Bits and Bytes from the Chair

By Jeremy D. Bisdorf, Jaffe Raitt Heuer & Weiss PC

The end of 2009 is quickly approaching. As Fall in Michigan enters its last stages, our days become more frequently filled with cloud cover and we see very little daylight as we frequently head to and from our weekly activities in the dark. Where does the time go?

For the Information Technology Law Section, at least some of that time has been spent on Section activities and early planning efforts for the next year. Mary Ann Wehr recently attended a State Bar Section Fair in Grand Rapids for Cooley Law School students on behalf of our Section. We completed our ICLE Seminar Event in Plymouth, Michigan and received high marks from the attendees. We have planned this year’s goals during our first Section Council Meeting.

During the next few months we will all be watching the Supreme Court to see how it will handle the Bilski case and any changes that may result to software related patents. Further, our Section is evaluating whether or not it should take a position for or against recent suggested amendments to the Michigan Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. Please keep an eye on this newsletter and our Section’s website for updates on these important matters.

Our spring networking event may be subject to some changes as a result of our efforts to promote our Section’s dual missions of recruiting more members to the Section and to better facilitate the networking opportunities among the existing members. While prior networking events have certainly been successful, it is always important to keep things “fresh” and appealing to the membership. I am looking forward to hearing the suggestions of the committee as to any changes to the event that they may recommend. We will pass that information along as soon as the Council makes some decisions.

Looking forward to seeing you soon. Have a wonderful holiday season.

Jeremy D. Bisdorf
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The 2nd Annual Information Technology Law Seminar was held on Thursday, October 29, 2009 at the Inn at St. John’s in Plymouth, and physical and virtual attendees were greeted with an interesting set of speakers on a variety of areas that fit this year’s topic of ‘Core Legal Issues in a High Tech Business World’. The moderator for the seminar was Charles A. Bieneman. After a brief welcome, attendees used hand-held fobs to vote on various topics concerning the Information Technology Section of the State Bar, including the location of future meetings (Metro Detroit won overwhelmingly). Three presenters spoke in each of two sessions, and each session allotted time for attendees to ask the speakers further questions.

To open the first session, Robert S. Gurwin, counsel for America Online, gave an interesting presentation on “The Legal Landscape of Web 2.0.” Robert gave an introductory definition of Web 2.0 and proceeded to discuss the legal issues facing business models that utilize Web 2.0 services, including copyright infringement, Communications Decency Act § 230 issues, defamation issues, electronic communications policies in employment contracts, and product disparagement. Robert commented on the recent Lori Drew MySpace case, as well as other principal cases implicating Web 2.0 issues.

Beth A. Mier, senior counsel at CSC Covansys Corp. gave the second presentation of the first session. Beth spoke on the allocation of risk in technical service agreements, and segmented these risks into financial, operational, and legal risks. Beth discussed practical considerations for negotiating the key terms of the service agreements, including having the appropriate experts available, managing the negotiating team, and keeping long-term goals in mind. Beth also provided an overview of important clauses, such as limitations of liability, indemnifications, and savings clauses.

Next, Robert L. Rothman, president of Privacy Associates International discussed privacy issues involved in cross-border data transfers. He discussed the philosophical differences between the US and European Union views of data privacy, and how the EU considers privacy a fundamental human right. Robert discussed the implications of moving data across national borders, using a hypothetical involving a corporate employee list, and discussed issues relating to contracting with foreign information technology suppliers.

The first speaker of the second session was Charles R. (Rod) Marvin Jr., the managing member at Dykema’s Washington D.C. office. Rod spoke on how to avoid problems when contracting with the government, including actual and apparent authority issues when licensing software to the federal government, termination on convenience clauses in government contracts, and choice of law clauses and their relation to jurisdiction in the Federal Court of Claims.

William T. Casey, an attorney for Hewlett Packard Enterprise Services, spoke on the benefits and risks of open source software. William discussed...
Recent Developments in Information Technology Law

By David R. Syrowik, Brooks Kushman PC

Patents – Case Law – U.S. Supreme Court

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 675, on September 25, 2009, the government filed a long-awaited brief in arguing that patent-eligible processes under 35 U.S.C. § 101 encompass “the broad expanse of technological and industrial fields”, but not “methods of organizing human activity”. **Bilski v. Kappos**

Patents – Case Law – U.S. Courts of Appeal

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 405 on July 27, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invalidated Blackboard Inc.’s patent for conducting courses online over the Internet, as all patent claims are determined to be either anticipated or inadequately disclosed. **Blackboard Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc.**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 502 on August 19, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held **en banc** that a statutory prohibition against supplying components of a patented invention for offshore assembly does not apply to method claims. In an 11-1 opinion, the court overrules its 2005 holding in **Union Carbide v. Shell Oil**, which appellants argued was in conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in **Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. Cardiac Pacemakers Inc. v. St. Jude Medical Inc.**

As reported at 91 USPQ2d 1417, in an unpublished opinion, on January 12, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff failed to overcome showing that asserted claims directed to system for delivering streaming media content on demand with search and playback capability are obvious in view of prior art, since plaintiff argued that inventive feature of patent is claimed “programmatic control” of media player by server module, and “direct control” of media player by search module, and it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in art to use prior art devices to develop control mechanisms described in claims. **Friskit Inc. v. RealNetworks Inc.**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 670, on September 22, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that unless a description of a new method of golfing is available in a searchable database before the patent application’s critical date, the patent was not invalid for anticipation. The document was deposited in the U.S. Copyright Office before the critical date. **In re Lister.**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 632, on September 23, 2009, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took another crack at patent damages reform in oral arguments. The case was placed on a fast track because of its impact on Microsoft’s distribution of its Word document processing application. **I4i L.P. v. Microsoft Corp.**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 583, on September 11, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a half-billion dollar award against Microsoft.
Corp. for use of its “pop-up calendar” in Microsoft Outlook. The court affirms patent validity and infringement judgments that Microsoft had also challenged, but rules that the jury’s damages calculation lacked sufficient evidentiary support. *Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Gateway Inc.*

As reported at 92 USPQ2d 1252, on September 24, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that patent claims directed to technology that allows customer to print secured document at home, using preprinted label sheets containing “preestablished data” from which remote processor creates “security indicia”, do not require that security indicia be created and validated under control of “key” contained in preestablished data; judgment of noninfringement is vacated. *Kara Technology Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc.*

**Copyrights – Case Law – U.S. Courts of Appeal**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 367, on July 10, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit largely affirmed the Copyright Royalty Board’s 2007 determination of royalty rates for copyrighted music used by webcasters. *Intercollegiate Broadcast System Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 699, on September 25, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that reorganization of licensee entities resulted in unauthorized transfer of software license. *Cincom Systems Inc. v. Novelis Corp.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 531, on August 21, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an Internet music service whose playlist is individually generated based on the preferences of a particular user is not an interactive service as defined by Section 1114 of the Copyright Act and thus is not required to pay individual licensing fees to copyright holders of the sound recordings that it webcasts. *Arista Records LLC f/k/a Arista Records Inc. v. Launch Media Inc.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 532, on August 24, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that the SCO Group Inc.’s claims to ownership of copyrights in UNIX operating systems should go to trial, reversing a lower court’s finding that the rights were never transferred to SCO. *SCO Group Inc. v. Novell Inc.*

**Trademarks – Case Law – U.S. Courts of Appeal**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 404, on July 23, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board had sufficient evidence to conclude that the term “hotels.com” is generic with respect to providing online information and reservation services. Affirming the board’s decision upholding a trademark examining attorney’s refusal to register the mark, the court emphasizes that many of the trademark applicant’s competitors used the elements “hotels” and “.com” in offering their online travel services. *In re Hotels.com LP.*

**Cybersquatting – Case Law – U.S. Courts of Appeal**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 339, on July 9, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that damages under the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act are not duplicative of damages under the Lanham Act. *St. Luke’s Cataract and Laser Institute v. Sanderson.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 410, on July 23, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a company’s continued registration of a domain name containing a competing company’s trademark did not violate the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. Evidence that defendant has kept control of “diamondbrite.com” Internet domain name to prevent others from registering it, rather than to display content, does not warrant finding that defendant had bad faith “intent to profit” from registration and use of domain name, since plaintiff accuses defendant of refusing to sell domain name, not intending to sell name for profit, and there is no evidence that defendant diverted customers from plaintiff’s Web site. *Southern Grouts & Mortars Inc. v. 3M Co.*

**Patents – Case Law – U.S. District Courts**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 600, on September 2, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held two computer-based stock trading patents obvious and thus invalid. *Papyrus Technology Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange LLC.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 341, on July 7, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled that a system for automating credit applications unpatentable under Bilski for failure to disclose a “particular machine.” *DealerTrack Inc. v. Huber.*
As reported at 91 USPQ2d 1565, on April 3, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that evidence does not support jury’s conclusion that first defendant exercised requisite “control or direction” over second defendant to permit finding of liability for joint infringement of patent, since defendants’ distributorship agreement granted first defendant no rights to second defendant’s software except right to promote software to end users, and communications between defendants regarding their joint bid on university’s request for proposal show that first defendant did not “direct” second defendant to submit bid. Golden Hour Data Systems Inc. v. emsCharts Inc.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 372, on July 16, 2009, in a case pending before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, BlackBerry maker Research in Motion Ltd. announced its agreement to pay $267.5 million to Visto Corp. to settle the latter’s 2006 patent infringement suit. RIM will receive a perpetual and fully-paid license on all Visto patents and a transfer of certain Visto intellectual property. Visto Corp. v. Research in Motion Ltd.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 432, on July 28, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona expanded the Bilski machine-or-transformation test for patentable subject matter by applying the test to apparatus claims. Research Corporation Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.

As reported at 91 USPQ2d 1123, on November 24, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that term “multitasking,” as used in preamble of claim in patent directed to “information processing apparatus with multitasking function,” is properly construed to be required element of claim, since term appears 45 times in patent, since summary of invention identifies capability of multitasking as primary objective of invention, and since term was added to claim and expressly relied on to overcome prior art. Intellectual Science and Technology Inc. v. Sony Electronics Inc.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 696, on October 6, 2009, in a patent infringement case pending in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation confirms that it has reached a settlement with semiconductor maker Intel Corp. The case involved Intel-funded research at the University of Wisconsin wherein the Federal District Court had earlier stated that: “donation” of research funds to a professor did not create a license to the resulting patents. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Intel Corp.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 508, on August 11, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that the 2003 and 2007 versions of the Microsoft Word word processing application infringed a patent related to the handling of digital documents using Extensible Markup Language and will be enjoined from distributing versions of Word that are capable of opening XML files. Granting final judgment on the issue of infringement, the court also finds willfulness and adds $40 million in enhanced damages for willfulness to the jury’s $200 million award. i4i L.P. v. Microsoft Corp.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 702, on September 29, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island vacated a $388 million jury award against Microsoft for patent infringement. Uniloc v. Microsoft Corp.

Copyrights – Case Law – U.S. District Courts

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 283, on June 30, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that online newsgroup service that marketed itself as a source for pirated music is liable for copyright infringement. Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com Inc.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 407, on July 27, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled that a file sharing student defending claims of copyright infringement may not assert a fair use defense. Capital Records Inc. v. Alaujan.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 433 on July 31, 2009, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts awarded $675,000 to record companies that had sued a Boston University student for online infringement of musical works. Capital Records Inc. v. Alaujan.

As reported at 91 USPQ2d 1281, on June 10, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that it lacked federal question jurisdiction over infringement claim stemming from defendants’ alleged unauthorized publication of copyrighted photographs, which are alleged to have been obtained from confidential e-mail and then featured during broadcast of network television program in Australia, and later in online story, since plaintiffs have not alleged in complaint that predicate acts of infringement, namely, copying and transmission of images to network, occurred within United States. Counter Terrorist Group US v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 763, on October 14, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a cell phone company does not have to pay performance royalties when its subscribers receive calls that

Continued on next page
trigger the playing of a copyrighted work as a ringtone, granting summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the phone company. *In re Application of Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 773, on September 30, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington ruled that a copyright’s first sale doctrine permits eBay sale of used software. *Vernor v. Autodesk Inc.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 720, on October 6, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware held that the posting of a photograph on an overseas Internet website is not a simultaneous publication in the United States that triggers the need to complete a U.S. copyright registration before suing for infringement. *Moberg v. 3ST LLC.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 664, on September 24, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York postponed an October 7 fairness hearing regarding the Google Book Search settlement between Google Inc. and a group of authors. This comes days after the Department of Justice files an amicus brief stating that the proposed settlement might not be consistent with U.S. antitrust law. *Authors Guild v. Google Inc.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 638, on September 11, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled that an online video upload service that complied with the requirements of the Section 512(c) service provider safe harbor is not liable for infringement based on its users’ unauthorized uploading of copyrighted material. *UMG Recordings Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 638, on September 11, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ruled that an online video upload service that complied with the requirements of the Section 512(c) service provider safe harbor is not liable for infringement based on its users’ unauthorized uploading of copyrighted material. *UMG Recordings Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 541, on August 11, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined Real Networks as court finds multiple DMCA violations and no personal copy fair use. *Real Networks Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Association Inc.*

As reported at 91 USPQ2d 1825, on April 15, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that statutory damages awarded for infringement of plaintiffs’ copyrights in musical recordings, in action in which copyrights were infringed by sales of digital downloads, must be calculated on per-album basis, rather than per-song basis, since total number of awards of statutory damages plaintiffs may recover depends on number of “works” infringed, since 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) provides that all parts of compilation constitute one work, and since each album copied by defendants is “compilation” of songs and cover art illustrations. *Bryant v. Europadisk Ltd.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 722, on October 2, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that counterclaims by the City of Chicago and the U.S. Olympic Committee in a website operator’s declaratory judgment action asserting rights to “Chicago 2016” as a trademark and in a domain name related to Chicago’s recently failed bid for the 2016 Olympics cannot be resolved on summary judgment. *Fayne v. Chicago 2016.*

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 643, on September 9, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska ruled that a database company’s alleged unauthorized use of data bearing a plaintiff’s trademarks survives dismissal under *Dastar. Experian Marketing Solutions Inc. v. U.S. Data Corp.*
As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 543, on August 14, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington ruled that there was no likelihood of confusion as to source between “Helix” streaming media and database management. Real Networks Inc. v. QSA Tool Works LLC.

**Trademarks - Jurisdiction – Case Law – U.S. District Courts**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 799, on October 20, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that a website not set up for ordering and minimal sales does not add up to personal jurisdiction. Guinness World Records Ltd. v. Due d/b/a World Records Academy.

**Trademarks - Cybersquatting – Case Law – U.S. District Courts**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 678, on September 21, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that a karaoke business owner’s role in transfer of rival domain name supported ACPA claim. D.J. Miller Music Distributors Inc. v. Strauser.

As reported at 92 USPQ2d 1215, on May 12, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that evidence warrants finding that plaintiff registered “horbiger.com” domain name, which is confusingly similar to defendant’s “Hoerbiger” mark, in bad faith, and defendant is granted summary judgment on its counterclaim for violation of Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act; plaintiff clearly knew that domain name was confusingly similar misspelling of defendant’s mark, and plaintiff was not using domain name in “surname sense”. Texas International Property Associates v. Hoerbiger Holding AG.

**Lanham Act/False Endorsement – Case Law – U.S. District Courts**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 569, on August 28, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ruled that false endorsement under the Lanham Act is not a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff’s privacy and reputation through offensive Internet links. Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc.

**Patents – U.S. Patent and Trademark Office**

As reported at 78 BNA’s PTCJ 798, on October 1, 2009, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences stated that software patent applicants are to provide patent claim language that is tied specifically and verbatim to structures in the specification of the patent application. Ex parte Rodriguez.

**Trademarks – U.S. Patent and Trademark Office**

As reported at 91 USPQ2d 1332, on June 19, 2009, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ruled that trademark applicant’s identification of its goods as “computer game software,” in application for registration of “Battlecam” mark, is not inaccurate, even if it is assumed that mark identifies only particular feature of applicant’s computer games, since such feature is essentially computer code that allows feature to be activated and used or controlled by player, and subset of entire collection of code used for particular game can aptly be referred to as “computer game software.” In re Petroglyph Games Inc.
Meet a Section Member: Karl A. Hochkammer

What is the name of your firm/corporation/employer?
Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP
in Detroit.

What is your area of practice? My practice focuses on the commercialization of technology in a wide variety of applications, including different types of outsourcing relationships, software development, licensing, the development of marketing and distribution channels, and advising clients with respect to the conduct of business via the internet and privacy issues. I represent both customers and vendors and have a lot of experience with companies in the manufacturing, financial services and health care sectors. I also have an active general corporate and commercial practice.

When did you first become involved with the Section? I first became active in the section several years ago at the behest of Jeremy Bisdorf, the current president of the section. At the time, I was spending most of my time out of town, working on a global IT outsourcing deal and Jeremy thought I would be interested in meeting other lawyers who also practiced IT law. Jeremy was right. I have enjoyed working with the section ever since.

Where did you grow up? Birmingham, Michigan.

Where else have you lived? I attended college in Appleton, Wisconsin. While in college, I spent time living in Germany. Since then, my wife and I have lived in Nashville, Tennessee and New York City.

Where did you attend undergraduate and law school? I received my B.A. from Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin, my J.D. from Vanderbilt University School of Law and my LL.M in Taxation from New York University.

What was your undergraduate major? German and history.

What are your hobbies, other interests? When I am not working, much of my time is focused on my children and their activities. Theoretically, I enjoy riding my dust-covered motorcycle. I often spend my free time reading (history, biography, or fiction).

Favorite restaurant? Phoenicia in Birmingham.

A recent book you read? I am usually reading several books at any point in time. I just finished Our Magnificent Bastard Tongue: The Untold Story of English by John McWhorter, a history of the English language that, among other things, explains the evolution of the English language and argues that some of the unique characteristics of English and English grammar are the result of influences from the Celtic languages (this book is a lot more interesting than my summary sounds).

What is your favorite movie of the past 10 years? I can’t think of any because the only movies I see are kids’ movies. In the kids’ category, I most enjoyed the Shrek movies.

Last vacation? Grand Cayman.

If you had to describe yourself using three words, they would be... Husband, father, son.

What do you like to do most with a free hour? Read.

A short comment on why you became involved with the Information Law Technology Section: To meet other lawyers with similar practices and learn from and with them.

What email can Section members use to contact you? khochkammer@honigman.com
Introduction

In the *Quanta* case, on June 9, 2008, a unanimous Supreme Court clarified the “patent exhaustion doctrine” by holding that the doctrine applies 1) to the method and not just the apparatus claims of patents and 2) to sales “authorized” by the patent holder of incomplete products that “substantially embody” essential features of a patented invention. Consequently, the patentee’s attempt in *Quanta* to contract around the doctrine and collect royalties from multiple points in a chain of users incorporating devices covered by its patents was ineffective.

As described by the Court, for more than 150 years the patent exhaustion doctrine “exhausts” a patentee’s rights following the first authorized sale of a patented item. Once a patented article is unconditionally sold by the patent owner or its licensee without restriction, that article passes beyond the exclusive rights of the patent. In this way, the first authorized sale of a patented article “exhausts” the patent to the extent that an “unconditional” sale free the purchaser from patent liability to use and resale the article.

While the patent exhaustion doctrine is relatively easy to state, it is not so easy to fully understand so as to be avoided as exemplified by the *Quanta* case. The history of *Quanta* reveals a misunderstanding of the doctrine wherein the Court reversed the Federal Circuit which, in turn, had earlier disagreed with a district court’s patent exhaustion ruling by holding that sales of microprocessors and chipsets made by Intel under license from LG Electronics (LGE) were conditional and, consequently, did not exhaust LGE’s combination patent rights. Apparently, LGE was willing to allow Intel’s customers to combine the licensed microprocessor products with non-Intel products but only upon payment of a further royalty to LGE for the right to do so.

The decision will most certainly affect the viability of certain patent and perhaps other intellectual property licensing strategies such as copyright licensing strategies. Because of the importance of intellectual property licensing to the domestic and foreign economy, it is important for intellectual property (IP) owners to not only fully understand the patent exhaustion doctrine as clarified by *Quanta* but also carefully consider the relatively recent sales and licensing strategies of others in other industries including the software industry if appropriate.

Part I of this paper takes a look at the history of the *Quanta* case. Part II of this paper looks at “field of use” licensing as a way to avoid the patent exhaustion doctrine. Part III of this paper looks at standard form agreements and the evolution of sales and licensing strategies employed over the last 20 years for software and digitized data. Part IV of the paper looks at the more recent printer cartridge business models of Hewlett-Packard and Lexmark. Part V of the paper concludes with some practice pointers when using standard form contracts to market products which “substantially embody” a patent under *Quanta*.

The *Quanta* Case

Facts

In 1999, LG Electronics (LGE) purchased a patent portfolio that included the patents at issue. These patents contained apparatus claims and claims for methods of managing the data flow inside a computer. LGE licensed the patent portfolio to Intel under a License Agreement, under which Intel was entitled to “make, use, sell (directly or indirectly) computer components that used the patented methods.” Such a clause typically appears in patent license agreements and is called the “grant clause.” The terms of the grant clause describe the legal character of the license being extended and are the essence of any license agreement. The
Quanta Court characterized this language as “broad.”[12]

The License Agreement, however, also stated that no license “is granted . . . to any third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed Products of either party with items, components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than a party hereto . . . .”[13] The License Agreement further provided, however, “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, the parties agree that nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed Products.” Consequently, clearly the parties to the Agreement knew of the patent exhaustion doctrine but, as described further below, did not fully understand the scope or significance of the doctrine as articulated by the Quanta Court.

A separate agreement (a Master Agreement) required Intel to notify its customers in writing that Intel’s license did not “extend, expressly or by implication, to any product that you make by combining an Intel product with any non-Intel product.” In other words, in the Master Agreement, LGE required Intel to give Intel’s customers notice that the patent license did not extend to any product made by combining a licensed Intel microprocessor product with any non-Intel products. The Master Agreement also provided that a breach of the Master Agreement would have no effect on the License Agreement and would not be grounds for its termination.

Quanta Computer, Inc., Bizcom Electronics, Inc., First International Computer Inc., and others purchased microprocessors and chipsets from Intel Corp. or other authorized LGE licensees and installed them in computers. Intel notified the purchasers by letter that although it had been licensed to sell the components, the purchasers were not authorized to combine the products with non-Intel products.[14] This notice was sent prior to execution of the License Agreement by the parties. Notwithstanding this notice, Quanta combined the Intel products with various non-Intel components to make computer systems.[15]

Federal Circuit Ruling

The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.[18] It reaffirmed that the doctrine of patent exhaustion does not apply to method claims. In the alternative, it held that LGE’s patents were not exhausted because LGE did not license Intel to sell the Intel products to Quanta for use in combination with non-Intel products.[19] The court found that although Intel was free to sell its microprocessors and chipsets, the terms of those sales had expressly prohibited Intel’s customers from infringing LGE’s combination patents, and thus the exhaustion doctrine did not apply. The court stated that Intel’s notification to its customers made its sales conditional sales. Quanta successfully petitioned for U.S. Supreme Court review.

Supreme Court Ruling

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion contained two holdings as noted earlier: (1) a patent’s method claims may be exhausted by the sale of a product that embodies the patented method; and (2) a patent is exhausted by the unconditional sale of a product, whether complete or not, that substantially embodies the claimed invention. Of equal, if not greater, interest (at least with respect to this paper) is the Court’s analysis of the different agreements between LGE and Intel and their impact on the patent exhaustion doctrine.

Method Claims Of A Patent May Be Exhausted

In prior cases, the Federal Circuit had held that method claims are not subject to the patent exhaustion doctrine. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed this categorical rule by relying on a pair of its earlier decisions[21] and held that method
claims may be exhausted by the sale of a device that embodies the claimed method. In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s contrary decisions, the Court expressly recognized that Federal Circuit rule provided an incentive for parties to convert apparatus claims to method claims during patent prosecution and thus provide “an end-run around exhaustion.” Such a result would violate the longstanding principle that, when a patented item is ‘once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee.’

Two-Part Test For Determining Whether The Sale Of A Product Exhau[st]s A Patent

As previously stated, a patent is exhausted by the first authorized sale of a product that embodies the patent. The Court again relied on the Univis case in stating that sales of an incomplete product, embodying the patent, may exhaust the patent. The Court provided a two-part test for determining whether the sale of an incomplete product exhausts the patent rights in that product.

First, the incomplete product must have no reasonable use other than practicing the patents. In reaching this decision, the Court pointed to whether the product embodied “essential features” of the patented invention or the inventive aspects of the patented methods. The Court also distinguished between practicing the patent and infringing the patent. Thus, the exhaustion doctrine is not defeated by the possibility of overseas sales that would use the patented technology without infringing the patent.

Second, the incomplete product must “substantially embody[ ...] the patent” and “all but completely practice the patent.” Thus, sale of an incomplete product exhausts the patent if the only “step[s] necessary to practice the patent is the application of ‘common processes’ or the addition of ‘standard parts.’” In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished the patents at issue from so-called combination patents, where the only inventive aspect of the patent is the particular combination of known elements that are claimed.

Analysis Of The Agreements Between LGE And Intel

LGE contended that the patent exhaustion doctrine was not applicable because Intel did not have the right to convey an unrestricted license to Quanta, citing the two decisions by the Supreme Court in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co. The Court, however, distinguished General Talking Pictures based on the language of the granting clause in LGE’s License Agreement with Intel:

The Court in General Talking Pictures held that exhaustion did not apply because the manufacturer had no authority to sell the amplifiers for commercial use, and the manufacturer “could not convey to petitioner what both knew it was not authorized to sell.” LGE argues that the same principle applies here: Intel could not convey to Quanta what both knew it was not authorized to sell, i.e., the right to practice the patents with non-Intel parts.

LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure of the Intel-LGE transaction. Nothing in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel parts. It broadly permits Intel to “make, use, [or] sell” products free of LGE’s patent claims . . . . To be sure, LGE did require Intel to give notice to its customers, including Quanta, that LGE had not licensed those customers to practice its patents. But neither party contends that Intel breached the agreement in that respect . . . . LGE does not suggest that a breach of that agreement would constitute a breach of the License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.

In summary, the Quanta Court concluded that patent exhaustion did not apply in General Talking Pictures because “the manufacturer ’could not convey to petitioner what both knew it was not authorized to sell.’” By contrast, exhaustion applied in Quanta because “Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s directions in that notice.” Rather, “[E]xhaustion turns only on Intel’s own license to sell products practicing the LGE Patents.” That sentence and the Court’s implicit adoption of General Talking Pictures demonstrate the limited holding in Quanta: if the scope of the rights conveyed is broad and not restricted or limited (i.e., the agreement language (the granting clause) authorized all acts that would otherwise be an infringement), then the patent exhaustion doctrine governs.

In other words, the Court is saying that LGE broadly licensed Intel to make, use, and sell microprocessor products without restrictions or conditions in the license grant clause of the License Agreement. LGE did not license Intel “to make, use, and sell microprocessor products only in the field of

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microprocessor products combined with other LGElicensed products” (so-called Intel products). There was no explicit field-of-use limitation on Intel’s manufacturing, using, and selling rights (no restrictions or limitations on sales in the license grant clause. Even though LGEl said it was not licensing third parties to combine licensed product with other products, and it required Intel to notify customers of that) LGEl failed to include this or similar language in the license grant clause of the License Agreement to expressly deny Intel any license to make microprocessor products that would be combined with other, non-Intel, products.

**Avoiding The Patent Exhaustion Doctrine Through “Field Of Use” Licensing**

**Background**

Licenses that carve out a particular field of customer class for the licensee are commonly referred to by the courts as “field of use” licenses, thereby lumping product and customer restraints together under a common label. Like territorial licenses, and unlike resale price maintenance of the Univis and Ethyl cases noted in the Quanta case, these arrangements have long been considered presumably lawful exercises of the patentee’s exclusionary rights (i.e., making, using, offering for sale or importing) under its patent, notwithstanding their obvious competitive ramifications. The leading case upholding the basic legality of field of use licenses is the Supreme Court’s decision in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. which, while distinguished, was implicitly adopted by the Quanta Court.

**General Talking Pictures Case**

In General Talking Pictures, the patent owner had granted Transformer Company a non-exclusive license to sell the patented product solely for home use. The license agreement required Transformer Company to mark each product with a label describing the limited field license. Transformer Company sold the product to General Talking Pictures with knowledge that the latter intended to use it for commercial purposes, and General Talking Pictures knew Transformer Company had no right to sell outside the home use field. The Court held that the patent owner could sue General Talking Pictures for patent infringement because:

The sales made by the Transformer Company to [General Talking Pictures] were outside the scope of its license and not under the patent. Both parties knew that fact at the time of the transactions. There is no ground for the assumption that [General Talking Pictures] was “a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade.”

**Tension Between General Talking Pictures And Quanta**

Even after Quanta, the General Talking Pictures doctrine remains valid law, subject to possible antitrust exceptions (see 1995 Federal Antitrust Guidelines noted below). Tension exists between the two doctrines (particularly when the granting clause of a patent license agreement is not as broad as it might be.) As illustrated by the Quanta case, when a court interprets a license or other contract as broadly granting the right to make, use and sell, the exhaustion doctrine governs and not the General Talking Pictures doctrine. A use restriction in the granting clause of a license must be explicit to bind a seller. Otherwise, the license is unlimited, i.e., it covers all possible fields or acts that would otherwise be infringement.

The Court in Quanta applied the exhaustion doctrine rather than the General Talking Pictures doctrine because of the broad language of the granting clause in the License Agreement. Therefore, purchasers of the patented product were free to use them without restrictions that the patentee sought but failed to impose on them.

**Mallinckrodt Case**

**Facts**

The plaintiff Mallinckrodt owned a patent on a device for dispensing a radioactive mist used in taking diagnostic lung X-rays, and for trapping the mist after use. Mallinckrodt sold the device to hospitals. Hospital personnel would load the device with a suitable radioactive fluid to perform a diagnostic procedure on a patient, use the device, and then discard it. Mallinckrodt sold the devices with a notice “Single use only.” For a recycling fee, Medipart would clean one of the devices for a hospital, replace some parts, subject the device to gamma radiation to kill germs, and return it to the hospital for reuse.
Federal Circuit Ruling

In the Mallinckrodt case, the Federal Circuit held that a patentee’s “Single Use Only” restriction, applied to its patented radioactive mist manifold and nebulizer combination, was not “as a matter of law, unenforceable under the patent law” and that a patent infringement remedy would be available against purchasers who used an item purchased from the patentee in violation of a restriction “validity conditioned un-

Patent Misuse And Antitrust Guidelines On The Use Of Restrictions Placed Upon Post-Sale Use Of Licensed Goods

The use of restrictions placed upon post-sale use of licensed goods as in the General Talking Pictures and Mallinckrodt cases is generally permissible since such restrictions are based on the patent right to exclude others from making, using, or selling. However, such restrictions must be evaluated to ensure their legality.

Patent Misuse

In the Braun case noted above, the Federal Circuit further commented on the “patent misuse doctrine” as limiting the use of restrictions placed upon post-sale use of goods:

In Mallinckrodt, we . . . outlined the framework for evaluating whether an express condition on the post-sale use of a patented product constitutes patent misuse. The patent misuse doctrine, born from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, is a method of limiting abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws. The key inquiry under this fact-intensive doctrine is whether, by imposing the condition, the patentee has “impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal scope” of the
Continued from page 13

patent grant with anticompetitive effect. Two common examples of such impermissible broadening are using a patent which enjoys market power in the relevant market, see 35 U.S.C. ‘ 271(d)(5) (1994), to restrain competition in an unpatented product or employing the patent beyond its 17-year term. In contrast, field of use restrictions (such as those at issue in the present case) are generally upheld, see General Talking Pictures, . . . and any anticompetitive effects they may cause are reviewed in accordance with the rule of reason.43

Federal Antitrust Guidelines
Unlike resale price maintenance of the Univis and Ethyl cases discussed in Quanta, express conditions on the post-sale use of product contained within intellectual property licenses are generally viewed as being pro-competitive by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission as long as the licensed rights are less than the rights that the licensor holds:

Field of use, territorial, and other limitations on intellectual property licenses may serve procompetitive ends by allowing the licensor to exploit its property as efficiently and effectively as possible. These various forms of exclusivity can be used to give a licensee an incentive to invest in the commercialization and distribution of products embodying the licensed intellectual property and to develop additional applications for the licensed property. The restrictions may do so, for example, by protecting the licensee against free-riding on the licensee’s investments by other licensees or by the licensor. They may also increase the licensor’s incentive to license, for example, by protecting the licensor from competition in the licensor’s own technology in a market niche that it prefers to keep to itself. These benefits of licensing restrictions apply to patent, copyright, and trade secret licenses, and to know-how agreements.

Example 1
Situation: ComputerCo develops a new, copyrighted software program for inventory management. The program has wide application in the health field. ComputerCo licenses the program in an arrangement that imposes both field of use and territorial limita-

tions. Some of ComputerCo’s licenses permit use only in hospitals; others permit use only in group medical practices. ComputerCo charges different royalties for the different uses. All of ComputerCo’s licenses permit use only in specified portions of the United States and in specified foreign countries. The licenses contain no provisions that would prevent or discourage licensees from developing, using, or selling any other program, or from competing in any other good or service other than in the use of the licensed program. None of the licensees are actual or likely potential competitors of ComputerCo in the sale of inventory management programs.44

Standard Form Agreements Such As Shrink-Wrap Agreements And Their Online Analogues

Background
Sellers of many types of products would like to control the use or disposition of their products after the products have been delivered to customers. For example, control over resale may be necessary to make a price discrimination scheme work as allowed by the antitrust laws described above. Another reason is that a vendor may simply not be willing to sell to a particular class of purchasers at all, such as to actual or potential competitors.

Price discrimination is possible only if the seller has some means to prevent arbitrage. If low-cost buyers could resell their products to high-cost buyers, such as over the Internet, they would swiftly undermine any such scheme for price discrimination. If the vendor can control resale, either by precluding it entirely or by limiting the class of purchasers to whom a buyer can resell, the vendor may be able to make a price discrimination scheme work.

To avoid the patent exhaustion doctrine as clarified by the Court in Quanta, conditional or restricted sales or licenses such as field of use licenses can be used. While many commercial contracts still conform to the classical model of contract formation wherein negotiation takes place, the vast majority of current contracts consist of standard forms.

Standard form contracts are necessary in a modern economy, and are important for efficiency and control purposes where an enterprise enters into many transactions of a similar kind. The drafter of the standard contract clearly
benefits from the contract’s terms, which are written to serve its interests. However, the impact on the other party or on society need not be negative. If the form’s terms are generally fair and not unduly one-sided they can create a sensible basis for contracting and could save on transaction costs and, consequently, keep prices down.

As mass markets for software emerged, software developers widely used standard form contracts in distributing their products not only to individual consumers but also to small and medium-sized businesses. In the mass market, software licenses could not practically be individually negotiated, so developers of software which is copyrightable began to use standard form licenses, a type of end user license. Also, such mass market end user license agreements were purported to avoid the copyright counterpart to the patent exhaustion doctrine, that is, the “First Sale Doctrine.” The uniform terms of standard form agreements which accompany the software facilitate high-volume distribution without the cost of individually negotiating individual licenses. The terms and conditions of use in the license agreement normally state that the customer/licensee can use the licensed copy only if it abides by the terms of such a license agreement. If the customer violates the agreement, the license normally requires that the licensed copy of software be returned.

A license agreement usually prohibits the customer/licensee from engaging in certain activities that it could otherwise engage in if it owned a copy of the software product. For example, typically a software license requires the customer/licensee to treat the software as a trade secret, prohibits reverse engineering of the software by the licensee, forbids the licensee from transferring the licensed copy by loan or sale to another party, requires that the software be used at a particular site or on a particular computer, and forbids use of the software on a computer network. Because of the additional control licensing can provide, most companies prefer to license rather than sell copies of their software.

Shrink-Wrap And Click-Through Agreements

Most early standard form end user license agreements for software were of the “shrink-wrap” type. The term “shrink-wrap” license usually refers to a license agreement, governing a purchaser’s use of software or digitized data, that is presented to the purchaser only after payment of the purchase price. The term takes its name from the clear plastic wrapping that typically surrounds boxes of software that are offered for sale at retail stores. The license agreement is enclosed within the box, and the shrink-wrap prevents the purchaser from reading its terms until after she pays for the software and is entitled to break the seal. There may or may not be a notice visible on the outside of the box, informing the prospective purchaser that additional terms are enclosed.

Step-Saver Case

Initially, courts were hesitant to enforce shrink-wrap licenses. In the Step-Saver case, once the leading case on shrink-wrap agreements, the court refused to enforce an end user license interjected by a software distributor in a dispute between the distributor and a value added reseller. This case involved a value added retailer, Step-Saver, who put together hardware and software packages to satisfy the word processing, data management, and communications needs for physicians and lawyers offices. Step-Saver selected software developed by The Software Link (TSL) as part of its package. This software developed chronic problems. Step-Saver sued TSL for breach of warranty.

The Third Circuit, applying UCC 2-207’s battle of the forms provisions, found that the end user agreement accompanying TSL’s software did not become part of the distribution contract between Step-Saver and TSL because TSL’s label notice of the condition at the time of purchase was only seen after paying for the product. Another way of looking at the Step-Saver case is that the court simply applied traditional offer and acceptance rules: The offer and acceptance occurred at the time of buying the goods. Terms not divulged to the offeree at that time are not part of the contract because the offeror cannot unilaterally impose terms on the offeree after the contract was formed.

ProCD Case

The first case to clearly address the enforceability issue in a dispute between an end user and a software publisher was ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg. Defendant, Zeidenberg, purchased a copy of plaintiff’s software, a program that was comprised of a database of information from over 3,000 nationwide phonebooks. Every box containing the software came with a notice on the outside of the box that the software comes with restrictions stated in an enclosed license. The software was sold for two prices, one for businesses, and the other for personal use, the latter being discounted. The personal use software contained a purchase agreement in the form of a “click-through” license with provisions against commercial use. Zeidenberg ignored the license and formed his own company, making the contents of the software available on his Web site for a fee.

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In determining whether defendant had breached the terms of his end user purchase agreement, the court held that the click-through license was enforceable under common law of contract and the UCC. The court stated:

Under Uniform Commercial Code ‘2-204(1): A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.

The court held that Zeidenberg did accept the offer by “clicking through.” The court noted, “He had no choice, because the software splashed the license on the screen and would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance.” The court also stated that Zeidenberg could have rejected the terms of the contract and returned the software.

ProCD emphasized the importance of standard form contracting and its benefits in streamlining contract formation in a modern economy. Furthermore, the court noted that it would be very cumbersome to insist that standard terms are made apparent when goods or services are ordered, so the law has to accommodate the practice of disseminating standard form contracts. ProCD stands for the proposition that it is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable for a party to provide standard terms that are not revealed to the other party at the time the transaction is entered provided that the terms are accessible, they are not outside the reasonable expectations of the marketplace, and they are not unduly harsh or one sided.

Another way of looking at ProCD is that the court adjusted the view of when a traditional offer and acceptance occurred: there was no offer and acceptance at the time of buying the software. Rather, the delivery of the standard terms (which occurs upon delivery of the box of goods that contain notice of the terms) is an offer. The buyer accepts the offer if he does not reject it within a reasonable time by returning or declining the benefit of the contract. This provides an opportunity to read the forms at the time of delivery and gives the buyer the opportunity to refuse to contract on the offeror’s standard terms by returning the product.

Boot Screen, Click-Wrap And Browse-Wrap Agreements

Background

More common today than shrink-wrap agreements are so-called boot screen, click-wrap, or browse-wrap agreements. In a boot screen license, the license appears on the computer screen the first time the software runs (or “boots”). The user agrees to the license by clicking on “I agree” button or icon or typing in the user’s name. This license is similar to the click-through agreement of the ProCD case noted above. If the user does not agree to the license, the software stops running.

A click-wrap license agreement accompanies software that is downloaded, usually from a server. Prior to download or installation, the license agreement is displayed. Like a boot screen license, the user manifests assent to the terms of the license agreement by clicking the “I agree” button or typing the user’s name. If the user does not agree, the software cannot be downloaded or installed.

A browse-wrap license is like a click-wrap license except that it is part of a website and the user assents to the contract when the user visits the website.

Click-wrap licenses are similar to shrink-wrap licenses except that they are viewed online and the software is usually downloaded over the Internet. Click-wrap licenses are generally held to be enforceable when the license terms are viewed prior to the software’s purchase or installation.51

Specht Case52

Facts. The defendant in this case, Netscape Communications, offered software which allows users to access the Internet. The company has a software application called “Smart Download” which helps users download files from the Internet. It has the capability to pause downloads or to resume downloading if the Internet connection is broken.

Users who want to download Smart Download can go to Netscape’s Web site to download the application. On the Web site, there is a download button, which, when clicked, downloads the “Smart Download” software. The reference to a License Agreement can be found only if a user scrolls down to the bottom of the page where the following text is displayed:

Please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape Smart Download software license agreement before
The use of each Netscape software product is governed by a license agreement. You must read and agree to the license agreement terms BEFORE acquiring a product. Please click on the appropriate link below to review the current license agreement for the product of interest to you before acquisition. For products available for download, you must read and agree to the license agreement terms BEFORE you install the software. If you do not agree to the license terms, do not download, install or use the software.

This page also contains a link to the full text of the Smart Download software license. This license agreement indicates that by using or installing the Smart Download software, the user agrees to be bound by the terms of the license agreement:

**BY CLICKING THE ACCEPTANCE BUTTON OR INSTALLING OR USING NETSCAPE COMMUNICATOR, NETSCAPE NAVIGATOR, OR NETSCAPE SMART DOWNLOAD SOFTWARE (THE “PRODUCT”), THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY/licensing THE PRODUCT (“LICENSEE”) IS CONSENTING TO BE BOUND BY AND IS BECOMING A PARTY TO THIS AGREEMENT. IF LICENSEE DOES NOT AGREE TO ALL OF THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, THE BUTTON INDICATING NON-ACCEPTANCE MUST BE SELECTED, AND LICENSEE MUST NOT INSTALL OR USE THE SOFTWARE.**

However, a user can download and use the software without taking any action explicitly indicating consent to the License Agreement.

**District Court Ruling.** The court applied California law and ruled that no contract was formed with respect to the license agreement for the Smart Download software. The Smart Download license agreement was not binding because: 1) the user did not have to click on an icon or link to unambiguously express assent to the terms of the associated license as a precondition to downloading and using the software; and 2) the text near where the user can download the application merely indicated an invitation to view the license agreement not a precondition that the user must agree to before using the software.

**Jacobsen Case**

**Background.** The key element in open-source licensing is providing source code under a license with broad rights to modify and redistribute. Open-source is not about simply giving the code away. The license agreement gives one control over what people do with the code so that the licensor can rely on intellectual property rights to enforce the license. However, by making the source code publicly available it is no longer confidential. So, although one is relying on copyright rights, you are giving up trade secret protection for the code.

Some of the elements typically found in an open-source license, or in open-source code, include the following:

1. **You may be required to post or disclose your “diffs,”** the changes that you made to the open-source code. Some licenses require that you identify, post, or disclose what you changed from the original program. Thus, if I download your version, I would know what was different and what changes you made.

2. **The license may contain restrictions on your ability to charge for distribution either in binary and/or source code form.**

3. **Open-source licenses usually include limitation of liability provisions, disclaimers of warranties (and, potentially, attribution or flow-through requirements), protecting you and all the upstream contributors to that code.**

**Facts.** The case involves certain software code made available by Robert Jacobsen, a physics professor at the University of California, on behalf of an open-source software group called the Java Model Railroad Interface (JMRI). Jacobsen offered the software free of charge under a type

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of open-source license called an Artistic License, which required only that subsequent distributors of the code include attribution, credit, and modification information. The Artistic License stated on its face that the document creates conditions: “The intent of this document is to state the conditions under which a Package may be copied.” (Emphasis added.) The Artistic License also uses the traditional language of conditions by noting that the rights to copy, modify, and distribute are granted “provided that” the conditions are met.

Matthew Katzer and his business, KAM Industries, incorporated the JMRI code into a commercial product that they called Decoder Commander. The program was used to program decoder chips in model trains. After Katzer failed to comply with the requirements of the Artistic License, Jacobsen filed a lawsuit claiming copyright infringement and seeking a preliminary injunction halting Katzer’s distribution of the JMRI code.

**District Court Ruling.** The district court had held that the Artistic License was “unlimited in scope” and did not provide a basis for copyright infringement. In particular, the court stated that the attribution and modification tracking requirements were covenants and not conditions in the Artistic License and that failure to comply with such covenants did not support enjoining use of the code. The district court also held that, although Jacobsen had a cause of action for breach of the license agreement, he did not have a cause of action for copyright infringement.

**Federal Circuit Ruling.** The Federal Circuit applied the copyright law of the Ninth Circuit, primarily relying on the analysis and holding in *Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.* In holding that a licensor providing free open-source software can enforce a restriction or condition on further distribution of the software through terms in an open-source software license requiring attribution credits to the author and modification tracking. The court looked to California contract law wherein the language “provided that” typically denotes a condition. The defendant failed to meet those requirements, breaching the license agreement by violating a condition of the license, and thereby infringed the plaintiff’s copyright.

Under *Sun Microsystems*, a breach of a covenant in a license gives rise only to a claim for breach of contract, whereas breach of a license condition takes the licensee’s conduct outside the scope of the license and so constitutes copyright infringement with a presumption of irreparable harm. The court said “Open source licensing has become a widely used method of creative collaboration that serves to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined just a few decades ago,” and cited as examples “the GNU/Linux operating system, the Perl programming language, the Apache web server programs, the Firefox web browser, and the collaborative web-based encyclopedia called Wikipedia.”

**Printer Cartridge Business Models And Cases**

**Background**

Over the lifetime of modern computer printers, the cost of the ink cartridges can in typical usage be much more than the printer itself. Consumers have a motivation to refill their own cartridges either themselves or through third-parties. Large printer manufacturers like Lexmark, Hewlett-Packard and Epson have been waging an ongoing battle with third-party ink sellers. The manufacturers have sought to employ standard form contracts and the intellectual property laws in their battle to control the use of their products after “first sale” with greater or lesser success as noted in the following Hewlett-Packard and Lexmark cases.

**Hewlett-Packard Case**

**Facts**

HP manufactures and sells ink jet printers and disposable ink jet cartridges for its printers. Before running out of ink, the cartridges can print approximately 200 to 2000 pages, depending on the cartridge used and the nature of the printing being performed. Once the ink in a cartridge has been depleted, HP expects the cartridge to be discarded and replaced by a new one. Instructions accompanying the cartridges disclaim liability for printer damage caused by refilling and advise the user to “discard old print cartridge immediately.”

The HP cartridges were designed to be non-refillable. HP stated because “refilled cartridges present significant problems of resistor lifetime, nozzle clogging and air bubble formation, the cartridges are not intended to be refilled. Accordingly, the user instructions in the HP cartridges advise the user to “Discard old print cartridge immediately.” Defendant, Repeat-O-Type Stencil (“ROT”), has chosen to disregard...
HP’s advice. ROT purchases HP cartridges, modifies them so that they will be refillable, and then resells them as refillable ink jet cartridges. As HP concedes, ROT starts with brand-new and unused HP cartridges. It does not modify “spent” cartridges.

HP filed suit against ROT after learning that ROT was selling refillable ink jet cartridges. HP asserted that ROT’s modification and resale of the cartridges infringed HP patents.

Federal Circuit Ruling

The Federal Circuit determined that despite what HP labeled as a single-use condition, it actually sold its printer cartridges unconditionally. More specifically, HP owned numerous patents on a toner cartridge compatible with its HP brand printers. HP’s instruction manual advised consumers to “discard old print cartridge immediately.” Defendant ROT, however, obtained the used cartridges and refurbished and resold them. In finding that ROT had not infringed HP’s patent rights, the court noted that HP had not placed any restrictions on the sale of the cartridges. “A non-contractual intention is simply the seller’s hope or wish, rather than an enforceable restriction.” To create a conditional sale, HP had to do more than place the words “discard old print cartridge immediately” in the instruction manual.

The Lexmark Cases

The Lexmark Business Model

The plaintiff, Lexmark (a spinoff from IBM), manufactures and markets laser and inkjet printers, along with printer toner cartridges. Lexmark designed and implemented a business strategy that enabled owners of certain Lexmark printers to buy either an ink cartridge at the regular price or a “Prebate” ink cartridge at a discounted price. A Prebate is similar to a rebate, but with a Prebate there is no need to send in a receipt to acquire a refund. Instead, the consumer accepts a shrink-wrap license agreement (that appeared on the outside of the packaging) and is offered an on-the-spot discount. For instance, in Lexmark, by opening Prebate cartridge packaging, consumers accepted the following agreement that required them to return their spent Prebate cartridge to Lexmark after the initial use and prohibited them from refilling the spent cartridge:

RETURN EMPTY CARTRIDGE TO LEXMARK FOR REMANUFACTURING AND RECYCLING. Please read before opening. Opening this package or using the patented cartridge inside confirms your acceptance of the following license/agreement. This all-new cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a restriction that it may be used only once. Following this initial use, you agree to return the empty cartridge only to Lexmark for remanufacturing and recycling. If you don’t accept these terms, return the unopened package to your point of purchase. A regular price cartridge without these terms is available.

To ensure customer compliance with the shrink-wrap agreement, Lexmark manufactured the Prebate cartridges with a microchip that prevented their compatibility with a Lexmark printer if the cartridges had been refilled. Lexmark placed the microchip on each Prebate cartridge, and employed an authentication sequence whereby certain Lexmark printers exchanged a “secret handshake” with each microchip.

Two computer programs allegedly were protected by the secret handshake. A Toner Loading Program (i.e., TLP) was located on each microchip, and downloaded by the printer to calculate the quantity of toner left within the cartridge. One version of the TLP contained 33 instructions and occupied 37 bytes of memory. Another version of the TLP contained 45 commands and occupied 55 bytes of memory.

A Printer Engine Program (i.e., PEP) resided within the printer, and controlled certain printer functions. The programs were protected by the secret handshake in the sense that the printer would return an error message and fail to operate upon the insertion of a toner cartridge incapable of satisfying the secret handshake. However, neither program was encrypted nor required a password to be read from memory.

The secret handshake was initiated whenever a Lexmark printer was powered up, opened or closed, or when a toner cartridge was inserted therein. When any of these events occurred, both the microchip and the printer calculated an authentication code, the results of which were then compared. The printer would function only when the authentication codes matched.

Case Against Static Control

Facts. The defendant, Static Control Components (SCC), manufactures, among other items, component parts for refurbished toner cartridges. By October of 2002, SCC had developed its Smartek microchip for use with remanufactured Prebate cartridges. This microchip mimicked the authentication sequence to allow interoperability between Lexmark printers and Prebate cartridges refurbished by unauthorized parties. Although SCC had independently reverse-engineered a means for bypassing the authentication sequence,
it programmed wholesale copies of the TLP onto its Smartek chips.

District Court Ruling. On December 30, 2002, Lexmark brought suit and moved for a preliminary injunction against SCC. Lexmark claimed that SCC’s Smartek chips infringed its copyright in the TLP, and that distribution of the chips violated the ’1201(a)(2) anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA. The district court first concluded that Lexmark’s claims of copyright infringement were likely to prevail on the merits. The court stated that the plain meaning of the statutory language was clear and therefore any appeal to legislative history of the DMCA would be inappropriate. Consequently, the court granted the preliminary injunction.

Sixth Circuit Ruling. SCC appealed the district court’s ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. As is usual for federal appeals in the United States, three judges (Gilbert S. Merritt, Jeffrey S. Sutton, and John Feikens (a district court judge temporarily assisting the appeals court) considered the case. On October 26, 2004, the judges issued their ruling. Somewhat unusually, all three judges wrote opinions.

Majority Opinion. In the majority opinion, Judge Sutton (with Judge Merritt agreeing) reversed the lower court’s ruling and vacated the temporary injunction, holding that Lexmark was unlikely to succeed in its case. The court found that the TLP was not copyrightable because of the merger and scenes a faire doctrines of the copyright law, and even if it were copyrightable SCC’s use of the program in this case appears to fall under the fair use exception of the copyright law. Its purpose, though commercial in nature, was only to sell cartridges that could be used by Lexmark printers rather than to profit by infringing any Lexmark copyright.

The court stated that the fact that the Toner Loading Program was not copyrightable defeated both Lexmark’s direct claim to copyright infringement and its DMCA claim based on the Toner Loading Program (because the DMCA only prevents the circumvention of measures that protect copyright-protected works). Also, Lexmark’s DMCA claim based on the clearly copyrightable Printer Engine Program failed because the authentication sequence does not, and is not intended to, “effectively control[] access” to the Printer Engine Program. Rather, the purchase of the printer itself allowed access to the program. “Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of the Printer Engine Program directly from the printer memory, with or without the benefit of the authentication sequence[...]. No security device, in other words, protects access to the Printer Engine Program[...].”

Concurring Opinion. In a concurring opinion, Judge Merritt agreed with Judge Sutton on the outcome of this particular case, but also expressly rejected the suggestion that any device that intentionally circumvents a technological access control measure violates the DMCA, regardless of the purpose of the circumvention. Were that the case, Judge Merritt noted, “Manufacturers could potentially create monopolies for replacement parts simply by using similar, but more creative, lock-out codes. Automobile manufacturers, for example, could control the entire market of replacement parts for their vehicles by including lock-out chips. Congress did not intend to allow the DMCA to be used offensively in this manner, but rather only sought to reach those who circumvented protective measures ‘for the purpose’ of pirating works protected by the copyright statute.”

Concurring/Dissenting Opinion. Judge John Feikens also joined in the majority opinion by agreeing that the DMCA was not intended by Congress to be used to create a monopoly in the secondary markets for parts or components of products that consumers have already purchased. He also agreed on the outcome of the second count, although he came to that conclusion for different reasons. Judge Feikens authored a separate opinion that concurred with respect to Lexmark’s DMCA claims. In particular, he stated his view that a customer’s purchase of a Lexmark printer entitles the customer to use the Printer Engine Program for the life of the printer. Judge Feikens dissented as to the majority’s decision on the first count, regarding the copyrightability and infringement of the Toner Loading Program (TLP).

Footnote 10 of Judge Feikens’ opinion is particularly instructive with respect to this paper:

SCC contends that such shrinkwrap agreements are not enforceable. In support of this, at least one amicus brief cites a 2001 Federal Circuit court decision that held there must be a “meeting of the minds” in order for restrictions in the agreement to be enforceable. Jazz Phot Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm., 264 F.3d 1094, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 950 (2002). Other circuits have upheld the validity of shrinkwrap agree-
ments. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that terms inside a box of software bind consumers who use the software after an opportunity to read the terms and to reject them by returning the product). Here, the shrinkwrap agreement was clear and the district court could find that it supports the conclusion that there was a meeting of the minds and the agreement is enforceable. To wit: “This all-new cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a restriction that it may be used only once. Following this initial use, you agree to return the empty cartridge only to Lexmark for remanufacturing and recycling. If you don’t accept these terms, return the unopened package to your point of purchase. A regular price cartridge without these terms is available.” Finally, I note this case is factually different from Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., Inc., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997), in which the shrinkwrap agreement contained only a warning against refilling, and did not condition the sale on a promise not to refill.

**District Court 2009 Ruling.** After the 2004 Sixth Circuit ruling described above, SCC filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that its new line of re-engineered toner chips did not infringe Lexmark’s copyrights or violate the DMCA. The cases were consolidated by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. In April 2007, the court ruled that the Toner Loading Program was not sufficiently original to be afforded copyright protection.62 Lexmark’s counterclaims included claims of infringement of nine patents.63 Static Control asserted exhaustion and invalidity as defenses and moved for summary judgment. Regarding the exhaustion argument, the court ruled that the restrictions were legitimate and could be enforced against a consumer.64

Recently, however, as reported at 77 BNA’s PTCJ 634, on March 31, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky relied on the Quanta case to reverse its earlier ruling that Lexmark’s shrink-wrap license terms were enforceable. The court stated that the Quanta ruling preventing LGE from using its patents to restrict the actions of downstream users prompts a “renewed” understanding of the first-sale doctrine that requires reversal of a decision that allowed Lexmark to use its patents to enforce restrictions on reuse of the cartridges by end users. Due to the prior dealings between the parties, this decision will most likely be appealed, but this time to the Federal Circuit since the Federal Circuit hears all patent appeals.

**Case Against Arizona Cartridge**

**Facts.** Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Association (i.e., ACRA) is an association of remanufacturers who obtain, refill, refurbish or remanufacture used toner cartridges for laser printers. ACRA filed an action against Lexmark for false and misleading advertising and unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code “17500 and 17200, and for conspiracy to violate those statutes.

The heart of ACRA’s complaint for misleading statements and unfair business practices arise out of three programs that Lexmark has initiated: the Prebate program, Lexmark’s threats of litigation, and Lexmark’s implementation of a lock-out chip.

**District Court Ruling.**65 Initially, the district court was not convinced that this was truly a false and misleading advertising case:

This is not a patent case. At least, that is what ACRA would have this Court believe. This is a case about deceptive advertising; about how Lexmark has deceived customers into believing that they are subject to a post-sale condition that, as a matter of law, is unenforceable. Whether or not it is, however, hinges on whether or not it falls within Lexmark’s patent rights. This may not be a patent case, but to determine whether or not Lexmark has engaged in deceptive and unfair business practices the Court must analyze this case under the rubric of patent law.

The court stated that:

Unlike the sale in Hewlett-Packard,66 here Lexmark does not obscure its single-use condition in its instruction manual. It places the Prebate label on the outside of its cartridge boxes. A purchaser picking up the Lexmark box will readily note the words, “Opening this package or using the patented cartridge inside confirms your acceptance of the following license/agreement.” Thus, ... whether it buys directly from Lexmark or indirectly through an intermediary distributor, the Lexmark purchaser is on notice that Lexmark has imposed a single-use condition on the cartridge. ... [T]he Lexmark purchaser can reject the condition. The Prebate package states, “[i]f you don’t accept these terms, return the unopened package to your point of purchase.” If the purchaser returns the Prebate cartridge, it can obtain a non-Prebate cartridge. If the purchaser does not return

Continued on next page
the Prebate cartridge, then . . . the Lexmark purchaser has accepted the single-use restriction.

Moreover, the Lexmark purchaser has accepted the single-use condition in exchange for a lower price. “This patented cartridge is sold at a special price . . .” [Citation omitted.] If the purchaser wishes to obtain a Lexmark cartridge without conditions, it may do so at a price that reflects Lexmark’s exhaustion of rights.

In short, the circumstances of the sale indicate: (1) purchasers, including end-users, are on notice of the single-use condition; (2) purchasers have an opportunity to reject the condition; and (3) the Prebate is offered at a special price that reflects an exchange for a single-use condition. Based on these circumstances, the Court concludes that Lexmark has not exhausted its rights. The Prebate is a conditional sale and the single-use condition is enforceable.

Ninth Circuit Ruling. The court affirmed the district court by holding: (1) restriction on reuse of cartridges did not violate California unfair competition and false advertising statutes, and (2) placement of a special chip in cartridges that prevent reuse did not violate California unfair competition statute.

Moreover, the ruling also states that such shrink-wrap contracts are binding on consumers who “indicate their agreement” by performing a physical action, as long as that contract was available to consumers before purchase: “Lexmark has presented sufficient unrebutted evidence to show that it has a facially valid contract with the consumers who buy and open its cartridges. Specifically, the language on the outside of the cartridge package specifies the terms under which a consumer may use the purchased item. The consumer can read the terms and conditions on the box before deciding whether to accept them or whether to opt for the non-Prebate cartridges that are sold without any restrictions. The district court found that the ultimate purchasers of the cartridge (consumers) had notice of the restrictions on use and had a chance to reject the condition before opening the clearly marked cartridge container.”

The court distinguished the Step-Saver case by stating in footnote 6 that:

This case is different from those instances in which a consumer lacks notice of the condition at the time of purchase. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991) (treating box-top license as an additional term not incorporated into the parties’ contract where the term’s addition to the contract would materially alter the agreement and the consumer did not see license until after paying for product). Another variant involves “shrinkwrap licenses” on software, which impose restrictions that a consumer may discover only after opening and installing the software. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that contract between the parties included license agreement terms that appeared on screen even though they came after user had purchased, opened and installed software).

Conclusion And Practice Pointers For Creating Standard Form Agreements To Avoid Patent Exhaustion

In view of the above, patentees should consider drafting the license grant clause in negotiated and non-negotiated standard form agreements narrowly through field of use limitations. Doing so may allow the patentee to extract a royalty or other consideration from each downstream conditional or restricted sale when it is prudent to do so from a business perspective. Patentees should consider such narrow license grants where the product includes software. Many purchasers are now conditioned to accept such a license when software is involved with a product.

In light of the Court’s examination of the language in the Master Agreement and License Agreement in Quanta, the restrictions should be explicit and unequivocal in describing the nature of future sales of licensed products. Patentees should also consider explicit restrictions on the types of downstream products that may be combined with the licensee’s products.

For instance, LGE may have included in its license grant clause a provision restricting Intel to selling products only to
entities that LGE had licensed to make and use computers under LGE’s patents. If Intel sold to an unlicensed customer, the sale would not have been contractually an “authorized sale,” and, as the Quanta court clearly said, authorized sales are a prerequisite for patent exhaustion.

A grant clause limited to sales in a field defined by customers who are licensed could read as follows:

LICENSOR hereby grants to LICENSEE a nonexclusive license to make or import LICENSED COMPONENTS and to offer for sale and sell such LICENSED COMPONENTS solely to entities who are licensed by LICENSOR at the time of such sale or offer for sale [or] to entities who agree as a condition of such sale not to use the LICENSED COMPONENTS without a license from LICENSOR.

Such a grant clause would deprive the licensee of authority to sell to unlicensed entities and thus any such sale would not be “authorized” and would not exhaust the patent owner’s rights.

A licensee may be authorized to sell products only with a standard form license agreement, such as a shrink-wrap agreement or a click-wrap agreement. Sales without the shrink-wrap agreement would be outside the license and an infringement. Of course, sales with the standard form agreement would be authorized with respect to such end-user license agreements. To meet the contractual expectations of the end user, such agreements should:

- Clearly alert potential end users that use of the product is subject to a license agreement, preferably prior to payment but certainly before or with first use.
- Make it clear that the product is only offered for use under the agreement’s terms.
- Give the user a meaningful opportunity to review the terms of the agreement at the time of sale.
- Given the medium, make the agreement as user friendly to review as possible.
- Provide a meaningful mechanism for the user to manifest assent to the agreement.
- Provide a means for the user to keep or get a copy of the agreement.
- Provide an opportunity for the user to decline the terms of the agreement, such as, by providing a refund, or by allowing return of the product.

Endnotes

2 Id. at 2118.
3 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1853); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873).
4 In another case, as reported at 77 BNA’s PTCJ 664, on April 8, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that an unconditional covenant not to sue in a settlement agreement is authorization to sell under Quanta, thereby frustrating the intent of the parties to the agreement. Transcore LP v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.
5 LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 USPQ2d 1589 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (sales held to be “authorized.”)
6 LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
7 More broadly, the doctrine is often called the “exhaustion doctrine” and is a rule that some or all of the exclusive rights belong to the owner of intellectual property are terminated as to a particular item upon the first authorized sale of that item by the owner of the intellectual property or the owner’s licensee. In the Copyright Act this rule is codified at 17 U.S.C. 109(a) and is known as the First Sale Doctrine.
8 “A Market for Ideas,” October 20, 2005, The Economist. (“In America alone, technology licensing revenues account for an estimated $45 billion annually; worldwide, the figure is around $100 billion and growing fast.” IBM alone earns over $1 billion annually from its intellectual property portfolio. HP’s revenue from licensing has quadrupled in less than three years, to over $200 million this year [2005].”).
9 Quanta Computer, 128 S.Ct. at 2113.
10 Id. at 2113-14.
11 Id. at 2114.
12 Id.
13 Id. (quoting License Agreement).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 USPQ2d 1589, 1593, 1600 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
18 LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
19 Id. at 1370.
The practice of granting licenses for restricted use is an old one, see Rubber Company v. Goodyear [76 U.S.] 9 Wall. 788, 799, 800 [19 L.Ed. 566 (1870)]; Gamewell Fire-Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Brooklyn, 14 F. 255 [C.C.N.Y. (1882)]. So far as it appears, its legality has never been questioned.

305 U.S. at 127, 59 S.Ct. at 117, 39 USPQ at 330.)

37 General Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 182.
38 Id. at 180-81.
40 Id. at 709.
41 In accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code, a license notice may become a term of sale, even if not part of the original transaction, if not objected to within a reasonable time. U.C.C. ' 1-207(2)(c).
42 B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
43 Id. at 1426.
44 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, Sec. 2.3 (April 6, 1995). (A discussion following the Situation of Example 1 stated: "The key competitive issue raised by the licensing arrangement is whether it harms competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors in the absence of the arrangement. Such harm could occur if, for example, the licenses anticompetitively foreclose access to competing technologies (in this case, most likely competing computer programs), prevent licensees from developing their own competing technologies (again, in this case, most likely computer programs), or facilitate market allocation or price-fixing for any product or service supplied by the licensees. (See section 3.1.) If the license agreements contained such provisions, the Agency evaluating the arrangement would analyze its likely competitive effects as described in parts 3-5 of these Guidelines. In this hypothetical, there are no such provisions and thus the arrangement is merely a subdivision of the licensor’s intellectual property among different fields of use and territories. The licensing arrangement does not appear likely to harm competition among entities that would have been actual or likely potential competitors if ComputerCo had chosen not to license the software program. The Agency therefore would be unlikely to object to this arrangement. Based on these facts, the result of the antitrust analysis would be the same whether the technology was protected by patent, copyright, or trade secret. The Agency’s conclusion as to likely competitive effects could differ if, for example, the license barred licensees from using any other inventory management program.”)

This doctrine is an exception to the exclusive right of a copyright owner to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work. Under this exception, after the first sale of a lawfully made copy or phonorecord of the copyrighted work, anyone who is the owner of that copy can sell or
dispose of that copy in any way without copyright infringe-
ment liability. This rule is codified in 17 U.S.C. ’ 109(a).
However, if the copyright owner transfers only possession
of a copy or phonorecord, without conveying title in the
object, then there is no ownership and the first sale doctrine
is not triggered. For example, if the owner of copyright in a
computer program licenses copies of the program to users,
a user would infringe the copyright if it resold that copy to
another. This rule is codified in 17 U.S.C. ’ 109(d).

46 Footnote 2 of the case Vault v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847
F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988), shows the kind of “shrink-wrap”
standard form license agreement terms that software mak-
ers typically enclose with their software as follows:

IMPORTANT! VAULT IS PROVIDING THE ENCLOSED
MATERIALS TO YOU ON THE EXPRESS CONDITION
THAT YOU ASSENT TO THIS SOFTWARE LICENSE. BY
USING ANY OF THE ENCLOSED DISKETTE(S), YOU
AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS. IF YOU
DO NOT AGREE WITH THESE LICENSE PROVISIONS,
RETURN THESE MATERIALS TO YOUR DEALER, IN
ORIGINAL PACKAGING WITHIN 3 DAYS FROM RE-
CEIPT, FOR A REFUND.

1. This copy of the PROLOK Software Protection Sys-
tem and this PROLOK Software Protection Diskette (the
“Licensed Software”) are licensed to you, the end-user,
for your own internal use. Title to the Licensed Software
and all copyrights and proprietary rights in the Licensed
Software shall remain with VAULT. You may not transfer,
sublicense, rent, lease, convey, copy, modify, translate,
convert to another programming language, decompile
or disassemble the Licensed Software for any purpose
without VAULT’s prior written consent.

2. THE LICENSED SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED “AS-IS”.
VAULT DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES AND REPRE-
sentations of any kind with regard to the
LICENSED SOFTWARE, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. UNDER NO CIRCUM-
STANCES WILL VAULT BE LIABLE FOR ANY CONSE-
quential, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL OR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES EVEN IF VAULT IS APPRISED OF
THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH DAMAGES OCCURRING.
SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE LIMITATION
OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY FOR INCIDENTAL OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE LIMIT-
ATION OR EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.

47 Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 979
F.2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1991).
48 Another case which follows this view is Klocek v. Gateway,
Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). However, even
that court stated in footnote 14 of the opinion that “it is not
unreasonable for a vendor to clearly communicate to a
buyer (at the time of sale) either the complete terms of
the sale or the fact that the vendor will propose additional terms
as a condition of sale, if that be the case.”
49 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
50 Similar to shrink-wrap licenses, a click-through license is
used by manufacturers of computer software when distribut-
ing software through the Internet, or before installation of
the software on the end-user’s computer. The click-through
license typically pops up on a computer display either
before the user can initiate the download, or install the
software. Although some of the same objections raised for
shrink-wrap licenses can be raised for click-through licenses,
i.e., that they are unenforceable adhesion contracts, the pre-
vailing notion is that click-through licenses are enforceable
since they present the user with the opportunity to read the
contract and agree to the terms of its use.
51 i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183
F.Supp.2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002) (“If ProCD was cor-
rect to enforce a shrink-wrap license agreement, where any
assent is implicit, then it must also be correct to enforce a
click-wrap license agreement, where the assent is explicit.
To be sure, shrink-wrap and click-wrap license agreements
share the defect of any standardized contract ... they are
susceptible to the inclusion of terms that border on the
unconscionable ... but that is not the issue in this case. The
only issue before the Court is whether click-wrap license
agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts, and
the Court holds they are.”).
52 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F.Supp.2d
585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
54 188 F.3d 1715 (9th Cir. 1999).
55 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
56 123 F.3d at 1447.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1453.
60 Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
61 Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
Court Rules Red Flags Rule Does Not Apply to Lawyers

Following oral argument on October 29, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) lacks authority to apply the Red Flags Rule to practicing lawyers, offering a reprieve to law firms across the country that faced weekend deadlines to put programs in place to meet the rule’s requirements, scheduled to go into effect on November 1, 2009.

The Red Flags Rule is an identity-theft prevention measure that requires creditors who defer payments for goods and services to develop and implement written protocols to identify, detect, and respond to warning signs of identity theft. In the spring of 2009, the FTC announced without prior notice or warning that lawyers are considered “creditors” under the rule and thus subject to its provisions. In late July, the FTC, at the request of the American Bar Association, suspended application of the rule to lawyers until November 1, but it rejected the ABA’s argument that the rule did not apply to lawyers. The ABA filed suit against the FTC on August 27, 2009, seeking an injunction to block the application of the rule to lawyers. Judge Reggie B. Walton of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered an order granting summary judgment as to Count I of the ABA’s complaint alleging that the Commission’s application of the Red Flags Rule to attorneys violates 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) as it is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” A memorandum opinion with points and authorities will issue within 30 days.

Counsel for the ABA says it has won all the relief it sought in its challenge to the regulation, including injunctive relief. The order in ABA v. FTC was handed down October 30, 2009—two days before the Red Flags Rule was scheduled to go into effect. The FTC is reviewing whether to appeal the decision. It continues to maintain that lawyers are not exempt from the rule.

In early June and again in late July, the State Bar of Michigan published Member Alerts, providing members information about the rule, the FTC’s position, and the ABA’s response.

There is also pending federal legislation, H.R. 3763, that would exempt from the rule any legal practice with 20 or fewer employees. The bill was unanimously passed by the House of Representatives on October 20 and is awaiting Senate action.
Publicly Available Websites for IT Lawyers

Following are some publicly available websites relating to varying aspects of information technology law practice. Some of these websites may require payment for certain services. Neither the State Bar of Michigan nor the IT Law Section endorses these websites, the providers of the website, or the goods or services offered in connection therewith. Rather these websites are provided for information purposes only and as possible useful tools for your law practice.

Please provide any feedback or recommendations for additional websites to brianhall@traverselegal.com or michael@gallo.us.com.

Privacy Resources

- [http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/id theft](http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/id theft) - Identity theft resources provided by the Federal Trade Commission.
- [http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs16-bck.htm](http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs16-bck.htm) - Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s Guide’, provided by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a non-profit consumer organization with a two-part mission - consumer information and consumer advocacy.
- [http://epic.org/privacy/ssn](http://epic.org/privacy/ssn) - Information regarding Social Security Numbers, which is provided by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a public interest research center established to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues.
- [http://www.worldprivacyforum.org](http://www.worldprivacyforum.org) - The World Privacy Forum, a nonprofit, non-partisan 501 (C) (3) public interest research group that is focused on conducting in-depth research, analysis, and consumer education in the area of privacy.
- [http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty](http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty) - Privacy related content and issues, as monitored and promoted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
- [http://www.cdt.org](http://www.cdt.org) - The Center for Democracy & Technology, a non-profit public interest organization, which seeks practical solutions to enhance free expression and privacy in communications technologies.
- [http://www.connectingforhealth.org](http://www.connectingforhealth.org) - Connection for Health, a public-private collaborative that promotes the use of health information technology, while protecting patient privacy and the security of personal health information.
- [http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy](http://www.eff.org/issues/privacy) - Privacy concerns presented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a donor-funded nonprofit organization that champions digital rights in free speech, privacy, innovation, and consumer rights.