smith, at the University of Pennsylvania (1946 to 1948). He was a member of Research Sociologists, the Committee on Family Research, and the American Society of Naturalists. In 1936 he studied, on the scene, social conditions in Nazi Germany.

Hankins's bibliography is impressive. In addition to his volume on Quetelet, he contributed widely to scholarly journals, anthologies, and the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (seventeen articles, including sturdy pieces on Charles Darwin, birth control, divorce, and social discrimination). His ground-breaking study, *The Racial Basis of Civilization: A Critique of the Nordic Doctrine*, was published in 1926, and two years later appeared *An Introduction to the Study of Society* (revised in 1935), a textual treatise presenting Hankins's principal theoretical and substantive concerns and convictions.

Hankins was a scientific determinist, but he remained skeptical of the capacity of social science to rival the theoretical and applied achievements of the natural sciences because of the complexity and changing nature of social causation. In a recent private document, he expressed his general orientation by rejecting the "robot" notion "that the stream of culture is a wholly independent variable and mankind wholly dependent thereon, because the human mind is the catalytic agent in culture change and scientific knowledge the basic progressive factor therein." His writings show an abiding and powerful interest in the role of biological factors in social life and history and, conversely, in the roles of such selective processes as urbanization, education, persecution, and war in the determination of population quantity and quality. He argued strongly that differential fertility between classes is dysfunctional for society and that this problem should be met by birth control: more for the lower strata and less for the privileged.

Hankins was critical of the egalitarian assumptions of political democracy, but he condemned authoritarian institutions and practices and advocated maximization of oppor-

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tunity for all. In *The Racial Basis of Civilization* and elsewhere, he questioned the view that members of different racial stocks are equally capable of individual and cultural achievement and emphasized the fact that the populations of all large societies are racially mixed; he maintained that such mixture is physically and socially beneficial, and he denounced racist policies. Hankins's work, then, wears the three traditional faces of sociology: scientific, humanistic, and reformistic.

In the circles of both gown and town, and among both cosmopolitans and locals, Frank Hankins enjoyed wide esteem and deep affection. Tough-minded, at times viewed as stubborn, a doughty opponent in debate, he persistently sought new knowledge and ideas, had little use for conventional or fashionable wisdom as such, and welcomed the challenge of intellectual dispute. He was a sensitive and generous friend, a chairman guided by collegial norms, and a wise counselor who encouraged students and younger colleagues to pursue their own interests. He was a delightful companion, splendid host, skillful gardener, enthusiastic philatelist, and became in recent decades an investment expert—and, of course, he was much more.

For many years, until the fall of 1969, Frank Hankins and his wife, the former Anne Keeling, graced one of the oldest and loveliest homes in Northampton. Besides Mrs. Hankins, he is survived by his brother Dr. Ralph H. Hankins, his sons Frank H., Jr., and Dr. Orville L. Hankins, his daughter Margaret (Mrs. James A. Farmer), six grandchildren, and five great-grandchildren.

CHARLES H. PAGE
University of Massachusetts

GUSTAV ICHHEISER

1897–1969

Gustav Ichheiser died in Chicago in November 1969. He wrote articles and books on social psychological subjects in Vienna in the 1930s and he came to this country as a refugee about 1940. He lived and worked in and about Chicago for most of the rest of his life. For a time, Ichheiser was a professor of sociology at Talladega College; his most recent employment was as an associate, first, of Hans Morgenthau in developing a theory of international relations and, later, of Sol Tax in analyzing communications among associates of *Current Anthropology*.

Dr. Ichheiser's main book from his Vienna days is *Critique of Success*. When he came to this country, he continued to write, his main publication being *Misunderstandings in Human Relations* published as a special supplement of the *American Journal of Sociology* (September 1949). A volume of his papers, *Appearances and Realities: Misunderstanding in Human Relations* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass) was in press at the time of his death.

EVERETT C. HUGHES
Boston College

RUBY JO REEVES KENNEDY

1908–1970

Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, chairman of the Department of Sociology at Connecticut College for the past twenty-four years, died suddenly at her home in Waterford, Connecticut,

August 1970

January 5, 1970. She was the widow of Raymond Kennedy, former professor of sociology at Yale University, who was killed in 1950 while on a field trip in Indonesia. A daughter, Miss Ellen Kennedy, a junior at the University of Bridgeport, Connecticut, survives her.

At the time of her death Professor Kennedy held the Lucretia L. Allyn professorship at Connecticut College and was the college's senior professor in years of regular service in that rank. She had taken sabbatical leave for 1969–70 to continue her long-term study in the field of mental retardation. Since 1948 when she published the results of her research into the social adjustments of mentally retarded young adults, she was a nationally recognized authority in this field. Not content merely to study the mentally handicapped, she devoted herself also to providing leadership and inspiration to local, state, and national associations for their aid. For many years she served on the board of the New London County Association for Retarded Children; she had been chairman of the research committee of the Connecticut Association for Retarded Children; and in the fall of 1969 she was elected chairman of the board of directors of the Connecticut State Training School at Mansfield. Recently she had concluded her service as a member of the Psycho-Social Advisory Review Board of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Professor Kennedy was born in Sanger, Texas, November 5, 1908. She received her bachelor's degree from Texas State College for Women in 1929, and her M.A. and Ph.D. were awarded by Yale University in 1936 and 1938 respectively. Her dissertation, written under the tutelage of Professor Maurice R. Davie, explored the relationship between residential propinquity and ethnic endogamy in the New Haven community, a topic that became the basis for several articles in *The American Journal of Sociology* during the 1940s.

Later she extended her study to include the religious affiliation of her subjects and discovered from her statistics that the device through which ethnic minorities were being assimilated into American society was a "triple melting pot," rather than the accepted single one. She concluded that although the different nationalities were clearly merging with the passage of time, this was not an indiscriminate process; on the contrary, it was being conducted within the compartments of the three major religions of the western world: Protestant British-Americans, Germans, and Scandinavians intermarried; Catholic Irish, Italians, and Poles formed a separate intermarriage group; and Jews remained almost completely endogamous. In a subsequent article Professor Kennedy reported that the lines of religion held fast through the 1940s. The "triple melting pot" concept soon became famous and has been the source of lively sociological speculation ever since her felicitous use of the term.

In 1961 Professor Kennedy edited a collection of articles and monographs by Professor Davie that had been presented to him by his colleagues at a testimonial dinner in honor of his retirement from Yale.

Before coming to Connecticut College in 1945, Professor Kennedy taught at Vassar College and at Texas State College for Women. She also served as research associate on the staff of the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Washington, D.C., and with the Yale Institute of Human Relations in New Haven.

At a memorial service in Harkness Chapel on January 8, 1970, Charles E. Shain, President of Connecticut College, recounted the qualities that had endeared Professor Kennedy to her colleagues and students, saying, in part,

We do not have a presidential address for Frank Hankins, but this paper published in 1938 provides some insight into his thinking.

American Academy of Political and Social Science

Pressure of Population as a Cause of War

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Pressure of Population as a Cause of War

By FRANK H. HANKINS

WAR arises from numerous and diverse causes. The conditions which give rise to it change from century to century in correspondence with changes in the social setting. There seems to be no form of internal social organization that eliminates its causes. It has flourished under tribalism, feudalism, monarchy, democracy, plutocracy, and both mass and individual dictatorships. Moreover, as with all important social phenomena, war does not spring from a single factor or condition; its causes constitute a social complex, which may never be twice the same. Here as elsewhere in the social field, it is extremely difficult to isolate the causal conditions with certainty and assurance.

It follows that lists of the causes of war include items that are inoperative some or even most of the time; and that different individuals attribute very different importance to the different factors operating in a given case. Moreover, these questions are seldom discussed as questions of social physics, or even as questions of social psychology. They are for most persons questions of social ethics; for some they are questions of economics; and in most cases they are discussed from the basis of simplistic assumptions leading to clear, logical solutions, more or less distantly removed from the realm of practicality.

That is, it is a relatively simple matter to devise intelligent solutions for our social ills, but quite a difficult matter to put the solutions into effect. It would, in fact, be a relatively easy matter for us to tidy up the whole world, internally and externally, if only

men would behave as we think they should behave.

This brief paper attempts a purely objective analysis of the rôle of population pressure as a cause of war. It appeals to no emotion; it preaches no sermon.

MEANING OF "CAUSE"

It seems desirable to begin by a brief discussion of the meaning of "cause" in a social context. Since social causation is always complex, and since the factors involved are certain to have different degrees of importance, one may define a cause as any social condition which being present facilitates the appearance of the phenomenon, and which being absent tends to forestall such appearance. Such a concept of cause derives from the theory of probabilities. It implies that a cause of war may be present in certain social complexes where war does not arise. A teeming population, ambitious national leaders, or frustrated trading advantages may or may not be factors in war in particular situations. The question of their causal relationship can be determined only by a statistical survey which indicates whether or not they show an appreciable correlation with those situations in which wars arise.

It is not necessary, therefore, to show that population pressure inevitably produces war, in order to demonstrate that it may in some cases be one of the contributing causes. Nor is it necessary in this brief paper to distinguish major from minor causes, surface causes or "occasions" from underlying causes, persistent from temporary

causes, or to attempt a classification into economic, political, racial, religious, and other causes.

The situational factors in war causation are extremely diverse because the direct and immediate cause of war is a psychological attitude. Not only do these psychological attitudes vary, but a given external situation may or may not give rise to a warlike attitude, because of variations in the attendant circumstances. We are witnessing in Europe today events that a generation ago would in all probability have been looked upon by the English or the French public as grounds for war. A war-weary and disillusioned public, filled with pacifist sentiments, prefers, however, to disregard aggressions that once would have filled it with heroic idealism.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF POPULATION PRESSURE

Whether or not a nation *feels* population pressure is, therefore, a problem with many variables. It is belief and the feeling attitudes that accompany it that always count as the motivations of action. Masses of men are governed in their group behavior by emotion rather than reason. One group may feel distinctly cramped though its density is less and its standard of living higher than that of another group which displays little urge even for migration, to say nothing of preparing an aggressive war.

The present war of Japan upon China seems certain to produce profound changes in the psychology of the Chinese, just as the industrial and commercial advances of the past two generations have transformed that of the Japanese. In any case, the Japanese are filled with the psychology of expansionism as compared with their former hermit frame of mind. The fact that their population has doubled

and acquired a taste of a rising standard of living makes it easy to convince themselves that they need new markets and new sources of food and raw materials.

Obviously, the rôle of population pressure in such a social complex cannot be determined with any exactness. It seems well-nigh certain, however, that growth in numbers is associated with an expansion of national pride. This growth in numbers has in modern times been associated with increased interdependence of all classes and regions of the nation, as well as with facilities for the development of like-mindedness and concerted action. A modern nation is, from many viewpoints, the primitive village expanded to the *n*th degree. It may have its internal dissensions, but it presents a united front to any threat to its welfare, and supports with common enthusiasm whatever policies seem likely to enhance the group advantages.

Now, the growth of population to a point where the opportunities for employment throughout the national domain and the national economic structure are saturated, is a prerequisite of complete integration and of the intensified spirit of nationalism which results therefrom. Moreover, when a nation has reached this stage and there is a serious disturbance of its national economy, whether internal or external, its sense of population pressure tends to be greatly accentuated. Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman said a quarter-century ago during a period of business recession that England had ten million too many people. The idea was repeated by Lloyd George during the 1920's. The statements may or may not be sound from the standpoint of economic analysis. That they reflected an almost universal feeling of population pressure cannot be doubted.

The term "population pressure" needs further analysis. This term is by no means synonymous with mere numbers or density. Populations which are largest and most dense, such as those of India and China, have not been driven to wars of aggression by population pressure. It does not follow that there is no sure sign of pressure until the population has become so dense that it perforce spills beyond the national boundaries. The term "pressure of population" cannot be confined to direct pressure on the means of subsistence, though this constitutes the simplest case. Here we have the so-called "hunger" wars, where a population is confronted with famine in consequence of drought, flood, or other natural disaster. It has three alternatives: death by starvation; peaceful migration, where available territory makes such possible; and invasion of a neighbor's territory. In countless cases it has chosen the last.

In fact, so frequent has been this situation as regards the relations of nomadic herdsmen to neighboring peasant populations that Oppenheimer has erected on it a theory of the origin and evolution of the state. The great migrations of the early centuries of the Christian era seem to have been of this sort, and they gave rise to innumerable wars. Such experiences may, moreover, develop the habit and tradition of war; they perfect the social organization and the psychology of the heroic which go far to make war successful.

It is but a short step from the true hunger wars to the wars of an expanding population in contact with a relatively stationary native population living on a lower standard. A typical case here is the westward expansion of the American agricultural population and the consequent Indian wars. Such movement illustrates the view

that the term "pressure of population" must comprise not merely density and standard of life, but also the extent and nature of the resistance to expansion. The westward flow was the result of a tendency to equalize opportunities for a livelihood in east and west. It was checked from time to time by increased resistance of the native population, and stimulated by the varying tide of European immigration.

Pressure of population does not, then, mean a crude Malthusianism. The reduction of the force of famine, vice, and pestilence has not resulted in an increased pressure of population on the means of subsistence. The truly prodigious increase in numbers of the past 150 years has been accompanied by a more or less steady rise in the standard of living as measured by the quantity of consumable goods per capita, a rise greatly accentuated in recent times by the adoption of contraception as a negative check on population increase. Only war remains as an important factor among the original Malthusian positive checks.

POPULATION AS RELATED TO LIVING STANDARDS

The result is that the form of population pressure today must be conceived in terms of pressure upon the standard of living, in which must be included not merely a quantity of consumable goods, but a mode of life and a set of life expectations. The combination of large numbers and a high standard of living makes population pressure as a factor in war psychology vastly more significant than it can possibly be in the case of a low-standard population. Because of the low level of their material culture, the vast populations of India and China have developed neither the resources nor the social organization to wage a modern war, especially a war of aggression;

they have acquired neither the national self-consciousness nor the *esprit de corps* needed to prepare and fight a war of more than desperate defense. When, however, a population has grown large and compact; has become accustomed to a high and rising standard of living; has acquired an intense spirit of patriotism and facilities of communication so that the whole nation can be suffused by a common emotion; then a threat to the national welfare may well lead to war.

There is thus a vast difference in the concrete situations leading to modern wars and to the hunger wars of a simpler economy, but this does not destroy a certain recurrent similarity of pattern. The nomadic herdsmen fought for new feeding grounds; agricultural peoples fought for new lands; but an industrial people fights for markets and sources of raw materials, not indeed to prevent starvation, but to safeguard and improve a standard of well-being.

This view translates population pressure into economic pressure. Not that the two are synonymous, but that, once it is seen that population pressure is not mere density or mere numbers, but must include as an integral part of its definition the customary standard of living and the normal life expectations of the population, then it becomes clear that population pressure makes up a large part of the wider concept, economic pressure.

Now economic pressure, like all causes of war, must be translated into psychological terms. In such terms it appears to be uniformly low among a poverty-stricken population, no matter how dense. It appears to reach its maximum in a high-standard population having a well-integrated national life, when its standard of living is reduced by economic policies applied by other nations.

RESISTANCE TO EXPANSION

As intimated above, what constitutes *disturbing* pressure is necessarily a correlative of the resistance to expansion. Some disequilibrium of forces is necessary to any movement. A strong water main will hold water within secure confinement and harnessed to human needs under a pressure that would wreck a weaker main. In the latter case the water breaks bounds and causes havoc and destruction. One cannot say that in the former case high pressure caused no damage, while in the latter a relatively low pressure caused great damage. The overflow must be attributed to the weak restraint as well as to the quantity of water. It follows that one cannot determine population pressure by mere figures of density per square mile of territory. He cannot do so even by a combination of figures of density plus figures of standard of living. One must know what resistance population movement will encounter. A thin population may spread in the hope of improving its lot, if the restraining barriers are low and the enticements strong. Many early American pioneers pushed farther westward from time to time because in their opinion the population was too thick when neighbors came closer than a mile or two.

Such migration is the first normal reaction to population pressure where opportunity for migration exists. In the century following 1820, around forty million emigrants left Europe for permanent settlement in the Americas.¹ This was Europe's spawning period, and this vast flow of population from areas of relatively high to areas of low pressure had important

¹ See A. M. Carr-Saunders, *World Population*, p. 49; R. R. Kuczynski, *Population Movements*, p. 22.

repercussions on the economic and political history of Europe. Gradually the formerly vacant lands of the temperate zones have become filled with teeming populations, so that the easy flow of the past has been stopped.

Moreover, it is nearly impossible to induce people to migrate from areas of advanced material culture and modern social services to undeveloped areas or to areas where they must compete with a lower-standard population. In addition, instead of inducements to immigrants, barriers have been erected against them throughout most of the world today.

Now it seems clear that, other things being equal, the cessation of the tendency of population pressures to readjust themselves by the peaceful expedient of migration will result in an intensification of the pressure for expansion in areas where population is increasing. Under these circumstances it will require a constantly increasing resistance on the part of other populations to prevent the expanding populations from breaking their bounds.

WORLD DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1750

The virtual closing of the frontier throughout the world in the last generation marks the end of an era in world history. It was an era marked by several striking developments pertinent to the present discussion. There was, first, the virtual trebling of the world's population since 1750.² During this time Europe's population much more than trebled. There was, second, the spread of the industrial technique from England to all parts of the world, and its special development among the nations that now rate as great powers.

Third, the industrial technique

² A. M. Carr-Saunders, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

proved so profitable that it brought about a continuous tendency to divert the nation's labor and capital to trade and manufacturing. Not only did the standard of living rise, but the population was urbanized and became accustomed to new life routines and to a relatively rapid expansion of life opportunities. National life was integrated, the level of national self-consciousness raised, and the nation otherwise made ready to respond as a unit to any threat, real or apparent, to what was believed to be the national interest. Moreover, these steps are irreversible in any short period of time. A population once shifted from country to city loses its old skills and acquires new habits and a new outlook on life. Once urbanized and industrialized, it must, for the most part, make its living by urban pursuits.

There were several important consequences of these developments. The capitalistic nations tended to develop a badly balanced internal economy. They acquired more people than they could either feed or employ on their own resources. Hence the scramble for colonies. Since the industrial technique proved so profitable, every backward nation became anxious to adopt it, and was usually aided by the exportation of both capital and capital goods from the advanced nations. Seeking to retain their home markets to themselves, tariff barriers were gradually raised by all nations.

Meanwhile, the annual increments to the population in most advanced countries continued to rise even after there were many signs that the era of easy and rapid expansion of the capitalist economy had come to an end. Because of the persistence of the mores of marriage and family, the birth rate of a nation cannot at once be adjusted to a changed economic situation.

Consequently, population pressure has tended to increase in Germany, Italy, Japan, and elsewhere during the past twenty years.

These developments have left several of the industrial nations in more or less of a dilemma. Owing to the law of diminishing returns in agriculture, an industrial nation which is already practicing intensive agriculture can feed its population only by an expansion of its opportunities for urban employment. This means that it must expand its exportation of manufactured products in exchange for needed food and the raw materials of industry. An alternative is that it export men. We have seen, however, that high barriers have been erected against the export of either goods or men. There remain two other possibilities: a reduction in the standard of living, and forceful seizure of territory promising the needed food and materials.

Birth control will help to solve the problem in the long run, but the generation subject to the most intense pressure will certainly be difficult to control. It is almost certain to experience periods of extensive unemployment and a general reduction of the standards of well-being. If the restraining bonds are too great to permit an aggressive effort at expansion, there will be an intensification of internal civil strife and possibly revolution. These have been the antecedents of Fascism and National Socialism. Even in this country, the depression produced much talk of planned economy and an enormous extension of governmental authority. Two national needs emerge as supreme: order must be preserved, and the population must be fed. Let me add that the threat to democracy does not come from ambitious and designing men. It comes from the breakdown of in-

dustrial organization and the reactions thereto of a bewildered public.

NATIONS MOST AFFECTED

The nations most critically affected by this situation are Germany, Italy, and Japan. For Germany, an important factor has been the reduction of foreign markets by high tariffs. For Italy, a factor has been the erection of immigration barriers. Japan has arrived at the stage of most rapid increase in numbers at an extremely unfavorable conjuncture of world affairs. There can be no doubt that she needs imported food and raw materials; and she must have markets for her silk and manufactures in order to buy the needed imports. Japan may be mistaken in believing that she can find a partial solution by controlling the future economic development of Manchuria and North China. Nations are often badly fooled. I think it reasonable to say, however, that the need she feels for expansion is based largely on her huge and growing population.

The contrast between these countries and Great Britain, however, is only one of degree. The latter has a large and dense population dependent on overseas trade for food, raw materials, and markets. She must, therefore, maintain a navy large enough to guarantee free ingress and egress of ocean-going vessels. Should she lose control of the sea, she would run the risk of general poverty, if not of actual famine and revolution. She is overpopulated from the standpoint of a self-sufficient economy; and this is true of other colonial powers—France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, as well as Italy and Japan.

Having been first on the scene, however, Great Britain retains immense historical advantages. Not only do trade lines once established tend to persist through elements of monopoly

of place, organization, and production, but her enormous investments in mines, forests, oil fields, and rubber plantations place her in a position of relative Imperial self-sufficiency. She must, however, be ready to fight in defense of her position, because the welfare of her large population is dependent thereon. Back of her foreign policy is a definite population pressure. She must fight to hold what others think they need.

WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?

There is no easy and happy general solution of such a world situation that seems readily practicable. From a strictly realistic viewpoint one can say that, all the factors being what they are, the world situation could not be otherwise than what it is. Idealistic, purely logical, aprioristic solutions may be numerous, but there seem to be no real ones. The history of post-war Europe is strewn with the wreckage of logical plans for the relief of international tensions, plans formulated by experts but wrecked by politicians compelled to cater to popular prejudice or lose their jobs. This tendency of a priori schemes to be wrecked in practice is mainly a consequence of the operations of mass psychology which we have as yet no means of controlling. Even if the map of the world could be redrawn into self-sufficient units, it would have to be redrawn again in another generation, because of differential rates of population increase and the concurrent industrial and psychological changes in the different national economies.

Idealistic solutions run along the line of complete or increased freedom of movement of both men and goods. Obviously, if the world were thrown open to free migration and free trade, inequalities would tend to be equalized before pressures became explosive. It

is not probable, however, that the high-standard nations possessed of either large domestic or colonial territories will give lower-standard nations free access either to their lands by migration or to their raw materials and markets by trade. No doubt much could be done by the establishment of a sound world currency, by a reduction of tariffs, and by the introduction of a friendly spirit of international cooperation. Since nations can buy only when they are able to sell, any relaxation of trade restrictions between nations, by reciprocal trade agreements or otherwise, should tend to reduce international tensions.

HOPEFUL AND OTHERWISE

One need not be very hopeful that these objectives can be largely attained in the near future. Meanwhile the world seems likely to follow the age-old plan of increasing the external pressure against the expanding nations in the hope that they can be prevented from breaking bounds. In this direction one can detect one basis of optimism. The increased cost and destructiveness of war may possibly in the future convince all peoples that nothing can be gained by it which compensates for its losses.

It should be noted, however, that such a conviction, even if held by all the powers, may not prevent territorial expansion by a population that develops strong expansionist tendencies. This is a question of the balance of internal pressure and external resistance. The surrounding populations may not be able to develop sufficient resistance to prevent such a step, especially when the great powers who might add to the resistance are unwilling to do so in an effective manner, because they have much to lose and little to gain by doing so. The willingness and the readiness to fight may be, and

apparently is today in Europe, sufficiently different in the various nations to induce the yielding of territory without a fight to the nation developing the more aggressive attitude. Such a nation is almost certain to be one feeling a strong population pressure. The recent annexation of Austria and the imminent changes in the relations of Germany to Czechoslovakia are cases in point. Whether a new equilibrium can be established by these means remains to be seen.

Then there is another small ray of optimism. All the leading nations of the world except Russia and Japan now have birth rates lower than true maintenance rates, and there is a continuing tendency for these rates to decline still further. Russia has immense territories and will long be busy with internal developments. Japanese aggression seems likely to meet sufficient obstacles in Asia. It is possible, therefore, to envisage a time when actually decreasing populations in Europe will greatly reduce threats of forceful expansion there.

Here again, however, one should not be over optimistic. The rising industrialism of the Orient, South America,

and even Africa, may well make it more and more difficult for the industrial nations of Europe even to maintain their recent standard of living, to say nothing of increasing it. As new nations enter upon industrial development their populations grow and they cease to be exporters of foods and raw materials. The industrial nations of Europe may well find themselves pushed by increasing internal difficulties and by increasing international competition to make war on less developed populations that are increasingly pushing for control of natural resources and trade advantages which Europe has thus far succeeded in reserving largely for herself. Nations do not surrender such advantages without a struggle, except in the face of insuperable odds.

It seems out of the question for the moment to set up an international organization able to settle questions of variable national need by democratic parliamentary processes. Until that time comes, it seems probable that recurring differentials of population pressure must be counted among those factors which from time to time threaten peace.

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