

DEMOGRAPHIC DESTINIES

Interviews with Presidents of the Population Association of America

Interview with Douglas Massey PAA President in 1996



This series of interviews with Past PAA Presidents was initiated by Anders Lunde
(PAA Historian, 1973 to 1982)

And continued by Jean van der Tak (PAA Historian, 1982 to 1994)

And then by John R. Weeks (PAA Historian, 1994 to present)

With the collaboration of the following members of the PAA History Committee:
David Heer (2004 to 2007), Paul Demeny (2004 to 2012), Dennis Hodgson (2004 to
present), Deborah McFarlane (2004 to 2018), Karen Hardee (2010 to present), Emily
Merchant (2016 to present), and Win Brown (2018 to present)

DOUGLAS MASSEY

PAA President in 1996 (No. 59). Interview with John Weeks, Dennis Hodgson, and Karen Hardee at the San Diego Bayfront Hilton Hotel, San Diego, California, April 30, 2015.

CAREER HIGHLIGHTS: Douglas Steven Massey was born in 1952 in Olympia, Washington, where he grew up. He received his B.A. (Magna Cum Laude) in Sociology-Anthropology, Psychology, and Spanish from Western Washington University in 1974, his M.A. in Sociology from Princeton University in 1977 and his Ph.D. in Sociology from Princeton University in 1978. He spent a year as a Research Associate in the Office of Population Research at Princeton, and then accepted an NSF Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Graduate Group in Demography at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1979 to 1980. He was Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and the Graduate Group in Demography at the University of Pennsylvania from 1980 to 1985, when he was promoted to Associate Professor. In 1987 he became Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, and from 1990 to 1994 he was Professor in the Irving B. Harris School of Public Policies at the University of Chicago. In 1994 he returned to the University of Pennsylvania as the Dorothy Swaine Thomas Professor in the Department of Sociology. In 2003 he returned to Princeton as Professor of Sociology and Public Policy, and since 2005 he has been the Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University, and the Director (since 2011) of the Office of Population Research.

His research has been very important both in terms of its scientific merit and because of its policy relevance. For example, his Mexican Migration Project has enormously increased our understanding of the dynamics of population movements from Mexico to the United States (and back), and his wide range of other sociodemographic research resulted in his being elected President of the American Sociological Association in 2001, one of only 7 PAA Presidents to have had that honor, [and still the most recent as of 2020]. His first book was published in 1987: *Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western Mexico*; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (Coauthored with Rafael Alarcón, Jorge Durand, and Humberto González). His most widely-acclaimed book was published in 1993: *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*; Cambridge: Harvard University Press (Coauthored with Nancy A. Denton). His 2002 book also influenced how we think about migration issues: *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Age of Economic Integration*; New York: Russell Sage Foundation (with Jorge Durand and Nolan Malone). As of the date of this interview in 2015, his most recent award-winning book is: *Climbing Mount Laurel: The Struggle for Affordable Housing and Social Mobility in an American Suburb*; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Coauthored with Len Albright, Rebecca Casciano, Elizabeth Derickson, and David Kinsey).

WEEKS: I'm John Weeks, historian of the Population Association of America and chair of the history committee. And with me today are two members of the committee, Dennis Hodgson and Karen Hardee. We are interviewing Douglas Massey, who is the Henry G. Bryant Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at Princeton University, and most importantly from our perspective today, past president of the Population Association of America in 1996—19 years ago.

MASSEY: Last century.

WEEKS: Last century. When you were still a baby. We'd like to get a little bit of a sense of how you got into the field of demography, and then talk about some of the many, many important things that you've done in the field. And then also talk to you a bit about the Association itself, and where you see

demography heading in the future. Now, you were born in Washington, the state of Washington, grew up there.

MASSEY: Yes.

WEEKS: Went to Western Washington University.

MASSEY: Yes.

WEEKS: And I found, on the occasion of your being elected president of the American Sociological Association, a piece online by Ed Stephan, who is talking about your undergraduate days. He talks about how you came into his office. So, you pick up the story, when you came into his office, about demography.

MASSEY: Well, when I was an undergraduate, I wanted to do something in social science. And I actually started out in psychology and took a whole bunch of psychology courses. But the lab was too far removed from the real world for me. So then I swung 180 degrees and went and started taking anthropology courses. And that was *very* real world. But it was not very cumulative, in terms of knowledge, because everything was relative. It was the heyday of cultural relativism. And so I got dissatisfied with anthropology. And then I discovered demography, which kind of put it together for me, because it had a set of methods. It had theories. You accumulated knowledge. But it was very real world: birth, death, migration, marriage—things that happened to people.

So I wanted to take a demography course, and I signed up for one. The local demography professor was a guy named Peter Mazur. But he got an NSF grant and then canceled his course. [laughter] So I asked who might be able to give me a reading course in demography. And I forget who told me, maybe Peter told me, “Well, Ed Stephan has had some demography. Maybe he would do it.”

So I show up in his office, and this is 1973. I have long hair down to my shoulders, a red bandanna around my head, probably a plaid shirt, jeans. It was Washington State. And I say, “Excuse me, Professor Stephan.” And he looks up at me kind of brusquely. “I heard that you might be able to give me a reading course in demography. They canceled the one I wanted to take this semester.”

So he looks at me and says, “Read Bogue.” [laughter] And looks down again. And I said, “What?” “Bogue. Donald Bogue, *Principles of Demography*. Read it. When you’ve read it, come back and see me.” And he looks back down again and keeps on writing.

So I back out of the office, go check out Donald Bogue’s *Principles of Demography* from the library, which is like 900 pages—[laughter]

WEEKS: Not something you assign to your students.

MASSEY: —and for the rest of the month I read *Principles of Demography*. Then I came back to Ed Stephan’s office and knocked on the door. He looked up at me like he didn’t really recognize me. And then I said, “I wanted to take a reading course in demography, and you told me to reading Bogue’s *Principles of Demography*, so I read that. Now what do I do?” And he looks at me and says, “Well, now you know more demography than I do.” And that was it. [laughter]

HODGSON: I hope you got three credits for that.

MASSEY: I got no credits.

WEEKS: But in truth, you probably didn’t need credit. Because you got a B.A. magna cum laude in four majors at the same time.

MASSEY: It's really only three.

WEEKS: Okay. Well, sociology and anthropology combined. But anybody looking at your life and your CV has to ask: How did you do it all? How did you do all of that at the same time?

MASSEY: I just followed my interests and took more courses than I had to, accumulated a lot of credits. I had a minor in chemistry, but they wouldn't let me have a minor because I had three majors. For a while I was toying with the idea of pre-med. But this was the 70s, and it was really cutthroat to go to medical school, and I didn't like the assholes that were in my classes. So I ended up going out of pre-med, although I like chemistry. I just kept taking courses. Then I discovered demography and decided that I wanted to go to graduate school in demography. So I stayed a few extra quarters, prolonging my undergraduate experience by about a year, and boned up on math and statistics, computer science, so I would be ready to go to graduate school.

WEEKS: I remember from Ed Stephan's comment that you took another year. But it wasn't really like a gap year, like kids in the UK take.

MASSEY: No. I actually remained an undergraduate through the end of the fall quarter of 1974. Officially, I graduated in December of 1974. I had already applied to graduate schools by that point. But just to hang around, I entered the masters' program in social science at Western Washington, and stayed for two more quarters, the winter and the spring, and took more courses. I had already started publishing by then, and so I had already written my first article [Douglas S. Massey and Lucky M. Tedrow, 1976, "Economic Development and Fertility: A Methodological Re-evaluation." *Population Studies*, 30:429-437].

HODGSON: Were you influenced by what was going on, you know, the "population bomb"? Were you at all focused on third-world fertility control?

MASSEY: No. That wasn't me. I was always heterodox. When I got to Princeton I ended up studying segregation and migration. Ansley Coale didn't know what to do with me. He hated migration research.

WEEKS: I didn't realize that.

MASSEY: He also managed to be absent the last lecture of the term when he was scheduled to give the migration lecture. He always passed it off.

WEEKS: Really.

MASSEY: So I got my migration lecture from James Trussell, a noted migration specialist. And it lasted 45 minutes out of a three-hour class. So I was very heterodox.

WEEKS: Well, even Jane Menken is quoted by Ed [Stephan] as saying she didn't know much about what you were doing on your dissertation, either, but she trusted you to be doing it.

MASSEY: I more or less was independent. I did it myself. My dissertation was the first nationwide study of Hispanic patterns of residential segregation, using the 1970 census. That's how old I am. And it was a different world back then. Simply to do a study of segregation in 30 metropolitan areas, you had to order tapes, like 25 or 30 tapes from the Census Bureau. And then it would come in a big box and it would go into the mainframe tape rack. Then you would go to the computer and read your cards

in at 2:00 in the morning, and wait for the operator to mount your tape. And then, of course, if you made one little mistake on your card—

WEEKS: Fatal error.

MASSEY: —you wouldn't find out until next morning. So it was a long process just to get the data up to a point where I could calculate measures of segregation. And now you can get a low-cost diskette from GeoLytics with census tract information from 1970 to 2010. You could have it in any system you want. The 1980 tract boundaries, the 1990 tract boundaries, the 2010 tract boundaries: they've done it all for you. So it's a different world now.

WEEKS: One of your majors as an undergraduate was Spanish. Had you come into contact with the migrant workers in Washington, or how did that come on your radar screen?

MASSEY: Well, for whatever reason, when I was in third grade, the third-grade teachers in my school decided we should learn Spanish. Now, it wasn't much. It was like, "Me llamo Douglas." "Muchas gracias." That sort of thing. So I got exposed starting in the third grade. And I grew up in Washington State. On the west coast there were Mexicans around. Then in seventh grade, I started taking Spanish classes for real. So I took 7 through 12. And then I went to Spain between high school and college, in one of those summer study programs. And then when I got to Western, I just kept taking Spanish classes so I wouldn't forget what I had learned. I never really wanted to be a romance language major, or really wanted to do anything in Spanish literature, I just took a course every quarter. And if you do that for four years, you end up with a major. [laughter] So that proved to be one of the most useful skills I picked up in my life, learning to speak Spanish reasonably well at a young age. It gave me a foundation in Spanish that I was able to build on when I later got involved in studying migration from Mexico.

WEEKS: Right. But it wasn't then the motivation to look at Hispanic segregation?

MASSEY: Partly.

WEEKS: Oh, it was partly that?

MASSEY: Because I was interested in Latinos. And they were just starting to make news.

HODGSON: But the census didn't have that Hispanic category yet.

MASSEY: They did in '70.

WEEKS: Spanish surname, right?

MASSEY: No. In 1970 the Census Bureau was sued to include an Hispanic-origin identifier. And they lost in court, but it came too late to put it on the long form, so they did it on a 5 percent sample. That was the first time there was a Spanish-origin question, the 1970 census, but it was too small to really generate good census tract data. I did use other measures: Spanish surname in the southwest, Puerto Rican birth or origin in the northeast, Cuban birth or origin in Miami. In 1970, Latinos were only 4.7 percent of the U.S. population, and they were isolated in these three regions, basically. So most of the cities I studied, aside from New York and Miami, were in the southwest. Mexican—

WEEKS: So was that then a natural transition to looking at migration from Mexico? Because that's what you were initially especially famous for.

MASSEY: No. I was actually famous for segregation, first.

WEEKS: Okay. All right. We'll clear up the record.

MASSEY: I don't know when I got famous.

WEEKS: You got famous real early out the gate.

MASSEY: My first book was on Mexican immigration. But I had already published a lot on segregation by then. I studied Hispanic segregation. Just for the sake of comparison, I compared patterns of Hispanic segregation to black segregation. And of course, what stood out was the high levels of black segregation, so I got interested in that. Then I wrote grant proposals to do systematic studies of black, white, and Asian segregation using the 1980 census, which was still coming on tapes in those days. And that became the line of work with Nancy Denton that led to *American Apartheid*.

When I finished my Ph.D., I spent a year as a postdoc at Princeton and then another year as a postdoc at Berkeley. And right after I finished my Ph.D., a friend of mine in sociology introduced me to Josh Reichert, an anthropologist who had just come back from a year of field work in Mexico, where he lived in this town in the state of Michoacán where three quarters of the households had somebody who migrated to the United States to earn money and invest at home. It was almost all circular migration, back and forth. So my friend introduced me to Josh, and he showed me a notebook. Each section of the notebook was a family, and each person in the household had his first and last U.S. trip, and where they were, and the wages and everything. And then for the household heads, he had a lot more detailed information. It was all handwritten.

So I got a little money from Princeton—one of the privileges of being at a place like Princeton is money lying around for things—and had it key punched—also a word that dates me—and put it in machine-readable form and began analyzing it. And we published three papers together.

So I published two or three papers with Josh and was convinced that if you'd blended anthropological and survey methods, like basically he did, and did it more systemically than he had done it as an anthropologist in the field, you could produce some really good information on what had been a clandestine process that was getting to be controversial and nobody knew anything about it. So after we published a few papers, I put together another NIH grant proposal to replicate what he had done in his Ph.D. fieldwork on a larger scale and do ethnographic surveys in four communities in Mexico. And that ultimately became the Mexican Migration Project.

WEEKS: Which is still going on, right?

MASSEY: Still going on. Just got funded for five more years. And Jorge [Durand] and I have written this one so that over the next five years, we fade out and a new team of PIs [principal investigators] fade in: David Lindstrom at Brown University, who is a former student of mine and former manager of the Mexican Migration Project, and his student Silvia Giorguli. She got her Ph.D. at Brown, and she's director of the demographic program at the Colegio de México. So Jorge and I will fade from the scene and they'll take over.

HODGSON: Intergenerational project.

MASSEY: It's been funded continuously since 1987. And the first wave of the fieldwork was 1982. So that's how I got into Mexican migration. I originally wrote the grant proposal thinking Josh Reichert

would be the fieldwork guy, because I had background in Spanish, but I had never spent any time in Mexico. I think I had been to Ensenada once or something like that.

This was 1980. Reagan was elected and started putting the screws to social science research. And David Stockman was at OMB [Office of Management and Budget] cutting back on things. I got a borderline priority score and I didn't know whether I was going to be funded or not. Meanwhile, Josh didn't want to wait around for my priority score. So he went off and took a job somewhere. And on the last day of the fiscal year, I think it was 1980-'81 fiscal year, that would have been September 30th of 1981, Jeff Evans calls me on the phone and said, "We have enough money to fund your project." And that became the first round of surveys for the Mexican Migration Project.

But there I was with a grant—\$200,000, I think, in those days, which was a lot of money—to do ethnographic surveys of four communities. I had no fieldworker and had never been to Mexico, really. [laughter] So Josh did call around and ask who might be up for working with me, and he connected me with an anthropologist named Guillermo de la Peña, who had just set up a new masters' anthropology degree at the Colegio de Michoacán. So I called him and talked to him, and he said, "Well, I don't want to do this, but I have students that would be probably really interested in working with you." So in April of 1982, I flew down to Mexico and went to the Colegio de Michoacán and met these students—Jorge Durand, Humberto González, and Rafael Alarcón—and arranged to put together a project. Actually, it was when the PAA meetings were in San Diego.

WEEKS: Yeah, that was '82.

MASSEY: Because I flew to Mexico, and then I flew back to San Diego for the PAA meetings. And I was at Penn then, so I flew back to Philadelphia.

WEEKS: And this is the first time since then that the meetings have been in San Diego.

MASSEY: The circle is completed.

WEEKS: Exactly.

MASSEY: So that was the beginning.

WEEKS: A somewhat circuitous route in many respects, to get to that point.

MASSEY: Yeah. In my experience, success comes when preparation meets chance opportunities. So I have a background in anthropology and Spanish and demography and sociology. And I meet an anthropologist who just spent time in Mexico studying migration. I was interested in migration, so I jumped in. My Spanish was pretty bad at that point. It was classroom Spanish, mostly, but it gave me the foundation I needed. And I've been working in Mexico 30 years now, so I speak Spanish pretty well. I don't even feel like a foreigner in Mexico at this point, I feel like a local.

HODGSON: And we changed our immigration laws.

MASSEY: Well, they did at that. I'm on sabbatical next year and I want to write two books. One is going to be the 25th anniversary update on *American Apartheid*. And another one is on the political economy of illegal migration. For the past 20, 30 years, watching what happened to Mexican migration and U.S. immigration policy has been like watching a train wreck in slow motion. Because I could see it was a disaster from the start. And I kept trying to tell people, this is going to backfire. You militarize the border, you're going to stop a circular flow that's been going on for decades and they're all going to settle here. You're going to increase the rate of undocumented population growth.

WEEKS: And the rest of us have been quoting you on that for a long time, because you're right, obviously.

MASSEY: Well, I proved to be right. The first inkling that this was happening officially was when the 2000 census came out and Hispanics had already passed Blacks as the largest minority, way before the projections had indicated. And that's because the census Bureau was just assuming the same thing was going on. And the inflow hadn't changed. But what changed was the outflow. And so they were totally blindsided by that.

I've testified before Congress many times, trying to tell them, Look, if you want fewer brown people in this country, less is more when it comes to border enforcement. Because they want to circulate. They don't want to live here. They mostly want to go home. Some will settle, obviously. But if you harden that border, you're going to cut off the circular flow and you're going to end up with a larger population. But they didn't listen to me.

WEEKS: They should have, shouldn't they? Well, that is funny. Because honestly, and I say this not to flatter you, I say this as a fact. As a person who has written a variety of things in fields related to yours and more generally, you can't talk about migration, nobody can talk about migration without quoting a lot of what you've done. Nor can you talk about segregation without quoting a lot of what you've done.

MASSEY: *American Apartheid* is, I think, considered to be a bit of a classic in its genre. And it changed the terms of the debate about Black poverty and the underclass. I wrote it with Nancy after we had done all the empirical work, basically six or seven years of research on census data to show and study patterns of Black segregation. We wrote it in the early 1990s, because the underclass debate was raging at the time. It was between people like Charles Murray, who said it's our overly generous welfare system that's trapped all these people in poverty, and Bill Wilson, on the other hand, who is saying, it's the structural transformation of the urban economy.

I didn't agree with Charles Murray at all, and I think that he's full of hot air still. I agreed with Bill Wilson that structural transformation of the economy was an important thing. But nobody was paying any attention to the fact that African Americans were uniquely segregated in the United States and had been for decades. And that segregation itself contributed to what was happening to African Americans. So we wrote *American Apartheid* to make that case, and I think it was successful.

WEEKS: I think it was. And last night I went back and reread your PAA presidential address, "The Age of Extremes." Nineteen years ago you were prescient about the things that are happening, because what you were talking about, in terms of the concentration of poverty and the increase in crime and violence, basically spoke to what's happening in Baltimore, it seemed to me.

MASSEY: Yeah. Baltimore. Ferguson.

WEEKS: Exactly.

MASSEY: Because of segregation and the concentrated poverty and deprivation that result from it, many American cities are tinderboxes just waiting for a spark to set off the conflagration. And it could be anything that sets it off. It could be the Bulls winning a championship basketball game. Or it could be another shooting death of a young Black male. You don't know what's going to set it off. But the conditions, the frustration, the anger, the lack of hope, are as bad in American's ghettos now as it was in the 1960s.

WEEKS: Right. The point of your paper was to not just talk about that, but to talk about the concentration of affluence and the separation that we've got between the affluent and the poor.

MASSEY: This was a long time before people started talking about the 1 percent.

WEEKS: Precisely. Well before Thomas Piketty and even the Republicans getting on board with the idea that inequality is a bad thing.

MASSEY: I remember going to an Aspen Institute conference, and Abigail Thernstrom was there. This would have been the '80s. And she was arguing that there was no rise in income inequality, that if you took into account the welfare and transfers, that income inequality went away. Even then, I could see that that was just make-believe.

HARDEE: You said that you've testified before Congress and tried to get your message out, but weren't listened to. With all of your experience, can you think of better ways for research to be actually used in policymaking?

MASSEY: That's a tough one, especially now. I think the U.S. is probably in the most anti-science, anti-intellectual, anti-fact era in all of its history. Logic, facts, information are held in low regard inside the Beltway. And people are very cynical. So I go to the Hill and testify, and then members of Congress posture, and either make up stuff or completely ignore what I've said. And then after the public performance, I'll talk to staff members and they'll say, Well, we know you're right, but we can't deal with the politics. The politics are such that we can't admit these facts.

WEEKS: How frustrating is that?

MASSEY: Some people believe me. When I testified before the House Judiciary Committee some time ago, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren from San Francisco was the chair. Democrats were in control. And before I made my presentation, she gave her speech for five minutes and said everything that I was going to say, basically that I was right and she was articulating a line of political thinking and policy thinking that I was supporting. But then the ranking Republican, Congressman [Steve] King, got up and ignored everything I said, and in so many words said, "Take your lying statistics and go home, because here's the truth." He made up stuff right out of thin air about what was happening with Mexican immigration, despite all the data that I brought to bear on it.

The whole purpose of the Mexican Migration Project is to produce high-quality, reliable data on a subject that's very difficult to study using standard methods and make it publicly available to people. The one fundamental principle of the Mexican Migration Project is that all the data are public, and they are put in the public domain as soon as we can get them cleaned and ready to go. This year, we just put up our 150th survey of communities in Mexico.

WEEKS: Yes. I've used your data. Thank you very much.

MASSEY: Last time I checked, we had around 3600 users around the world—including when people at Homeland Security want to really know what's going on, they use my data. But they don't like me at Homeland Security.

WEEKS: No? Because you have a different view of what they should be doing?

MASSEY: Yeah. I testified before Congress once, right before Michael Chertoff, who was Secretary of Homeland Security at the time. And later a *Washington Post* reporter told me that Chertoff told him that they didn't like me because I had a bad attitude.

WEEKS: Bad attitude? Okay.

MASSEY: Well, I was showing—proving, I think—that massive increase in spending on border enforcement had no effect on the probability of apprehension. And certainly no effect on the probability that anyone was coming to the United States or getting into the United States. And I put all these data up, so if they want to challenge me on that, they're free to do it. But nobody ever has.

HARDEE: It's easier to say you have a bad attitude.

MASSEY: That's right. When I retire, I think maybe I'll start a blog. And I'm going to call it the Bad Attitude Blog.

WEEKS: But thinking about policy now, one of the ways in which you ended that presidential address on "The Age of Extremes"—

MASSEY: I invited everybody to the bar for a drink.

WEEKS: Well, just before that. You were saying that you weren't in a position at that point to suggest what policy ought to be, but that you'd needed to get the dialogue going. Now, 19 years later, do you have a sense of those policies?

MASSEY: I understand it a lot better now, what was driving the rise in inequality. The deregulation and financialization of the U.S. economy is a big driver. That's what separates us from many other countries. You know, Canada is a lot like the United States, but they never decontrolled their banks like we did, and they never set up this speculative casino economy. So when everything blew up in 2008, in Canada nothing happened.

So much of what's happened is that Wall Street has become so powerful. And it's a bipartisan use of power. Chuck Schumer is in the pocket of Wall Street, senator from New York. They basically figured out ever more sophisticated techniques to extract wealth out of the real economy and put it in the pockets of a small number of people in and around New York City. And they did this in the savings and loan crisis. They did it in the dot-com boom. And they really did it in the mortgage meltdown in 2008.

Then they got bailed out—billions. And they were made whole and prosperous again. Meanwhile, all the people they victimized through predatory lending are underwater. In foreclosure. Destitute. It's basically because we have an oligarchy now, where policy is made by the rich and for the rich. They've stacked the deck against everyone else. They've manufactured a political economy where they can't lose. So they screw up, they make really bad bets, they drive the economy into the ground, and they get bailed out. And they're still rich.

And Obama, whom I supported and thought was going to be a progressive president, basically turned his treasury over to Goldman Sachs. The whole AIG bailout really was a bailout of Goldman Sachs. Because AIG was the insurer that insured through credit-default swaps on all those bad bets that Goldman Sachs had made. So if AIG went under, Goldman Sachs would go under. So they bailed out AIG so AIG could pay off the credit-default swaps for Goldman Sachs, and Goldman Sachs could survive the crisis. And who was in charge? It was people from Goldman Sachs.

HODGSON: That's going to be the second book!

MASSEY: No. That's not my book.

HARDEE: You're slowing down, Doug.

MASSEY: I get that from people like Matt Taibbi and Paul Krugman and Gretchen Morgenson that I read. I've got several other books to write, too. Those were just the two that I'll probably try to get to next.

WEEKS: You said you've got a sabbatical coming up, and you have in mind to write two books?

MASSEY: I've done that before.

WEEKS: Have you? Obviously, you've done that before. But I don't know of anybody else except you that has that kind of productivity. And I still don't understand. Do you have more hours in the day than the rest of us?

MASSEY: No, I don't. And I don't work all the time, either.

WEEKS: You don't?

MASSEY: No. I like to have a good time. I have a lot of help. If you look at my CV, 90 percent of the things I've written are coauthored. I rely a lot on students and postdocs to collaborate with me to help me get these things done. Nancy Denton was a postdoc. And Jorge Durand is a colleague. He didn't work for me. He started out working for me, but we both were co-directors of the whole project at this point. He gives me a lot of visibility in the Spanish-speaking world. We're published jointly. And whenever we publish in Spanish, I write in English and he translates into Spanish. And whenever we publish in English, he writes his parts in Spanish and I translate it into English.

WEEKS: Can we talk just for a minute about the trajectory of your career? Because after Princeton, a postdoc at Berkeley, you went to Penn, then Chicago, back to Penn, and back to Princeton. You actually did complete the circle nicely there. Were there particular events that inspired you to do those things?

MASSEY: All things in my personal life. I met my first wife as a graduate student at Princeton. I got my first job at Penn. She got her first job at University of Illinois at Chicago. And so after seven years of a commuting relationship and marriage, I got a job at University of Chicago. And then she decided she wasn't happy at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Penn offered two positions, so we went back to Penn, and I thought that would make her happy. It didn't make her happy, and we ended up getting divorced. Then I was divorced and living in Philadelphia, still at Penn, and I wasn't looking to move anywhere. Princeton had let it be known that if I were interested, they would be interested. But I had a daughter who was growing up in Philly. Her mother had primary custody. But then I married a Princeton professor, and that tipped the scales. I moved to Princeton.

Princeton is the only place I would have moved, because I didn't have to give up anything with my daughter. It's so close to Philadelphia. So I kept my house in Philadelphia and my same visitation schedule. From her point of view, nothing changed. I did the commuting for a few years until she graduated from high school. And I've been at Princeton ever since. And I'm still married to my wife. She's a professor of psychology.

WEEKS: That was one of your majors, yes?

MASSEY: One of my majors. I actually had read a paper by her father, Fiske and Campbell, on multi-trait, multi-method research. It's a classic in psychology. That's her father, my wife's father. He was a professor at Chicago.

WEEKS: Now, thinking about you in your year as president of the PAA. It's 19 years ago. Are there any things that stand out that you had to deal with that year, or that you remember in particular?

MASSEY: We were having some turmoil in the office then. I think we didn't have a stable person. We were moving from relying on the American Sociological Association to our own office. It was before we hired Stephanie Dudley. We had an unstable person in the office, and we were in the process of solving that problem. It got solved after my term. I think they hired Stephanie after my term. But I remember grappling with some instability in the office. The person we had in the office at that time wasn't ideal.

WEEKS: I recall that. But Stephanie was a good choice.

MASSEY: Stephanie was a good hire. She was around for 15 or 20 years, 15 years maybe.

WEEKS: She just retired.

MASSEY: She just retired? So it must have been about 15 some-odd years [1996 to 2015]. And now the PAA is much more on a stable basis. It's got a better funding model. It's raised some money. It's got a bit of an endowment. So I think it's in good shape.

WEEKS: Getting started while you were president, right?

MASSEY: Well, I don't know if it got started right then. It was a real transition period for a while, not just during my one year as president. There was about a five-year period where things were kind of unstable. People were charting the way forward.

WEEKS: Thinking about the field more generally, it seems like meeting after meeting we get more submissions to the meetings and more presentations. We keep trying to figure out how to squeeze more people into the meetings. So obviously the field of demography is getting at least more popular. Do you see it going in one particular direction or another?

MASSEY: Demography has expanded. It's always been interdisciplinary, but it's really become interdisciplinary. It's moved well beyond the original classic three fields of fertility, mortality, and migration. It's a much bigger field now than when I was a graduate student. I think there's a whole big area of expansion in research on biosocial processes. And I think demographers are uniquely well-positioned to be at the forefront of that, because we *are* interdisciplinary.

It's becoming increasingly obvious that there are these big interactions between human biology and the social structure in which human beings inevitably live. Everything from epigenetics, gene/environment interactions, to methylation processes to allostatic load to cognitive effects—all these things are on the table now. And demographers are taking the lead and producing the data and doing the interdisciplinary work that needs to be done. Add [Adolescent] Health was an early pioneer in this, and is continuing to add genetic information and biomarkers to the Adolescent Health Survey [see Richard Udry's interview for more on this]. The kids are no longer adolescents at this point, they're moving into middle-age adulthood. But it's a very valuable data set.

Sara McLanahan with the Fragile Families data set is adding a lot of biomarkers, including looking at telomeres, which are the ends of chromosomes, and with stress and aging they wear down.

She's already published a couple of papers showing that exposure to very disadvantaged circumstances reduced the length of telomeres in young black men, black boys, raised in poverty. So I think that's the sort of thing that's really going to have major payoffs in the future. And demography is right there in the middle of it.

WEEKS: And you actually referenced some of those kinds of things in that "Age of Extremes" paper. You were talking about the brain chemistry changes among young people growing up in a violent, crime-prone neighborhood.

MASSEY: I actually did more of that in my presidential address for the American Sociological Association, and have subsequently written some more papers, including a lot in the book that I wrote called *Strangers in a Strange Land*, about humans in an urbanizing world. I actually built the book around my two presidential addresses, worked both into chapters into that.

WEEKS: Yeah. I meant to go back and look at your ASA address, but I ran out of time. It was about emotions, right?

MASSEY: It was about emotions and the importance of emotion, and also neuroscience. I'm trying to bring insights from neuroscience into the awareness of sociologists.

WEEKS: And so you think this brain initiative at NIH is something that demographers need to be involved in or will be involved in?

MASSEY: That seems to be more at the biochemical level than the kind of neural-structural level. See how it develops. So far it's been fairly micro. So I'm not sure. I'm more interested in FMRI data and brain structure, and stuff like that. But inevitably, those things have micro reference at the level of neurons and brain chemistry.

WEEKS: That is obviously the micro-level stuff, but your goal is to connect the micro to the societal-level activity.

MASSEY: The brain, we know, is incredibly plastic and can go in a whole variety of different pathways, depending on the experiences it receives. And what determines the experience that any brain receives is positioned in a social structure. You're in a family. You're in a neighborhood. You're in a school. You're in a society. And the experiences that are socially structured determine basically who you become in a very real way.

There's a lot of evidence coming out now that sustained exposure to disadvantage in neighborhoods has these powerful effects on allostatic load—you know, overstimulation of your stress response—on cognitive development, on telomere length, all these sorts of things. The work of Pat Sharkey in particular suggests that particularly among African Americans, segregation and neighborhood conditions have become the nexus through which inequality and disadvantage is perpetuated across the generations. And it's largely responsible for the stall in black progress since the civil rights movement.

WEEKS: Getting into the subcultural kind of arguments?

MASSEY: It's all kinds of things. It's cultural. There are cultural elements. But there are also physiological elements. And there are just plain opportunity elements. So it's all wound up in a neighborhood package.

WEEKS: Getting back to the issue of what could we do, let's suppose you actually had a receptive congressional committee that you could talk to. What would you say to them about how to move the country forward out of this morass?

MASSEY: I think that we need more financial regulation. We've basically created a giant casino for rich people to play in, and created a simultaneous moral hazard, because they get bailed out when they screw up. That's an important feature.

You need to do more income redistribution à la Piketty. We're really in a crisis of overproduction where there's not enough demand from the middle class. All the money is concentrated at the top. What do you buy with your second billion dollars? If you get a yacht, it doesn't produce much in the way of employment and economic growth. So that money has to be redistributed into the middle class so that the middle class will buy things and energize the economy. It amazes me that rich people don't even understand their economic interests. They're just so ideologically driven. The work my wife does suggests they're just completely out of touch. And I think the work that I'm doing also suggests they're completely out of touch, because it's clear that the more one is isolated among other affluent people, the more out of touch one gets.

WEEKS: Right. So the spatial concentration you've been talking about for a long time is really working negatively.

MASSEY: Yeah. There's evidence to show that as the concentration of affluence in your neighborhood rises, the less people give to charities.

WEEKS: Is that right? Interesting.

MASSEY: Yeah. Poor people actually give more to charity, as a proportion of their income, than rich people. The more that rich people live in rich neighborhoods, the less they give. And just the sense of entitlement among really wealthy people drives me crazy. I almost got myself thrown out of a plane once by taking somebody on.

WEEKS: Do you want to tell us that story?

MASSEY: Not really. [laughter]

HODGSON: Verbally, right? Not physically?

MASSEY: Not physically, no. It's just the sense of entitlement that gets me. And my wife's work, she's a social psychologist. She shows that people filter themselves upward. Nobody tells Donald Trump he's full of shit. Nobody tells him he's an idiot and he's got a bad comb-over. And he lives oblivious to all of this, because he never gets the criticism. It's all filtered.

WEEKS: Maybe John Stewart, but that's about it.

MASSEY: Yeah. But he doesn't pay much attention to John Stewart. It's people around you giving you feedback constantly that governs your behavior. You don't get accurate feedback when you're rich and powerful. It happens to all the presidents over the course of their term as well. They surround themselves with people who are gatekeepers and they don't get feedback.

WEEKS: So now, as we wrap up here, can you tell us what advice you give to your Ph.D. students or even undergraduates that you might be wanting to recruit into the Ph.D. program and postdocs, people who are starting their career and thinking, what do I want my career in demography to be?

MASSEY: Well, I tell them, don't think about your career, think about the work you want to do and follow your interests. If you're doing work that energizes you, that you're passionate about, that you want to find the answers to, do that—because if you try to manage your career and your life and your research to please other people, it usually is self-defeating. If you don't like what you're doing, why do you do it?

Academia is a great place. My first year as an assistant professor, this old professor at Penn, Digby Baltzell, took me aside and said, "Doug, if you're not born rich, the next best thing is being a tenured professor." [laughter] And it's true, because I don't have a boss. Nobody tells me what to do. I do what I want to do. I follow my interests. And people pay me to do things I like to do and go places I want to go. So I think Digby was right. If you try to somehow manufacture a career beforehand, it probably won't work. I didn't sit around thinking, how am I going to build something called the Mexican Migration Project? How am I going to write *American Apartheid*? Those things just emerged organically. I just took one step ahead each time and built up to the point where I could do these things.

WEEKS: Right. And all of it starting back there at Western Washington when somehow or another, demography caught your eye.

MASSEY: Yeah.

HARDEE: It's all due to Don Bogue.

MASSEY: I think maybe I became a demographer in spite of Don Bogue, not because of Don Bogue. [laughter] That wasn't the best read of my entire career. I later got to know Don Bogue, of course. Marta Tienda and I went to the University of Chicago in 1987 together. Don Bogue and Phil Hauser had rival centers at the University of Chicago. And then the economists had a center grant. So there were three demographic centers in Chicago. And when Marta and I went there, we caucused with Bob Michael, who was running the economics one. And we decided we were going to merge them all into a single pop center, because it didn't make any sense. So actually Marta closed down Don Bogue's shop and merged it. The title that remained was Phil Hauser's Pop Study Center. But it didn't make any sense to have rival pop centers at the same institution, so we buried the ghosts.

WEEKS: Right. So Don Bogue needed an editor in more than one sense of the word.

MASSEY: I think so.

WEEKS: Do you guys have anything else that we should be asking?

HODGSON: Maybe one sort of big, general question. In the context of being in demography all these years—you've already told us some things about change in the field itself. You noted that we've moved well beyond the fertility, mortality, and migration. Do you see any challenges for demography, new areas that we ought to be going into that we haven't yet? Or perhaps there is a loss of coherence in the context of a discipline that formerly had been defined by a source of data, census and vital statistics, and our focus on these three demographic variables. Now we've gone well beyond that. Is there a possibility that we've become too diffuse?

MASSEY: I have a lot of faith in demographers to figure things out as they go along. And if you try to replicate the past, you don't get anywhere. I think as the field broadens and expands, demographers will reconceptualize it and develop new ways of organizing knowledge and thinking about things. So I think in substantive terms, in research terms, in terms of the people in demography, I have a lot of faith.

My biggest worry is that a lot of forward momentum in demographic research has been driven by funding from NIH. And I think NIH is really, really broken at this point. Really broken in terms of its peer-review process. Really broken in terms of its bureaucracy and administration. Really broken in just so many fundamental ways that as a center director and an R01 grant recipient, just immeasurable amounts of time are now devoted to crap that don't have anything to do with the science. In the center, we have two FTEs [full-time employees] now just trying to keep in compliance with PubMed. And it doesn't accomplish anything—doesn't push the science forward, doesn't make it more accessible, nothing. And NIH's computer interfaces are so bad, we devote another FTE just to correcting mistakes from NIH itself. The human-subjects burdens are just becoming immense. They're empowering bureaucrats in universities to look over your shoulder and micromanage your research projects. I've been getting emails asking me, Why are you doing this? Why are you doing that? I'm the PI. It's between me and the grantors. That's the sort of thing that makes you want to retire, not the research.

The bureaucracy of the funding agencies and the bureaucracy of universities is just getting horrible. If you look at the size of the universities, the faculties haven't changed. Look at the number of administrators earning six-figure salaries: that's mushroomed. And they're just a thorn in my side.

WEEKS: Can I ask you one more substantive question? Then we're out of time. I meant to mention this earlier. When you were talking about what inspired you to get into demography, you were talking about theory. There are a lot of people who complain that demography doesn't have theory. Now, when I read your stuff, I get a sense of theory. What do you think about demographic theory?

MASSEY: Well, demographers historically have been quite close to the data. The biggest theory that classical demography had was demographic transition, which is more of a generalized observation about how you went from high-fertility mortality to low-fertility morality. But demographic research now is infused by the theories from all the various disciplines that come into demography. And demography mixes them together to create demographic theory. In my work on international migration, I'm constantly blending and contributing to theoretical understanding of international population movements. I'm drawing upon models from economics, from sociology, geography, even cognitive science now, thinking about how people make decisions and think. So that's where the theory comes from.

WEEKS: Good. Is there anything that you want to have down on the record that we forgot to ask?

MASSEY: No. It's a good life in demography. I've had a good time. Enjoyed the pop meetings all these years. And I'm happy to have made a contribution.

WEEKS: Well, I think we've all benefited from your contributions, so we appreciate that very much. Thank you very much for being with us—

MASSEY: No problem.

WEEKS: —and taking time this morning, because we know you're awfully busy, even if you do have twice as many hours in the day as the rest of us.

MASSEY: I don't.

HODGSON: You could have written a book.

MASSEY: At least an article. [laughter]

WEEKS: Okay. Thanks.

Recorded and transcribed by Nicholas P. Steckel, May 2015

Audited and edited by Revan Schendler, June 2015

Reviewed and approved by Douglas S. Massey, June 2015

THE AGE OF EXTREMES: CONCENTRATED AFFLUENCE AND POVERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY*

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY

Urbanization, rising income inequality, and increasing class segregation have produced a geographic concentration of affluence and poverty throughout the world, creating a radical change in the geographic basis of human society. As the density of poverty rises in the environment of the world's poor, so will their exposure to crime, disease, violence, and family disruption. Meanwhile the spatial concentration of affluence will enhance the benefits and privileges of the rich. In the twenty-first century the advantages and disadvantages of one's class position will be compounded and reinforced through ecological mechanisms made possible by the geographic concentration of affluence and poverty, creating a deeply divided and increasingly violent social world.

Poverty is old news. For thousands of years the great majority of human beings have lived and labored at a low material standard of living. In the first hunter-gatherer societies that emerged on the savannahs of Africa, in the agrarian villages that later appeared in the highlands of the fertile crescent, in the great agricultural empires that arose in Mesopotamia, the Mediterranean area, India, and China, most people were very poor. This iron fact of life prevailed in all human societies until quite recently.

Despite universal material deprivation, human societies evolved cultures and social structures that permitted people to live and reproduce in relative peace. Social order was possible in conditions of pervasive poverty because of one fundamental condition: The deprivation existed at low geographic densities. Under this circumstance, the socially disruptive correlates of poverty occurred infrequently and could be managed, more or less, through informal means; and because the poverty-stricken masses rarely came into contact with the tiny elite, they did not perceive the full extent of their relative deprivation.

The one place where rich and poor families came into direct contact was in cities, but preindustrial urban centers were few in number and never contained more than a tiny fraction of the human population. In premodern cities, moreover, the wealthy were constantly exposed to the poor and their privations, because preindustrial technologies permit-

ted neither the separation of work from residence nor the segregation of the elite from the masses. Class integrity was maintained largely through social means, not physical separation. Indeed, the coexistence of poverty and wealth at high densities created problems of social order, as any student of ancient Rome can attest.


The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century upset the apple cart by creating and distributing wealth on a grand scale, enabling affluence and poverty to become geographically concentrated for the first time. Through urbanization, the rich and the poor both came to inhabit large urban areas. Within cities new transportation and communication technologies allowed the affluent to distance themselves spatially as well as socially from the poor, causing a rise in the levels of class segregation and a new concentration of affluence and poverty.

For a short time after World War II, mass social mobility temporarily halted the relentless geographic concentration of affluence and poverty in developed countries. The postwar economic boom that swept Europe, Japan, and the United States created a numerically dominant middle class that mixed residentially with both the upper and the lower classes. After 1970, however, the promise of mass social mobility evaporated and inequality returned with a vengeance, ushering in a new era in which the privileges of the rich and the disadvantages of the poor were compounded increasingly through geographic means.

In the coming century, the fundamental condition that enabled social order to be maintained in the past—the occurrence of affluence and poverty at low geographic densities—will no longer hold. In the future, most of the world's impoverished people will live in urban areas, and within these places they will inhabit neighborhoods characterized by extreme poverty. A small stratum of rich families meanwhile will cluster in enclaves of affluence, creating an unprecedented spatial intensification of both privilege and poverty.

As a result of this fundamental change in the geographic structure of inequality, the means by which the undesirable correlates of poverty were managed in the past will break down. The juxtaposition of geographically concentrated wealth and poverty will cause an acute sense of relative deprivation among the poor and heightened fears among the rich, resulting in a rising social tension and a growing conflict between the haves and the have-nots. As I demonstrate below, we have entered a new age of inequality in which class lines will grow more rigid as they are amplified and reinforced by a powerful process of geographic concentration.

*Douglas S. Massey, Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6298; e-mail: doug_massey@pop.upenn.edu. Presidential address presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, New Orleans. I would like to thank Kristin Espinosa for preparing the graphics used in this presentation, and Nancy Denton for special calculations that she carried out on my behalf. I also thank Paul Jargowsky and Lauren Krivo for making available unpublished statistics on poverty concentration and class segregation.

FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POOR BY RURAL-URBAN STATUS: LATIN AMERICA, 1970–1990

THE SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF POVERTY

Poverty is notoriously difficult to define; statistics on its incidence are unreliable and difficult to acquire, especially in the developing world. Tabatabai and Fouad (1993) conducted a survey of poverty estimates in developing countries for the International Labour Office and found that most regions lacked statistics dating back more than a few years. In Latin America, however, they were able to assemble reasonably accurate estimates of poverty rates beginning in 1970. To illustrate trends in the geographic concentration of poverty in developing countries, I apply rates of rural and urban poverty estimated by Tabatabai and Fouad for Latin America to rural and urban populations estimated for this region by the United Nations (1995). The resulting distribution of poverty by rural-urban status is shown in Figure 1 for 1970, 1980, and 1990.

In 1970 most of Latin America's poor—nearly two-thirds—lived in the countryside, typically in isolated farming communities, small agrarian villages, and tiny rural hamlets. In the ensuing two decades, however, the poor urbanized rapidly. By 1980 the balance of rural and urban poverty was approaching parity, and by 1990 a substantial majority (60%) of Latin America's poor lived in urban areas. This transformation of the geographic structure of human deprivation was so quick that the ratio of rural-to-urban poverty in 1990 was almost precisely opposite the ratio that had prevailed only 20 years earlier.


Therefore, in this hemisphere, poverty is already well on the way to complete urbanization. The typical poor Latin American of the twenty-first century will not live in a village or town but in a city, and most likely a very large one. Although data limitations prevent me from demonstrating this fact for other regions of the developing world, projected

trends in urbanization suggest that a majority of the world's poor will soon live in cities.

The urban concentration of poverty is already well advanced in developed countries. Figure 2 shows the metropolitan distribution of poor people in the United States in 1970, 1980, and 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973, 1983, 1993). By 1970 U.S. poverty was already predominantly urban; 56% of all poor persons lived either in central cities or in suburbs. Nonetheless, a large plurality of the poor (44%) lived in nonmetropolitan areas only two decades ago.

Over the next 20 years, however, the percentage of poor people living in nonmetropolitan areas dropped steadily, to 31% in 1980 and to 28% in 1990; thus by the early 1990s, 72% of America's poor lived in urban areas. Not only was poverty becoming more urbanized, however; it was also becoming more highly concentrated in the urban core. The proportion of poor people who lived in central cities stood at 34% in 1970, but the figure rose to 39% in 1980 and to 43% in 1990. Meanwhile the percentage of the poor living in suburbs, after rising during the 1970s, fell slightly during the 1980s and reached 29% in 1990.

While American poverty was becoming more concentrated in central cities, it was also concentrating in already-poor urban neighborhoods. John Kasarda (1993:265) recently computed the share of poor persons living in poor and very poor neighborhoods at different points in time. He defined a poor neighborhood as one with a tract poverty rate from 20% to 40%, and a very poor neighborhood as one with a tract poverty rate of more than 40%; nonpoor neighborhoods had a tract poverty rate below 20%. Figure 3 displays the distribution of poor persons among these three neighborhood types in 1970, 1980, and 1990 for the 100 largest central cities of the United States.

FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POOR BY METROPOLITAN STATUS: UNITED STATES, 1970–1990

In 1970, 45% of central-city poor people lived in a neighborhood that was *not* poor, whereas 55% lived in a poor or very poor neighborhood (38% in the former and 17% in the latter). Over the next two decades, however, the concentration of poor people in poor places increased sharply. From 1970 to 1990, the percentage of central-city poor people living in nonpoor areas declined from 45% to 31%, while the percentage living in poor neighborhoods increased from 38% to 41%. Meanwhile the share living in very poor neighborhoods grew markedly, from 17% to 28%. As of 1990, more than two-thirds of all central-city poor people lived in poor or very poor neighborhoods.

Elsewhere Mitchell Eggers and I argue that the P* isolation index popularized by Stanley Lieberman (1980, 1981) provides a reliable and accurate summary measure of poverty concentration (Massey and Eggers 1990). This index gives the rate of poverty in the neighborhood of the average poor person. The left-hand side of Figure 4 presents isolation indices for poor inhabitants of the nation's 10 largest metropolitan areas in 1970, 1980, and 1990, using data recently published by Abramson, Tobin, and VanderGoot (1995).

Over the past two decades, class isolation among the poor has risen steadily, growing by 21% between 1970 and 1990. As of 1990, the average poor resident of the nation's largest metropolitan areas lived in a neighborhood where roughly one-quarter of his or her neighbors were also poor. Analyses performed by Abramson and colleagues show that this geographic concentration of human poverty was remarkably widespread, and in some metropolitan areas reached extreme levels. By 1990 the average poor person in New York, Chicago, and Detroit lived in a neighborhood where 29% of the people were poor; the typical poor resident of New Orleans lived in a neighborhood where the poverty rate was a


remarkable 35%. Over the past two decades, the social environment of the poor shifted to higher and higher densities of poverty.

THE SPATIAL CONCENTRATION OF AFFLUENCE

Despite a substantial and growing effort to study concentrated poverty, remarkably little attention has been given to the concentration of affluence. Since the dawn of urbanism, however, the elite have always clustered in cities for purposes of command and control. Indeed, in pre-industrial times they tended to settle in and around the city center (Sjoberg 1960). Because communications were rudimentary, effective administration required face-to-face interaction that could be achieved only through physical propinquity. Moreover, because transportation technologies were limited, goods and services required by the elite had to be produced, distributed, and sold near their places of residence.

The core of preindustrial cities thus tended to house a variety of social classes, generating considerable face-to-face interaction across class lines. Although the rich may have been centralized, they were not separated physically from the masses, and although a wide social gulf separated them from the poor, affluence itself was not spatially concentrated (see Hershberg 1981; Zunz 1982).

This residential status quo was terminated in the nineteenth century by improvements in technology. Advances in transportation, communication, and construction led to an increase in density at the urban core, a separation of work from residence, and new possibilities for physical separation between the classes. Especially in the United States, the middle and upper classes began to leave central cities for affluent suburbs on the urban periphery early in the twentieth century, first axially along rail lines and then, as the automobile became more widely available, concentrically through-

FIGURE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL CITY POOR BY NEIGHBORHOOD TYPE: UNITED STATES, 1970–1990

out a wide hinterland. The working classes meanwhile clustered in factory zones adjacent to the central business district, creating the spatial structure made so famous by my predecessor at the University of Chicago, Ernest Burgess (1925).

Although we have no direct measure of income segregation before 1940, we know that ethnic segregation increased substantially during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to the changed ecological structure of the city (see Hershberg 1981; Massey 1985; Massey and Denton 1993). It is reasonable to surmise that class segregation also increased. After the World War II, however, both class and ethnic segregation clearly declined (Massey 1985; Simkus 1978), fueled by an ongoing process of generational succession, social assimilation, and mass economic mobility unleashed by the postwar boom (Alba 1981).


As shown in seminal work by Blau and Duncan (1967) and Featherman and Hauser (1978), a remarkably fluid and open stratification system emerged in the United States during the years World War II. Socioeconomic status came to depend less on one's social origins than on one's achievements; the result was a sustained decline in income inequality and an unprecedented rise in living standards. From 1947 to 1973, U.S. families doubled their incomes, while inequality declined by 5% (Levy 1987). According to James Smith (1988), the share of families with middle-class incomes grew from a minority of 40% of the population in 1940 to two-thirds of the population in 1970, while the poverty rate fell from 34% to 11%. In only 25 years the United States became a middle-class society structured meritocratically.

This broader trend toward socioeconomic equality was expressed spatially, as the degree of residential segregation between the upper and the lower classes was reduced sharply. According to calculations by Albert Simkus (1978), residen-

tial dissimilarity between high- and low-status workers declined markedly between 1960 and 1970. In the metropolitan areas he studied, the average dissimilarity index between professionals and laborers decreased by 19% from 1960 to 1970, while that between managers and service workers decreased by 17%. At the same time, residential dissimilarity between managers and laborers dropped by 23%, and that between managers and service workers by 17%. Therefore, during the 1960s, people located at the extremes of the American occupational structure were moving rapidly together in residential terms, and observers at the time thought class segregation was on the wane.

Sometime during the mid-1970s, however, this pattern was reversed, and the classes once again began to pull apart socially and spatially. Just as we observe an increase in the concentration of poverty between 1970 and 1990, we also encounter a remarkable increase in the concentration of affluence. The right-hand side of Figure 4 shows P^* isolation indices for affluent persons in the 10 largest metropolitan areas of the United States. This index gives the proportion affluent in the neighborhood of the average affluent person. The figures for 1970 and 1980 come from work I published earlier with Mitchell Eggers (Massey and Eggers 1993); the figure for 1990 was computed especially for this address by Nancy Denton. Following James Smith (1988), I define the affluent as persons living in families whose incomes are at least four times the poverty level for a family of four—about \$54,000 in 1990 dollars.

As Figure 4 clearly shows, affluence is even more highly concentrated spatially than poverty. Whereas the average poor person lived in a neighborhood that was 19% poor in 1970, the typical affluent person lived in a neighborhood that was 39% affluent. In the ensuing years, this already high concentration of affluence became even more intense: The

FIGURE 4. CONCENTRATION OF AFFLUENCE AND POVERTY IN THE 10 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS: UNITED STATES, 1970–1990

isolation index increased to 43 in 1980 and to 52 in 1990. By the beginning of the present decade, in other words, the typical affluent person lived in a neighborhood where more than half the residents were also rich; the outcome was a social environment that was far more homogeneously privileged than at any time in the previous 20 years. In their daily lives, affluent residents of U.S. urban areas were increasingly likely to interact only with other affluent people, and progressively less likely to interact with other classes, especially the poor.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The hallmark of the emerging spatial order of the twenty-first century will be a geographic concentration of affluence and of poverty. Throughout the world, poverty will shift from a rural to an urban base; within urban areas poor people will be confined increasingly to poor neighborhoods, yielding a density of material deprivation that is historically unique and unprecedented. As poverty grows more geographically concentrated over time, its harmful by-products also will become more highly concentrated, intensifying social problems that the affluent will naturally seek to escape. Class segregation will increase, ratcheting up the concentration of affluence and poverty in self-reinforcing fashion.

This new ecological structure stems from deep and powerful forces operating in the world today. Simply put, concentrated poverty follows from any process that gathers poor


people together in space and then impedes their socioeconomic and residential mobility. At the end of the twentieth century, poor people are being assembled geographically through an ongoing process of urbanization that is already well advanced. Their social mobility is blocked by the emergence of a global economic structure characterized by stagnant mean incomes, rising inequality, and growing class rigidity; and their spatial mobility is stymied by a rising tide of class segregation that is exacerbated, in many places, by an ongoing pattern of deliberate racial and ethnic exclusion. Welcome to the new world order.

The Urbanization of Poverty

In a world where the great majority of people live in cities, poverty perforce will be urbanized. Figure 5 shows projected trends in the level of urbanization from 1970 to 2020 in developed regions, developing nations, and the United States (from United Nations 1995). Obviously most inhabitants of developed countries already live in urban areas: The proportion urban in the developed world was 74% in 1990 and is projected to reach 82% by 2020; in the United States the respective figures are 75% and 84%. Therefore, among developed nations, poverty already is highly urbanized, and this concentration will increase slowly but steadily in the coming decades.

The potential for change is considerably greater in the developing world. As late as 1970, only one-quarter of its

FIGURE 5. LEVEL OF URBANIZATION IN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970-2020



population was urban; in 1990 the figure was only 35%. The path of urbanization, however, generally follows a logistic curve, beginning slowly and then accelerating rapidly for a time before leveling off and gradually approaching an upper asymptote (Preston 1979; United Nations 1980). Developing countries are now in that segment of the logistic curve characterized by rapid growth; the percentage urban is projected to rise rapidly in the next two decades, reaching 41% by the turn of the century and 47% in 2010.

Sometime between 2010 and 2020 the developing world as a whole will cross a significant dividing line: For the first time, a majority of its population will live in cities. Because the great majority of these new urbanites will be impoverished by any standard, this event implies that poverty also will become concentrated in urban areas. Therefore, early in the next century, the typical poor citizen of Planet Earth will cease to inhabit a small town or rural village, and instead will live in a large city. Because there is no precedent for a reversal of urbanization once it has begun, the future of human poverty almost certainly lies in cities. Barring a catastrophe that wipes out much of the world's urban population, poverty will become progressively urbanized during the next century, and nobody can do much to change this fundamental fact.


The Return of Inequality

Urbanization stems entirely from rural-urban migration rather than from natural increase within cities (Preston 1979; United Nations 1980). Historically much of this urbanizing population movement was internal, with peasants leaving ru-

ral areas for cities in their own countries, but a substantial part has always been directed to urban destinations overseas. Such was the case in Europe as it underwent development in the nineteenth century (Hatton and Williamson 1994; Nugent 1992); much the same is occurring in developing nations today (Massey 1988).

When they arrived in cities, rural in-migrants of the past took advantage of numerous ladders of mobility to climb out of poverty and into the working, middle, and even upper classes (Alba 1981, 1990; Hutchinson 1956; Lieberman 1980). Through the mid-1970s a pattern of widespread social mobility prevailed for in-migrants to cities, not only in developed countries such as the United States (Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Hauser and Featherman 1977) but also in developing societies such as Mexico (Balán, Browning, and Jelin 1973; Muñoz, Oliveira, and Stern 1977).

In the future, however, poor migrants who arrive in the world's burgeoning metropolises will be more likely to stay poor. Industrial growth and development from 1870 to 1970 produced a wholesale upgrading of the occupational structure to create a diamond-shaped status distribution that supported mass upward mobility, rising income, and declining inequality; in contrast, the postindustrial transformation since 1973 has produced an hourglass economic structure of high-paying jobs for the well-educated, a dwindling number of middle-income jobs for the modestly schooled, and many, many poorly paid jobs for those with little schooling. Such a structure creates few opportunities for mobility and carries great potential for inequality.

FIGURE 6. GINI INDICES FOR INCOME INEQUALITY IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: 1980–1990

We are thus in an era of high and rising inequality (see Braun 1991; Levy 1995; Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Wolff 1995). Figure 6 presents Gini indices measuring income inequality in selected developed nations in 1980 and 1990 (from Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995). During the 1980s, inequality increased most sharply in Anglophone countries such as Australia, Ireland, Britain, and the United States, where the Gini rose from 33 to 36. The index also rose in Scandinavia (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands). Only the relatively poor countries of southern Europe—Italy, Spain, and Portugal, where incomes were lower and inequality was greater to begin with—opposed the trend toward greater inequality. The shifts in Gini coefficients may appear modest, but they conceal a rather profound transformation in underlying economic structure.

The nature of this transformation may be discerned by a closer look at trends in the United States during two contrasting eras: 1949–1969 and 1973–1991. During the earlier period, median family income doubled in real terms; this increase was shared by families throughout the income distribution. When Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk (1995) divided family incomes by the poverty line and observed changes between 1949 and 1969, they found that relative incomes in the bottom quintile increased by 457%, while those in the next lowest quintile increased by 169%. In the two highest quintiles, meanwhile, relative incomes grew respectively by 102% and 93%. Therefore, in the postwar economy that prevailed through the early 1970s, everyone did better—the poor as well as the rich. A rising tide lifted all boats, and

the poverty rate dropped from 40% to 14% while the Gini index fell from 38 to 35 (Levy 1987).

After 1973, however, the median family income stagnated in real terms, ending only 6% higher in 1991. This stagnation in average income was produced by divergent trends at the extremes of the distribution. From 1973 to 1991, relative incomes for families in the two bottom quintiles declined by 19% and 8% respectively, whereas those for families in the two top quintiles increased by 21% and 22% (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995). Rather than a rising tide that lifted all boats, after 1973 Danziger and Gottschalk found uneven tides that elevated the yachts of the rich but beached the dinghies of the poor.

As a result of these contrasting trends, the shape of the income distribution changed gradually. As Martina Morris and her colleagues have shown, the middle categories shrank while the extremes expanded (Morris, Bernhardt, and Handcock 1994). After 1973 the poverty rate stopped falling in the United States, and the Gini index for family income rose from 35 to 40 by 1991 (Levy 1995). This 14% increase in inequality over the course of 18 years wiped out the entire postwar decline, and by 1991 had produced a more skewed distribution of income than existed in 1947!

Similar trends were occurring elsewhere in the developed world. Except for Australia and the United Kingdom, however, they were less dramatic than in the United States (Atkinson et al. 1995). In continental Europe, the new economic order was expressed more strongly as stagnating employment than as a decline in real wages. Income inequality rose slightly in European countries during the 1970s and

1980s, but unemployment increased fivefold between 1973 and 1985 (Krugman 1994). Despite population growth, European employment fell in absolute terms between 1973 and 1985, yielding a jobless rate whose degree and permanence were unprecedented in the postwar era.

It is much more difficult to make factual statements about trends in inequality in developing countries. Certainly in Mexico, the one developing country I know well, prospects for socioeconomic mobility seem bleak. From 1980 to 1989, the real minimum wage declined by 47%, GDP per capita declined by 9%, and the percentage of families earning less than twice the minimum wage, a rough indicator of poverty, rose to include 60% of the population (Sheahan 1991). According to conservative estimates, 48% of all Mexicans lived in poverty by 1989 (Escobar Latapí 1996); by 1996 Mexican wages had lost 68% of their 1982 value (Equipo Pueblo 1996). Over the course of the 1980s, Mexico's standard of living fell to levels last seen in the 1960s. In just five years, from 1984 to 1989, income inequality increased enough to cancel out half of the decline achieved over the two previous decades (Cortés and Rubalcava 1992); it would have increased even more if not for the massive entry of additional household workers into the informal workforce (Cortés 1994; González de la Rocha 1986). Rates of occupational mobility increased during the 1980s, but most of the movement was downward (Escobar Latapí 1995).

Therefore, whether they stay in Mexico or come to the United States, therefore, poor Mexicans migrating from rural communities will face dim prospects for social mobility wherever they go, be it Los Angeles or Guadalajara. On both sides of the border, rural-urban migrants will confront a socioeconomic structure that offers few ladders of mobility, little access to high-wage employment, and, for those without education, the strong possibility of an enduring place at the bottom of the income distribution.

These trends are not likely to moderate soon. Although the causes of the new inequality are under debate, my own reading of the literature suggests that the transformation stems from three broad, interrelated trends that are rooted deeply in the postindustrial economic order: the computerization of production, the globalization of capital and labor markets, and the fragmentation of consumer markets.

The cybernetic revolution has profoundly altered the nature and the social organization of human production. During the 1970s and early 1980s, computerization swept through manufacturing. Older manufacturing plants that employed thousands of well-paid, unionized workers were replaced by new, capital-intensive facilities where a few workers operated mechanized, continuous-flow production lines controlled by computers and staffed by robots. Manufacturing productivity soared, and those plants that could not compete either closed their doors or relocated to low-wage areas overseas. Employment in manufacturing plummeted, especially in older urban areas (Kasarda 1995); as manufacturing employment dwindled, so did union membership. Between 1969 and 1989 the share of nonagricultural workers in unions dropped from 29% to 16%; in the private sector the level of

unionization reached 12%, a figure last seen in the 1920s (Freeman 1993).

While manufacturing bore the brunt of the cybernetics revolution during the 1970s and early 1980s, the moment of truth came for the service sector during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Large bureaucratic organizations loaded with mid-level white-collar workers gave way to reengineered, downsized, and flattened organizations that were "lean and mean" (Harrison 1995).

Making use of new, ultrafast computer chips and fiber optics, programmers wrote software that routinized human expertise within canned algorithms that had user-friendly interfaces. Armed with these new cybernetic tools, one modestly trained operative could perform all of the tasks formerly carried out by scores of expensive white-collar workers, often in a fraction of the time. During the 1990s, the gray flannel suit gave way to the pink slip as corporations shed mid-level bureaucrats by the thousands (Harrison 1995; Rifkin 1995).

While computers were transforming productivity in manufacturing and services, they were also facilitating a revolution in the geographic reach of factor markets. Over the past two decades markets for capital and labor have globalized, causing a worldwide competition for funds and workers. Capital now roams the world incessantly, seeking companies and countries that offer high returns and low risks, while labor finds itself in a global hiring hall where high-wage workers in developed nations compete directly with millions of desperately poor workers throughout the developing world.

This globalization of factor markets was facilitated by the rising speed of communications, the declining costs of transportation, the increasing ease of international movement, the growing prevalence of smaller and lighter consumer products, and the rising importance of knowledge in the productive process. If the owners of capital find more attractive prospects in one venue, or dislike developments in another, they can shift billions of dollars across international borders in a nanosecond, as Mexico learned to its dismay in December 1994. Likewise, if producers based in developed nations need to reduce their labor costs, they can easily relocate factories to low-wage areas overseas, or they can simply wait for immigrants from these areas to appear at their factory gates.

The third development of the postindustrial era has been the fragmentation of consumer markets. From 1870 to 1970, nations in general and the United States in particular prospered because companies were able to manufacture standardized goods and sell them to a growing mass market of middle-class consumers who exhibited similar needs and tastes. Products became more affordable because economies of scale reduced their price; consumer markets grew because mass production required armies of well-paid, unionized workers to staff the manufacturing apparatus and legions of salaried white-collar workers to administer it (Maddrick 1995; Rifkin 1995).

Since 1970, international competition, technological innovation, and demographic shifts have fragmented these

mass markets. In response, firms have developed new strategies to cater to small, specialized market niches that rely on new techniques of flexible production, just-in-time delivery, outsourcing, and continuous-flow production. Under the old industrial regime, companies were large, hierarchies were deep, authority was rigid, markets were massive and homogeneous, and firms were slow to respond to shifts in consumer demand. In the new postindustrial order, companies are lean, hierarchies are flattened, authority is flexible, markets are fragmented and diverse, and successful firms move quickly to anticipate shifting demand. The end result is a further segmentation of labor markets in developed countries and additional downward pressure on salaries and wages (Harrison 1995).

The forces of computerization, globalization, and fragmentation have operated simultaneously over the past two decades in mutually reinforcing fashion; it is fruitless to ask which came first or which is most important. Rather, the three processes have fed off one another to cause a marked and seemingly permanent change in the economic structure of nations and the world.

The abruptness of the discontinuity is suggested by the disappearance of numerous well-established empirical regularities that characterized economic life in the United States through 1970. In contrast to the industrial regime of the past, wages in the new postindustrial economy are not related to trends in productivity; poverty is not correlated with the business cycle; corporate pay is not tied to the company's profitability; and there is no longer an association between workers' wages and managers' salaries (Krugman 1995; Maddrick 1995).

That something profound has happened is obvious from a simple recitation of the titles of books that I read in preparing this address: *The End of Affluence* (Maddrick 1995), *The End of Equality* (Kaus 1992), *The End of Work* (Rifkin 1995), *The Jobless Future* (Aronowitz and DiFazio 1994), *The Age of Diminished Expectations* (Krugman 1994), *Understanding American Economic Decline* (Bernstein and Adler 1994), *America Unequal* (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995), *The Winner-Take-All Society* (Frank and Cook 1995), *Revolt of the Elites* (Lasch 1995), and *The Next American Nation* (Lind 1995).

Clearly we are in a new era, and there is no going back. Computers cannot be disinvented; instantaneous telecommunications cannot be undone; transportation cannot become slower and more expensive; the globalization of factor markets will not be reversed; and the homogeneous mass consumer markets of the postwar era will not return soon. If anything, the pace of technological change will quicken to reinforce the structural changes that have already occurred. The age of economic inequality is upon us.

Class Segregation

Not only have the rich and the poor been pulling apart economically through a transformation of the income distribution; since 1970 they have also been separating spatially through a resurgence of class segregation. In the United

States, the geographic barriers between rich and poor have increased steadily, resulting in a significant rise in residential segregation by income, as shown in Figure 7.

The left-hand bars show the degree of residential dissimilarity between poor and nonpoor persons in 1970, 1980, and 1990 in the 10 largest metropolitan areas of the United States (from Abramson et al. 1995). The middle bars show the extent of residential dissimilarity between affluent and poor families; figures for 1970 and 1980 come from Massey and Eggers (1993), and those for 1990 from Nancy Denton. Both series reveal a steady rise in the degree of segregation between the haves and the have-nots in U.S. society. The poor-nonpoor index rose from 37 in 1970 to 40 in 1980 to 41 in 1990, while the poor-affluent index rose from 49 to 52 to 56 over the same period.


In a forthcoming paper, Paul Jargowsky shows that the use of dissimilarity indices to measure class segregation confounds changes in the spatial distribution of income groups with changes in the shape of the income distribution itself, thereby understating the degree of class segregation. To control for this bias, he proposes an alternative "class sorting index" based on the correlation ratio, which I present on the right-hand side of Figure 7.

This index increases from 37 to 45 between 1970 and 1990, a confirmation that earlier trends based on the index of dissimilarity were not merely methodological artifacts. Detailed analyses conducted by Jargowsky and by Abramson et al. show that increasing class segregation was remarkably widespread among regions and population groups. Whether one looks south, north, east, or west, or at whites, blacks, Hispanics, or Asians, America became a more class-segregated society during the 1970s and 1980s (Abramson et al. 1995; Jargowsky forthcoming).

Because of an absence of data, once again it is difficult to assess whether comparable trends are occurring elsewhere in the developed world, or whether U.S. trends can be generalized to developing regions. I suspect that I would detect similar trends elsewhere if I had the requisite ecological data, although perhaps the trends would be less striking than in the United States. Certainly in Mexico, the evidence suggests a long-standing pattern of residential segregation between high- and low-income groups in metropolitan areas, an ecological gulf that widened significantly during the 1980s (see Alegría 1994; Delgado 1990; Rubalcava and Schteingart 1985; Walton 1978).

Racial and Ethnic Segregation

Given a high and rising level of urbanization, growing income inequality, and rising class segregation, an increase in the geographic concentration of affluence and poverty is all but inevitable. These spatial processes are magnified, however, when they occur in a group that is also segregated on the basis of an ascribed characteristic such as race; and no feature of our national life has proved to be as enduring as the residential color line separating black from white America (Massey forthcoming). Because of a history of discrimination in the real estate and banking industries, the persistence

FIGURE 7. MEASURES OF INCOME SEGREGATION IN THE 10 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS: UNITED STATES, 1970–1990

of white racial prejudice, and a legacy of racially biased public policies, blacks continue to be the most residentially segregated group in the United States (Farley and Frey 1994; Massey and Denton 1993).

As a result, when black poverty rates rose during the 1970s and 1980s, the increased poverty was absorbed by a small set of racially homogeneous, geographically isolated, densely settled neighborhoods packed tightly around the urban core; and because class segregation was increasing as well (see Jargowsky forthcoming), a disproportionate share of the economic pain was absorbed by neighborhoods that were not only black but also poor. As a result, broader trends toward income inequality and class segregation in the United States isolated poor blacks far more severely than poor whites.

By 1990, according to John Kasarda (1993), 41% of poor blacks in U.S. central cities lived in poor neighborhoods, and 42% lived in very poor neighborhoods, figures well above the comparable levels for whites (32% and 11% respectively). Computations performed by Lauren Krivo and colleagues (1996) show that the extent of poverty concentration was 50% higher among central-city blacks in 1990 than among central-city whites (with an isolation index of 32 for the former and 21 for the latter).


Focusing on central cities, however, understates the black-white contrast. When Mitchell Eggers, Andrew Gross, and I examined the 50 largest metropolitan areas in 1980, we found that 64% of poor blacks lived in neighborhoods with a poverty rate over 20%, compared with just 13% of poor whites (Massey, Gross, and Eggers 1991). The isola-

tion indices we computed revealed that the level of poverty concentration for poor blacks was four times that of poor whites.

To a great extent, then, increases in the concentration of poverty observed during the 1970s and 1980s in U.S. urban areas reflect rising inequality caused by racial rather than class segregation. At any given level of income segregation, poverty is concentrated most strongly in cities that are also racially segregated; and when for the degree of class segregation is controlled, racial segregation exerts a powerful independent effect on the extent of poverty concentration (Massey and Eggers 1993). Were black-white segregation to be eliminated, a principal force behind the spatial concentration of poverty in the United States would disappear.

Unfortunately, although Reynolds Farley and William Frey (1994) have detected "small steps toward an integrated society," we are not yet able to debate whether the glass is half empty or half full. At this point the glass is about 80% empty and 20% full. Figure 8 presents black isolation indices and black-white dissimilarity indices for 1970, 1980, and 1990 in the 30 U.S. metropolitan areas with the largest black populations. Although black-white dissimilarity declined by 10% in the two decades after 1970, it still stood at a remarkable 73 in 1990. This figure is higher than even the most extreme scores observed for other groups, such as Hispanics and Asians (Farley and Frey 1994).

A glance at the isolation indices yields an even more pessimistic picture: During the 1980s the small declines of the 1970s were arrested and reversed. Over the 20-year period, average black isolation decreased from 69 to 65 and

FIGURE 8. BLACK SEGREGATION IN THE 30 U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS: 1970–1990

then rose again to 67. The sad fact is that African Americans were virtually as isolated in 1990 as on the day when Congress passed the Fair Housing Act in 1968.

As if these patterns were not enough, the numbers are even more disturbing in one set of metropolitan areas. On the basis of an analysis of 1980 data, Nancy Denton and I coined the term *hypersegregation* to describe places where blacks were highly segregated on multiple geographic dimensions simultaneously (Massey and Denton 1989). Nancy has reexamined the issue using 1990 data and has found that black hypersegregation not only continues, but in many ways it has grown worse (Denton 1994). Of the 16 metropolitan areas defined as hypersegregated in 1980, 14 met the technical criteria again in 1990. The two areas that missed the threshold did so by a trivial amount, and all areas that were hypersegregated in 1980 showed an increase on at least one dimension of segregation by 1990.

Thus, metropolitan areas that were hypersegregated in 1980 generally remained so in 1990, and we found little trend away from this extreme pattern of racial isolation. On the contrary, hypersegregation spread to new urban areas during the 1980s. Of the 44 nonhypersegregated metropolitan areas that Nancy and I examined in 1980, six met the criteria in 1990, bringing the total number to 20. Taken together, these areas contain 11 million African Americans, who together constitute 36% of the black population of the United States.

Thus it is quite clear that racial segregation will not disappear from U.S. urban areas soon, and that its poverty-concentrating effects will be with us for the foreseeable future. Although trends in racial and ethnic segregation are documented less clearly in other countries, we know that racial and ethnic minorities are rapidly growing throughout Europe, Australia, and Japan as a result of international migration (Stalker 1994), and that these growing populations have aroused racist sentiments in many countries. Insofar as these sentiments are translated into residential segregation, broader trends toward concentrated affluence and poverty will be exacerbated.

THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF INEQUALITY

Unless there is a radical departure from recent trends, poverty and affluence are almost certain to become geographically concentrated at high levels throughout the world early in the next century. Increasingly the poor and the rich will inhabit large urban areas, and within these places they will concentrate in separate neighborhoods. This ecological structure constitutes a radical departure from the past, and creates the potential for a new geopolitical order capable of compounding the benefits and liabilities of class by superimposing administrative segmentation on economic segregation.

Whether or not this potential is realized depends on how political districts are constructed. Insofar as the boundaries of local governmental units can be arranged to approximate

the geographic contours of concentrated affluence and poverty, and insofar as the financing and delivery of public services can be shifted down the political hierarchy, the potential for reinforcing class advantages and disadvantages will be maximized.

In a society where most people live in small towns and villages, rich and poor families must mix socially, share the same public services, and inhabit the same political units. In such a geopolitical structure, the poor benefit from public institutions to which the rich are committed by reason of self-interest. When poverty and affluence become urbanized and geographically concentrated, however, the affluent acquire a means to separate themselves politically from the poor through the judicious drawing of political lines in space. If they can create separate governmental and administrative districts that encompass concentrations of poverty, and if they can force these poor districts to supply and pay for their own services, then the affluent will be able to insulate themselves from the economic costs imposed on society by the poor.

In the United States, the poor are isolated politically by the segmentation of metropolitan regions into a patchwork of separate municipalities. The concentration of affluence in certain suburbs generates high real estate values that allow the affluent to tax themselves at low rates while offering generous, even lavish municipal services. The concentration of poverty in central cities and some inner suburbs generates a high demand for services but yields low property values; thus, higher tax rates are required to support generally inferior services. The end result is a vicious cycle whereby city taxes are raised to maintain deficient services; consequently families with means are driven out; property values then decline further; the result is more tax increases and additional middle-class flight, which further exacerbate the concentration of poverty.

Under an ecological regime of concentrated affluence and poverty, efforts to decentralize government and shift the financing and provision of services to local government represent a means of enhancing the social and economic well-being of the rich at the expense of the poor. Political decentralization is progressive and democratic only in a world where all classes live together in small communities; this antiquated model of society no longer prevails, however, although it appears frequently in the writings of conservative thinkers (see Herrnstein and Murray 1994). In today's world of dense, urban agglomerations characterized by pronounced income inequality and increasing class segregation, political decentralization is punitive and regressive, forcing the poor to bear most of the cost of their own disadvantage. In a world of small towns and modest communities, political decentralization yields the social world of Andy Hardy; in a class-segregated world of large urban areas it produces the bleak vision of the *Blade Runner*.

Many mechanisms compound class advantages and disadvantages in the new ecology of inequality, but perhaps the most significant occurs through schools. Education is the most important single resource presently traded on global la-

bor markets: In recent years workers with college and postgraduate degrees have seen their earnings rise, while high school graduates' and dropouts' wages have fallen. Access to high-quality education thus has become the crucial factor determining one's position in the postindustrial pecking order.

Because the emerging ecological structure concentrates the best-prepared students in areas of resource abundance while gathering the least well-prepared students in areas of resource scarcity, it necessarily exacerbates class inequities and promotes a more rigid stratification of society. Students from low-income families with poorly educated parents, little experience with books or reading, and multiple social problems attend schools with the fewest resources to help them learn, while students from affluent families with well-educated parents, extensive experience with books and reading, and few social problems attend well-funded schools that are most able to promote learning. The spatial concentration of affluence and poverty thus raises the odds that affluent children will receive a superior education while poor children will get inferior schooling.

THE CULTURAL ECOLOGY OF INEQUALITY

Until recently, poverty, though endemic, was spread uniformly in space and rarely occurred at high densities. Most impoverished families lived in small rural communities where the range of material well-being was limited. The few affluent families that were present locally were not especially affluent, and they tended to be closely related to others in the community. Truly wealthy families in the governing elite lived far away; the prevalent atmosphere in most places was one of collective poverty and shared deprivation.

In such settings, proclivities toward violence, crime, and other maladies exacerbated by material deprivation could be held in check by informal means. In small rural communities, as generations of cultural anthropologists have shown, everyone knows everyone else, either directly through personal experience or indirectly through ties of kinship or friendship. Through social networks, rewards and punishments are meted out to reinforce and maintain accepted standards of behavior. Age-old devices such as gossip, ridicule, shame, and ostracism, backed occasionally by physical discipline, are employed to punish public departures from accepted behavior, whereas praise, esteem, and prestige are accorded to those who conform (see Foster 1967; Lewis 1951).

As observed by theorists from Emile Durkheim ([1893] 1933) to Edward Banfield (1967), these informal mechanisms of social control which prevail in small towns and villages produce a repressive moral code that preserves public order and maintains social stability at the cost of individuality, innovation, and change. Louis Wirth, however, noted in his classic 1938 essay that these informal mechanisms break down in large, densely settled, and diverse urban populations. Great size confers anonymity and a certain immunity from social interference by friends and relatives. In a city, rural migrants are freed from the constraints of tradition to pursue their own individual interests and tastes, conducting

activities that might have been discouraged or even punished in their communities of origin.

Wirth was disturbed by the implications of urbanism; he viewed it as breeding impersonality, isolation, alienation, anomie, and a proliferation of vice and deviance, a collection of maladies he generically labeled *urban malaise*. Certainly there was plenty of malaise in his own time and place, Chicago in the 1930s, which by any standard exhibited high rates of violence, alcoholism, prostitution, drug abuse, and intergroup conflict. All of this was documented extensively by Wirth's students and colleagues at the University of Chicago.

In subsequent years, however, key postulates of Wirth's theory were not sustained by research, and his ideas fell into disrepute. Although correlations between urbanism and various forms of social deviance endured over time, urban sociologists such as Claude Fischer (1982) did not find that urban dwellers were isolated, alienated, or anomic. Indeed, inhabitants of large cities were connected to other people just as fully as inhabitants of small towns. Although the networks they built were composed more of friends than of family, their social circles were about the same size and they were just as satisfied with their lives.

It is clear that Wirth failed because he looked at the social world of Chicago in the 1930s and made the wrong inference. He saw high rates of unconventional and antisocial behavior, and attributed these outcomes to urbanism. I believe that what he actually saw in depression-era Chicago were the consequences of concentrated poverty. Louis Wirth was the first social scientist to note a connection between the geographic concentration of poverty and the proliferation of socially destructive behavior, although he didn't quite recognize it at the time.

The social malaise observed by Wirth did not stem from urbanism per se, but from the concentration of poverty during the Great Depression. A few years after Wirth wrote his essay, St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton (1945) published a map showing the percentage of families on relief in various Chicago neighborhoods in 1934. This map is almost identical to a map published 40 years later by William Julius Wilson (1987). In the 1980s, as in the 1930s, the spatial concentration of material deprivation stemmed from the same underlying causes: rising income inequality and growing class segregation amplified by racial segregation.

Drake and Cayton's maps clearly revealed the close connection between high concentrations of poverty and various social problems such as unwed childbearing, delinquency, and disease. The importance of these empirical connections was soon forgotten, however, as mass socioeconomic and residential mobility during the 1950s and 1960s weakened the ecological correlations underlying Wirth's theory and discredited his ideas. A series of detailed ethnographic studies also showed that poor urbanites were anything but socially disengaged and alienated (see Gans 1962; Stack 1974; Suttles 1968; Whyte 1955).

In 1975 Claude Fischer proposed a theory to account for the connection between urbanism and unconventionality

without resorting to concepts such as alienation, anomie, and malaise. His analysis provides a way of understanding the cultural consequences of concentrated affluence and poverty. In essence, Fischer argued that cities create fertile conditions for the emergence and perpetuation of urban subcultures. Under conditions of geographic concentration, subcultures emerge and intensify to produce high rates of unconventional behavior. Apparent deviance within cities occurs not because urbanites are alienated or anomic, but because they are deeply embedded in intense, socially cohesive subcultures that sustain and reinforce attitudes and behaviors which the wider public finds exotic, foreign, or deviant.

According to Fischer (1995:549), "subcultural theory seems really to be a theory of *group concentration*...[and] subcultural processes are revealed to be fundamentally about *intragroup accessibility*. Spatial agglomeration is...one way group members gain access to one another [and] in the end, [it]...is largely about the ability of subcultural members to communicate, to create 'moral density'...it is not necessarily about *cities per se*" (emphasis in original). The geographic agglomeration, through urbanization, of people with similar traits gives rise to distinct subcultures that reflect the characteristics of the people who are concentrated in space.

In this sense, the advent of geographically concentrated affluence and poverty as the dominant spatial structure of the twenty-first century has profound implications for the nature of social life. Not only will the informal means by which past societies preserved public order break down and ultimately disappear under the onslaught of urbanization; they will be replaced by new cultural forms rooted in the ecological order of concentrated affluence and poverty.

Just as poverty is concentrated spatially, anything correlated with poverty is also concentrated. Therefore, as the density of poverty increases in cities throughout the world, so will the density of joblessness, crime, family dissolution, drug abuse, alcoholism, disease, and violence. Not only will the poor have to grapple with the manifold problems due to their own lack of income; increasingly they also will have to confront the social effects of living in an environment where most of their neighbors are also poor. At the same time, the concentration of affluence will create a social environment for the rich that is opposite in every respect from that of the poor. The affluent will experience the personal benefits of high income; in addition, they will profit increasingly from the fact that most of their neighbors possess these advantages as well.

Therefore, in the emerging ecology of inequality, the social worlds of the poor and the rich will diverge to yield distinct, opposing subcultures. Among those at the low end of the income distribution, the spatial concentration of poverty will create a harsh and destructive environment perpetuating values, attitudes, and behaviors that are adaptive within a geographic niche of intense poverty but harmful to society at large and destructive of the poor themselves. At the other end of the hierarchy, a contrasting subculture of privilege will emerge from the spatial niche of concentrated affluence

to confer additional advantages on the rich, thereby consolidating their social and economic dominance.

Perhaps no consequence of concentrated poverty is as destructive as the proliferation of crime and violence. Criminal behavior is associated strongly with income deprivation; thus the geographic concentration of poverty will cause a concentration of criminal violence in poor neighborhoods (Massey, Condran, and Denton 1987). According to estimates I developed for Philadelphia, every one-point increase in the neighborhood poverty rate raises the major crime rate by 0.8 point (Massey 1990, 1995). Krivo and Peterson (forthcoming) use data from Columbus, Ohio to show that moving from a neighborhood where the poverty rate is under 20% to a neighborhood where it is over 40% increases the rate of violent crime more than threefold, from around 7 per thousand to about 23 per thousand.

How will the poor adapt to an environment where violence is endemic and the risk of victimization great? At the individual level, a logical adaptation is to become violent oneself. As my colleague Elijah Anderson (1994) has discovered through his ethnographic fieldwork, one can deter potential criminals and increase the odds of survival by adopting a threatening demeanor, cultivating a reputation for the use of force, and backing that reputation with selective violence. In a social world characterized by endemic violence, an obsessive concern with respect becomes a viable adaptive strategy (Bourgois 1995).

Therefore, given the progressive concentration of violence, some poor people certainly will adopt violent attitudes and behavior as survival strategies. As more people adopt more violent strategies for self-preservation, the average level of violence in poor neighborhoods will rise, leading others to adopt still more violent behavior. As the average level of violence rises over time, more people will adopt increasingly violent strategies to protect themselves from the growing threat of victimization, and ultimately will produce a self-perpetuating upward spiral of violence.

The fundamental need to adapt to structurally embedded conditions of endemic violence leads to the emergence of a "code of the streets" that encourages and promotes the use of force. Asking residents of poor neighborhoods to choose a less violent path or to "just say no" to the temptation of violence is absurd in view of the threatening character of the ecological niche they inhabit. To survive in such areas, one must learn and (to a significant extent) internalize the code of violence described by Anderson. In this way, aggression is passed from person to person in a self-feeding, escalating fashion.

Recent brain research suggests that this internalization of violence is more than a socially learned reaction that one can set aside whenever the situation warrants. Repeated exposure to high levels of danger and physical violence wire emotional predispositions to rage and violence directly into the brain and make them an organic part of a person's makeup. Research has shown that perceptions of danger are channeled directly to a small mass of neural cells known as the amygdala, which sits above the brain stem near the bot-

tom of the limbic ring (Goleman 1995). The amygdala is capable of generating an emotional response that triggers aggressive, violent behavior without passing through the neocortex, the center of rational thought (LeDoux 1986).

Emotional responses developed through the limbic system are learned, but they are unconscious and automatic. Perceptions of danger may be signaled not only by physical threats but also by symbolic injuries to self-esteem or dignity (Goleman 1995). The threat triggers the amygdala to produce a limbic surge, which releases catecholamines to generate a quick rush of energy lasting minutes. At the same time, the amygdala activates the adrenocortical system to produce a general state of readiness that lasts for hours or even days. Adrenocortical arousal, in turn, lowers the subsequent threshold for anger and increases the intensity of emotions, raising the odds that the rational centers of the brain will be overwhelmed by powerful emotions beyond the control of the neocortex.

By dramatically increasing the exposure of the poor to violence from a very early age (see Ousseimi 1995), the new ecological order will maximize the number of people with hair-trigger tempers and elevated predispositions to violence. These emotional reactions, moreover, will not be turned on and off easily and rationally in response to shifting social contexts. People who grow up in areas of concentrated poverty and violence will experience profound spillover effects in other areas of life: Disagreements with bosses, spouses, and children will be more likely to turn violent, and thus the odds of successful employment, marriage, and childrearing will be diminished. Concentrated poverty is a stronger predictor of violent crime than of property crime, and of violence between people known to one another than between strangers (Krivo and Peterson forthcoming; Miles-Doan and Kelly 1996).

The contrasting ecologies of affluence and poverty will also breed opposing peer subcultures among rich and poor youths. As affluence grows more concentrated, the children of the privileged will socialize increasingly with other children of well-educated and successful parents. Knowledge of what one does to prepare for college and an appreciation of the connection between schooling and socioeconomic success will be widespread in the schools of the affluent. Students will arrive in the classroom well prepared and ready to learn. School officials need only build on this base of knowledge and motivation by using their ample resources to hire well-informed guidance counselors and enthusiastic, talented teachers.

Meanwhile, the children of the poor increasingly will attend schools with children from other poor families, who themselves are beset by multiple difficulties stemming from a lack of income. Parents will be poorly educated and will lack adequate knowledge about how to prepare for college. Children will not fully appreciate the connection between education and later success. Supervision and monitoring of students will be difficult because so many come from single-parent families, and the schools will be unable to offset this deficit because of funding limitations. Students will arrive in

the classroom poorly prepared, and neither the dispirited guidance counselors nor the overworked, underpaid teachers will expect much from the students.

In such settings an alternative status system is almost certain to develop. Under circumstances where it is difficult to succeed according to conventional standards, the usual criteria for success typically are inverted to create an oppositional identity (Ogbu, 1978, 1983). Children formulate oppositional identities to preserve self-esteem when expectations are low and when failure by conventional standards is likely. Thus, in areas of concentrated poverty, students from poor families will legitimize their educational failures by attaching positive value and meaning to outcomes that affluent children label deviant and unworthy. In adapting to the environment created by concentrated poverty, success in school will be devalued, hard work will be regarded as selling out, and any display of learning will be viewed as uncool.

Oppositional subcultures already have become entrenched in many black inner-city areas of the United States, where high levels of racial segregation have produced unusually high concentrations of poverty and educational distress (Fordham and Ogbu 1986). Once such a subculture becomes established, it acquires a life of its own that contributes independently to the perpetuation of educational failure, the reproduction of poverty, and the cultural transmission of low socioeconomic status from person to person, family to family, and group to group (see Anderson 1990; Portes 1995).

INTO THE AGE OF EXTREMES

Thus a new age of extremes is upon us. In the social ecology now being created around the globe, affluent people increasingly will live and interact with other affluent people, while the poor increasingly will live and interact with other poor people. The social worlds of the rich and the poor will diverge, creating the potential for radical differences in thought, action, values, tastes, and feelings, and for the construction of a new political geography that divorces the interests of the rich from the welfare of the poor. For the first time in human history, the advantages and disadvantages of one's class position in society will be compounded and reinforced by a systematic process of geographic concentration.

I have tried to present my arguments at a general level, describing the forces that produce geographically concentrated affluence and poverty and outlining the consequences of these trends without reference to a specific racial or ethnic group. I believe that social scientists in the United States have focused too narrowly on the problems of African Americans in urban ghettos, and thus have mistakenly racialized processes that are much broader and more general than most observers realize.

The effects of ongoing urbanization, rising income inequality, and growing class segregation are exacerbated by racial segregation so that the effects are most salient and most visible among African Americans, but the basic processes are sweeping the world and concentrating poverty everywhere. In presenting the arguments at a general level, I

seek to create a theoretical link between violence in Harlem and disorder in the slums of Rio and Mexico City, between social breakdown on the South Side of Chicago and the collapse of authority in rapidly urbanizing societies of Africa. In my view, the spatial concentration of poverty is implicated in the escalation of crime, disease, family breakdown, and the proliferation of various social pathologies throughout the world.

I also believe that social scientists' attention of has concentrated too narrowly on the poor and their neighborhoods. Our obsessive interest in the generation and reproduction of class is rarely focused on the affluent. Scores of ethnographers descend on the homes, bars, and street corners of the poor to chronicle their attitudes and behavior; few attempt to infiltrate the mansions, clubs, and boutiques of the wealthy to document the means by which they maintain and reproduce their affluence. The concentration of affluence and poverty means that the social lives of the rich and the poor increasingly will transpire in different venues; we must study both in order to fully comprehend the newly emerged system of stratification.

Although I have sketched a few of the ecological mechanisms by which inequality will be created and reproduced in the postindustrial society of the twenty-first century, my list is not exhaustive. A great deal remains to be said, written, and researched. Although limitations of time and space do not permit me to go into detail, I believe that the concentration of poverty is a primary force behind the spread of new diseases such as AIDS and the resurgence of old ones such as tuberculosis (see Garrett 1994; Gould 1993; Wallace and Wallace 1995); it also stands behind the creation and perpetuation of joblessness and the decline of marriage among the poor (Kriwo et al. 1996; Massey and Shibuya 1995; Wilson 1987). It is implicated as well in the increase in unwed childbearing (Massey and Shibuya 1995), and I believe it contributes to the spread of homelessness around the United States and the world. No doubt concentrated poverty also can be implicated in a variety of other social and economic phenomena in ways that have yet to be discovered.

Although I have attempted to explain how our social world has been transformed by the forces of spatial redistribution, it is more difficult to describe how the harmful social consequences of this transformation might be avoided. Confronting the new ecology of inequality is particularly difficult because concentrated poverty creates an unstable and unattractive social environment that is at once a cause and a consequence of class segregation. The social chaos stemming from concentrated poverty propels the affluent further into geographic and social withdrawal, and their departure further isolates the poor and stokes the fires of social disorder. Insofar as racial and ethnic segregation perpetuate concentrated poverty and its consequences in minority communities, the proliferation of antisocial behaviors will fuel pejorative stereotypes and intensify prejudice, making political solutions so much more difficult.

How does the future look to me? Bleak, because I know that it is in the elite's narrow self-interest to perpetuate the

status quo. Addressing serious issues such as increasing income inequality, growing class segregation, racial prejudice, and the geographic concentration of poverty will inevitably require sacrifice, and the immediate course of least resistance for affluent people will always be to raise the walls of social, economic, and geographic segregation higher in order to protect themselves from the rising tide of social pathology and violence.

If the status quo indeed is the most likely outcome, inequality will continue to increase and racial divisions will grow, creating a volatile and unstable political economy. As class tensions rise, urban areas will experience escalating crime and violence punctuated by sporadic riots and increased terrorism as class tensions rise. The poor will become disenfranchised and alienated from mainstream political and economic institutions, while the middle classes will grow more angry, more frustrated, and more politically mobilized. The affluent will continue to withdraw socially and spatially from the rest of society, and will seek to placate the middle classes' anger with quick fixes and demagogic excesses that do not change the underlying structure responsible for their problems.

This scenario is by no means inevitable, and I sincerely hope it will not come to pass. Yet we are headed in this direction unless self-conscious actions are taken to change course. A principal motivation for my pessimistic candor and perhaps overly brutal frankness is to galvanize colleagues, students, politicians, and reporters into action. Until now, neither the nature of the new ecological order nor its social implications have been fully realized; my purpose here is not to offer facile solutions to difficult problems, but to begin a process of serious thought, reflection, and debate on the new ecology of inequality, from which solutions ultimately may emerge. Until we begin to face up to the reality of rising inequality and its geographic expression, no solution will be possible.

REFERENCES

- Abramson, A.J., M.S. Tobin, and M.R. VanderGoot. 1995. "The Changing Geography of Metropolitan Opportunity: The Segregation of the Poor in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1970-1990." *Housing Policy Debate* 6:45-72.
- Alba, R.D. 1981. "The Twilight of Ethnicity among American Catholics of European Ancestry." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 454:86-97.
- . 1990. *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White Identity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Alegría, T. 1994. "Segregación Socioespacial Urbana: El Ejemplo de Tijuana." *Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos* 9:411-28.
- Anderson, E. 1990. *Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1994. "The Code of the Streets." *Atlantic Monthly* 273(3): 80-94.
- Aronowitz, S. and W. DiFazio. 1994. *The Jobless Future: Sci-Tech and the Dogma of Work*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Atkinson, A.B., L. Rainwater, and T.M. Smeeding. 1995. *Income Distribution in OECD Countries: Evidence from the Luxembourg Income Study*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Balán, J., H.L. Browning, and E. Jelin. 1973. *Men in a Developing Society: Geographic and Social Mobility in Monterrey, Mexico*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Banfield, E.C. 1967. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Bernstein, M.A. and D.E. Adler. 1994. *Understanding American Economic Decline*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Blau, P.M. and O.D. Duncan. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure*. New York: Free Press.
- Bourgois, P. 1995. *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Braun, D. 1991. *The Rich Get Richer: The Rise of Income Inequality in the United States and the World*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Burgess, E.W. 1925. "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project." Pp. 47-62 in *The City*, edited by R.E. Park and E.W. Burgess. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Cortés, F. 1994. "La Evolución de la Desigualdad del Ingreso Familiar Durante la Década de los Ochenta." Unpublished manuscript, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos, El Colegio de México.
- Cortés, F. and R.M. Rubalcava. 1992. "El Ingreso Familiar: Su Distribución y Desigualdad 1984-1989." *Demos: Carta Demográfica sobre México* 5:28-30.
- Danziger, S. and P. Gottschalk. 1995. *America Unequal*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Delgado, J. 1990. "De los Anillos de la Segregación: La Ciudad de México 1950-1987." *Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos* 5:237-74.
- Denton, N.A. 1994. "Are African Americans Still Hypersegregated?" Pp. 49-81 in *Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy*, edited by R.D. Bullard, J.E. Grigsby III, and C. Lee. Los Angeles: CAAS Publications, University of California.
- Drake, St.C. and H.R. Cayton. 1945. *Black Metropolis: A Study of Life in a Northern City*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Durkheim, E. [1893]1933. *The Division of Labor in Society*, translated by G. Simpson. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Equipo Pueblo. 1996. "Salaries Continue to Plummet." *Mexico Update* 69, April 23, p. 1.
- Escobar Latapí, A. 1995. "Movilidad, Reestructuración, y Clase Social en México: El Caso de Guadalajara." *Estudios Sociológicos* 13:231-60.
- . 1996. "Mexico: Poverty as Politics and Academic Disciplines." Pp. 539-66 in *Poverty: A Global Review*, edited by E. Oyen, S.M. Miller, and S.A. Samad. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- Farley, R. and W.H. Frey. 1994. "Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks during the 1980s: Small Steps toward a More Integrated Society." *American Sociological Review* 59:23-45.
- Featherman, D. and R.M. Hauser. 1978. *Opportunity and Change*. New York: Academic Press.
- Fischer, C.S. 1975. "Toward a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism." *American Journal of Sociology* 80:1319-41.
- . 1982. *To Dwell among Friends: Personal Networks in Town and City*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- . 1995. "The Subcultural Theory of Urbanism: A Twentieth-Year Assessment." *American Journal of Sociology* 101:543–77.
- Fordham, S. and J.U. Ogbu. 1986. "Black Students' School Success: Coping with the 'Burden of Acting White.'" *Urban Review* 18:176–206.
- Foster, G.M. 1967. *Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Frank, R.H. and P.J. Cook. 1995. *The Winner-Take-All Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Freeman, R.B. 1993. "How Much Has De-Unionization Contributed to the Rise in Male Earnings Inequality?" Pp. 133–63 in *Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America*, edited by S. Danziger and P. Gottschalk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Gans, H.C. 1962. *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian Americans*. New York: Free Press.
- Garrett, L. 1994. *The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World out of Balance*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Goleman, D. 1995. *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ*. New York: Bantam Books.
- González de la Rocha, M. 1986. *Los Recursos de la Probeza: Familias de Bajos Ingresos de Guadalajara*. Guadalajara: El Colegio de Jalisco.
- Gould, P. 1993. *The Slow Plague: A Geography of the AIDS Pandemic*. Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.
- Harrison, B. 1995. *Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hatton, T.J. and J.G. Williamson. 1994. "What Drove the Mass Migrations from Europe?" *Population and Development Review* 20:533–61.
- Hauser, R.M. and D.L. Featherman. 1977. *The Process of Stratification: Trends and Analysis*. New York: Academic Press.
- Herrnstein, R.J. and C. Murray. 1994. *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*. New York: Free Press.
- Hershberg, T. 1981. *Philadelphia: Work, Space, Family, and Group Experience in the 19th Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hutchinson, E.P. 1956. *Immigrants and Their Children, 1850–1950*. New York: Wiley.
- Jargowsky, P.A. Forthcoming. "Take the Money and Run: Economic Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas." *American Sociological Review*, forthcoming.
- Kasarda, J.D. 1993. "Inner-City Concentrated Poverty and Neighborhood Distress: 1970–1990." *Housing Policy Debate* 4:253–302.
- . 1995. "Industrial Restructuring and the Changing Location of Jobs." Pp. 215–68 in *State of the Union: America in the 1990s*, edited by R. Farley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Kaus, M. 1992. *The End of Equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Krivo, L., R.D. Peterson, H. Rizzo, and J.R. Reynolds. 1996. "Race, Segregation, and the Concentration of Disadvantage: 1980–1990." Presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, New Orleans.
- Krivo, L. and R.D. Peterson. Forthcoming. "Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban Crime." *Social Forces*.
- Krugman, P. 1994. *The Age of Diminished Expectations*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Lasch, C. 1995. *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy*. New York: Norton.
- LeDoux, J. 1986. "Sensory Systems and Emotion." *Integrative Psychiatry* 4:237–43.
- Levy, F. 1987. *Dollars and Dreams: The Changing Distribution of American Income*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- . 1995. "Incomes and Income Inequality." Pp. 1–58 in *State of the Union: America in the 1990s*, edited by R. Farley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Liebersohn, S. 1980. *A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants since 1880*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 1981. "An Asymmetrical Approach to Segregation." Pp. 61–82 in *Ethnic Segregation in Cities*, edited by C. Peach, V. Robinson, and S. Smith. London: Croom Helm.
- Lind, M. 1995. *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution*. New York: Free Press.
- Maddrick, J. 1995. *The End of Affluence: The Causes and Consequences of America's Economic Dilemma*. New York: Random House.
- Massey, D.S. 1985. "Ethnic Residential Segregation: A Theoretical Synthesis and Empirical Review." *Sociology and Social Research* 69:315–50.
- . 1988. "International Migration and Economic Development in Comparative Perspective." *Population and Development Review* 14:383–414.
- . 1990. "American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass." *American Journal of Sociology* 96:329–58.
- . 1995. "Getting Away with Murder: Segregation and Violent Crime in Urban America." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 143:1203–32.
- . Forthcoming. "The Residential Segregation of Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians: 1970 to 1990." In *Immigration and Race Relations*, edited by G.D. Jaynes. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Massey, D.S., G.A. Condran, and N.A. Denton. 1987. "The Effect of Residential Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being." *Social Forces* 66:29–57.
- Massey, D.S. and N.A. Denton. 1989. "Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation along Five Dimensions." *Demography* 26:373–93.
- . 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Massey, D.S. and M.L. Eggers. 1990. "The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the Concentration of Poverty, 1970–1980." *American Journal of Sociology* 95:1153–89.
- . 1993. "The Spatial Concentration of Affluence and Poverty during the 1970s." *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 29:299–315.
- Massey, D.S., A.B. Gross, and M.L. Eggers. 1991. "Segregation, the Concentration of Poverty, and the Life Chances of Individuals." *Social Science Research* 20:397–420.
- Massey, D.S. and K. Shibuya. 1995. "Unravelling the Tangle of Pathology: The Effect of Spatially Concentrated Joblessness on the Well-Being of African Americans." *Social Science Research*

- 24:352-66.
- Miles-Doan, R. and S. Kelly. 1996. "Neighborhood Contexts of Assaultive Violence: A Tract-Level Study of Disaggregated Rates in Duval County, Florida—1992." Presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, New Orleans.
- Morris, M., A.D. Bernhardt, and M.S. Handcock. 1994. "Economic Inequality: New Methods for New Trends." *American Sociological Review* 59:205-19.
- Muñoz, H., O. de Oliveira, and C. Stern. 1977. *Migración y Desigualdad Social en la Ciudad de México*. México, DF: Universidad Nacional de México y Colegio de México.
- Nugent, W. 1992. *Crossings: The Great Transatlantic Migration, 1870-1914*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Ogbu, J.U. 1978. *Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective*. New York: Academic Press.
- . 1983. "Minority Status and Schooling in Plural Societies." *Comparative Education Review* 27:168-90.
- Oliver, M.L. and T.M. Shapiro. 1995. *Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality*. New York: Routledge.
- Ousseimi, M. 1995. *Caught in the Crossfire: Growing Up in a War Zone*. New York: Walker.
- Portes, A. 1995. "Children of Immigrants: Segmented Assimilation and Its Determinants." Pp. 248-80 in *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*, edited by A. Portes. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Preston, S.H. 1979. "Urban Growth in Developing Countries: A Demographic Reappraisal." *Population and Development Review* 5:195-216.
- Rifkin, J. 1995. *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era*. New York: Putnam.
- Rubalcava, R.M. and M. Schteingart. 1985. "Diferenciación Socioespacial Intraurbana en el Area Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México." *Estudios Sociológicos* 3:21-85.
- Sheahan, J. 1991. *Conflict and Change in Mexican Economic Strategy: Implications for Mexico and Latin America*. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- Simkus, A.A. 1978. "Residential Segregation by Occupation and Race in Ten Urbanized Areas, 1950-1970." *American Sociological Review* 43:81-93.
- Sjoberg, G. 1960. *The Preindustrial City: Past and Present*. New York: Free Press.
- Smith, J.P. 1988. "Poverty and the Family." Pp. 141-72 in *Divided Opportunities: Minorities, Poverty, and Social Policy*, edited by G.D. Sandefur and M. Tienda. New York: Plenum.
- Stack, C. 1974. *All Our Kin: Strategies of Survival in a Black Community*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Stalker, P. 1994. *The Work of Strangers: A Survey of International Labour Migration*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Suttles, G.D. 1968. *The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tabatabai, H. and M. Fouad. 1993. *The Incidence of Poverty in Developing Countries: An ILO Compendium of Data*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1973. *1970 Census of Population Subject Reports: Low-Income Population*. PC(2)-9A. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- . 1983. *1980 Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Part 1: U.S. Summary*. PC80-1-C1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- . 1993. *1990 Census of Population, Social and Economic Characteristics: Metropolitan Areas*. CP-2-1B. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- United Nations. 1980. *Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth*. Population Studies, No. 68. New York: United Nations.
- . 1995. *World Urbanization Prospects: 1994 Revision*. New York: United Nations.
- Wallace, R. and D. Wallace. 1995. "U.S. Apartheid and the Spread of AIDS to the Suburbs: A Multi-City Analysis of the Political Economy of a Spatial Epidemic." *Social Science Medicine* 36:1-13.
- Walton, J. 1978. "Guadalajara: Creating the Divided City." Pp. 25-50 in *Metropolitan Latin America: The Challenge and the Response*, edited by W.A. Cornelius and R.V. Kemper. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Whyte, W.F. 1955. *Street Corner Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wilson, W.J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wirth, L. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." *American Journal of Sociology* 44:3-24.
- Wolff, E.N. 1995. "The Rich Get Increasingly Richer: Latest Data on Household Wealth during the 1980s." Pp. 33-68 in *Research in Politics and Society*, Vol. 5, edited by R.E. Ratcliff, M.L. Oliver, and T.M. Shapiro. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
- Zunz, O. 1982. *The Changing Face of Inequality: Urbanization, Industrial Development, and Immigrants in Detroit, 1880-1920*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

RESPONSE TO DANZIGER, FARLEY, AND HOUT ET AL.

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY

You don't give an address called "The Age of Extremes" unless you expect to stir things up a little, and I am gratified by the early signs of success, as indicated by the thoughtful replies of Sheldon Danziger, Reynolds Farley, and Michael Hout (who is joined in his reply by Richard Arum and Kim Voss). I am honored that such distinguished social scientists took me seriously enough to prepare a written response for publication. There is no greater tribute to a scholar than to have his or her work considered in a thoughtful and serious debate.

I am most pleased with Sheldon Danziger's comments, of course, for I believe he best recognizes the spirit and intent of my address. As he recognizes, I did not seek to extract well-established conclusions from a definitive literature review, or to inspire a political movement to challenge the rising tide of inequality. I sought only to identify global trends of great scholarly and public interest, and to suggest provocative hypotheses about their causes and consequences in hopes of fomenting interest in the geographic dimensions of rising inequality, a neglected topic much in need of research.

Reynolds Farley offers a more critical view of my address, arguing that my dire prognostications about rising inequality and the harmful consequences of concentrated affluence and poverty are too pessimistic. He suggests that my description of recent trends is incomplete, and cites alternative data on capita income, total net worth, average education, mean income segregation, and average black-white segregation to paint a more cheerful future than the one I depict.

Averages, however, do not capture the increase in variance that has occurred in so many indicators of socioeconomic well-being, and it is precisely the growth in variance that I find most disturbing. Per capita income indeed increased, but only because the earnings of the affluent rose faster than those of the poor declined. Similarly, Americans' net worth increased because the rich grew a lot richer while the assets of the poor slowly dwindled. Black-white segregation did decline, on average, but the declines were concentrated in places where few African Americans live, while the nation's largest black communities remained hypersegregated (indeed, the number of hypersegregated metropolitan areas *increased* during the 1980s). I could have written a more upbeat address called "The Age of Averages," but I believe that focusing on average trends yields a misleadingly sanguine view of our recent past and an overoptimistic vision of our proximate future. Averages tell you little when all the movement is toward the extremes.

Michael Hout and his colleagues offer the most critical assessment of my address, chastising me for ignoring the po-

litical decisions that underlie the shift toward greater socioeconomic inequality. According to them, "inequality is part of the design of society, but that design is political, subject to controls...." They illustrate their point with a variety of "U.S.-centric" examples.

Naturally I agree that the shift toward rising inequality in the United States was mediated by political decisions, but I do not agree that causality lies solely or even mainly at the national level. Rather, I believe that its roots are transnational and have more to do with the emergence of a global capitalist economy characterized by intense competition between nations and free factor mobility across international boundaries.

In such an economy, transnational corporations, international financiers, and the professional classes that serve them have the upper hand because they operate on a global stage beyond the effective reach of national governments. As international boundaries have become porous with respect to capital, knowledge, information, goods, labor, and technology, the power and autonomy of national governments have waned while the control and influence of international corporations have waxed. National authorities are left to cushion the blows of global capitalism, but they can't do much to change it. Some governments may provide softer cushions than others, but everywhere the blows rain down and everywhere the cushions are going flat.

In a global economy there are essentially three classes of people. Owners of capital do very well because they control the principal engine of growth and because the resource they possess is in very scarce supply on world markets. Owners of human capital do relatively well because capitalists need their knowledge and information and because the skills they possess are in relatively scarce supply on world markets. Owners of labor, however, do exceedingly poorly because the resource they control is in oversupply on world markets and is increasingly superfluous to economic production, growth, and development.

In an era of global capitalism, socioeconomic trends in the United States cannot be understood through a U.S.-centric analysis. Ethnocentrism is a luxury that American social science can no longer afford, for we are no longer an omnipotent economic autarky impervious to economic and social developments outside our borders. In confining our attention to the United States, we fall into the technocratic trap of thinking that recent trends are all products of local "design," and that by pushing the right policy buttons we can somehow easily alter or reverse recent socioeconomic trends. In my view, increasing inequality in the United States and

the political policies that have reinforced it are both products of other, more powerful developments occurring at the transnational level.

I acknowledge one exception to this generalization: race, something truly unique in the American experience. Here I agree with Hout and his colleagues: The subordination and deprivation of African Americans is built into the design of

our society, and I believe that politicians in the United States have deliberately manipulated race to promote policies that exacerbate broader trends toward socioeconomic inequality and undermine most workers' status and well-being. Possibly because of our continuing failure to face up to "the American dilemma," the shift toward the extremes has been more pronounced here than elsewhere.