Stamps of Power and Conflict:
Imprinting and Influence in the U.S. Senate, 1973-2009*

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Abstract
Structural power is often assumed to lead to influence. Yet people vary in their ability to convert power into influence, and the experience of power can itself sow the seeds for the loss of influence. We bring a temporal, historical perspective to account for these disparities and apparent contradictions. We theorize that the gain or loss of power produces corresponding shifts in influence; however, these effects are contingent upon people’s experiences with power and conflict at the time of organizational entry. Individuals who enter an organization wielding considerable structural power can acquire enduring cognitive rigidities—a stamp of power—that subsequently make them less influential, while those who initially experience conflict can derive lasting learning benefits—a stamp of conflict—that later make them more influential. We evaluate and find support for these propositions in analyses of the U.S. Senate from 1973 to 2009: (1) senators became more influential when their party moved into the majority and when they became committee chairs; (2) entering the Senate as a member of the majority party dampened senators’ subsequent ability to exert influence; and (3) initial assignment to politically divided committees enhanced senators’ later influence.

We discuss implications for research on power, conflict, and imprinting.

Keywords: Power; Influence; Imprinting; Conflict; Networks; Collaboration.
INTRODUCTION

Structural power, or the control over resources on which others depend (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Weber, 1978), is often assumed to lead to greater interpersonal influence—the ability to persuade and secure the compliance of others on issues over which there is overt or implicit conflict (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Yet people vary considerably in their ability to convert structural power into influence (Pfeffer, 1981; Molm, 1990; Brass and Burkhardt, 1993). Moreover, the experience of power can itself change people in ways that sow the seeds for their later loss of influence—a phenomenon often referred to as the paradox of power (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson, 2003).

Given these disparities and contradictions, recent years have seen a surge of research on the benefits and pitfalls of power (for recent reviews, see Galinsky et al., 2012; Lucas and Baxter, 2012; Anderson and Brion, 2014). These studies have used a variety of experimental methods to advance our understanding of the causal effects of the experience of power. At the same time, they have tended to focus on power’s proximate antecedents and consequences, typically within dyads or small groups (for a review, see Mason, Conrey, and Smith, 2007).

Missing from this literature has been a temporal, historical perspective that considers how earlier experiences in careers can shape how influential people become in an organizational system as a whole when they later gain or lose structural power. Yet we know that past organizational experiences can have profound consequences for people’s future attitudes and behavior (van Maanen, 1975; Ashforth and Saks, 1996; Michel, 2007; Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). Just as the environmental conditions and founder characteristics at the time an organization was founded can leave lasting imprints on its structure (Beckman and Burton, 2008) and the relative power of its subunits (Boeker, 1989), so there is reason to expect that initial
experiences with conflict and power upon entering a new organization will affect an individual’s subsequent levels of influence.

Yet we have heretofore lacked a compelling account of whether and how initial experiences with structural power and conflict can alter people’s ability to later exert influence. Moreover, within the imprinting literature, the focus has been on the formative early stages of careers (e.g., McEvily, Jaffee, and Tortoriello, 2012). It remains unclear whether people can also be imprinted by early experiences in organizations that they join after their careers are well established. Finally, whereas prior work on imprinting has examined how individuals acquire features of the organizations they enter, little is known about whether the groups and teams in which people initially work can also leave lasting and consequential imprints. These lacunae exist in part because of the twin empirical challenges of obtaining detailed, longitudinal career histories—including initial experiences with structural power and conflict—for cohorts of new organizational entrants and of disentangling measures of potential power from actual influence within these career histories (e.g., Finkelstein, 1992).

In this article, we seek to fill these gaps by bringing together insights from research on power, conflict, and organizational imprinting. We theorize that, all else equal, the gain or loss of structural power within an organization produces corresponding shifts in the degree of influence that people have over their colleagues; however, these effects are contingent upon experiences with power and conflict at the time of organizational entry. Individuals who enter an organization with structural power can acquire enduring cognitive rigidities—a stamp of power—that make them less influential when they later gain or lose power relative to those who entered without structural power. At the same time, those who experience high levels of group conflict when they first enter an organization can derive lasting learning benefits—a stamp of
conflict—that make them more influential when they later gain power compared to those who faced limited conflict at the time they joined.

We evaluate these propositions in the context of the U.S. Senate from 1973 to 2009. Although it differs in important respects from the typical differentiated organization, the Senate is a strategic research site for the study of power (Brescoll, 2011), conflict (Lee, 2009), and influence (Liu and Srivastava, forthcoming). For four reasons, it is especially well-suited to our theoretical aims. First, senators vary in their initial experiences with power, depending on whether or not their political party was in the majority at the time they joined, and with group-level conflict, based on the level of political division they experienced on the committees to which they were initially assigned. These initial experiences are largely outside of a senator’s control and exogenous to their subsequent shifts in structural power (Fenno, 1989; Deering and Smith, 1997). It is therefore possible to examine how variation in these initial experiences promotes or inhibits a senator’s later ability to convert structural power into influence.

In addition, at various points in their careers, senators experience changes in structural power—for example, shifts in their party’s majority or minority status or ascension to the role of committee leader. These changes are governed by external factors and longstanding tradition and norms. Thus, they too can be thought of as quasi-exogenous shifts, which provide empirical insight into how initial experiences in the Senate enhance or constrain a senator’s later ability to convert structural power into influence. Third, election to the Senate often represents the culmination of a person’s political career: it is rarely, if ever, the first organization to which a senator is exposed. Thus, the Senate is an apt setting for the study of the potential effects of organizational imprints acquired later in one’s career. Finally, senators’ legislative behavior is part of the public record, and their varying influence—that is, their ability to enlist legislative
support from other senators—can be readily observed. As a result, we can analytically distinguish potential power, based on structural position, from influence, as measured by the number of colleagues a senator successfully enlists as co-sponsors on bills he or she originates.

**STRUCTURAL POWER AND INFLUENCE**

Power and influence have long served as cornerstones of organizational theory (Cyert and March 1963; Hickson et al., 1971; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974). A recurring theme in this line of work is that the ascension to advantaged structural positions confers legitimacy, which in turn enables people to exert greater interpersonal influence over others (Gouldner, 1954; Crozier, 1964; Brass, 1984). This structural power derives from the positions that people occupy within an organization, rather than from their individual attributes (Weber, 1947; Pfeffer, 1981; Brass, 1984). For example, holding a position that is aligned with a dominant coalition or that comes with formal authority can confer preferential access to valuable resources on which others depend (Astley and Sachdeva, 1984; Brass and Burkhardt, 1993).¹

In the context of the Senate, the two most important determinants of structural power are: (1) the majority / minority status of a senator’s party; and (2) whether or not the senator is a committee chair. Senators from the majority party set the legislative agenda, deciding which bills will (or will not) be scheduled for a vote. Control over the legislative agenda thus represents an important resource that is hotly contested between the two parties. Similarly, committee chairs control the resources that senators vie for within committees: they decide which items should

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¹ Positions in network structure—for example, network centrality (Brass, 1984)—can also represent a form of structural power. Because initial organizational experiences give rise to networks (Morrison, 2002), significant concerns about endogeneity would arise if the effects of those initial experiences on the subsequent ability to convert structural power into influence were estimated using network-analytic measures of structural power. To support causal identification, we instead focus on changes in structural power that are exogenous to initial organizational experiences.
appear on the committee’s agenda, determine how the committee’s sizable staff will be supervised, and choose how to communicate about the group’s deliberations and decisions to the external world (Deering and Smith, 1997).

Gains in structural power—all else equal—increase a person’s ability to influence others, while losses have the opposite effect. One reason is that having more structural power enables people to reduce their dependence on others for valued resources and thereby makes them more influential (Emerson, 1962; Cook and Emerson, 1984; Molm, 1990). For example, Zajac and Westphal (1996) found that boards of directors with greater structural power had greater independence and could therefore influence CEO succession choices in the direction of their own demographic profile. Second, the holders of structural power are often perceived by others as being more powerful, whether or not they actually control resources, and these perceptions boost their influence (Fombrun, 1983). Finally, positions of formal authority confer legitimacy, which can also lead to greater influence (Goldhamer and Shils, 1939; Weber, 1947; French and Raven, 1959). Raven and French (1958: 83), for instance, argued: “Legitimate power in formal organizations is largely a relationship between offices rather than between persons. Assuming that the factory worker accepts the right of his supervisor to hold his position, that supervisor will, by virtue of this occupancy, have the legitimate right to prescribe behavior for his worker; the worker will, in turn, feel obligated to accept these orders.”

In our setting, senators constantly strive to influence one another’s legislative behavior. One of the most concrete manifestations of influence is a senator’s ability to garner support from other senators for his or her policy initiatives. Senators originate legislation in the form of a bill and then seek support, in the form of co-sponsorships, from their colleagues in the chamber (Fowler, 2006a, 2006b). The more co-sponsors a senator enlists to support his or her bill, the
greater its likelihood of passing. Though co-sponsorship choices partly reflect a senator’s public identity—that formed in response to public commitments, normative obligations, and the expectations of party leaders (Liu and Srivastava, forthcoming)—they also represent one senator’s ability to exert direct influence over another (Browne, 1985). In other words, bill co-sponsorships provide a meaningful indicator of a senator’s degree of influence in a given session of Congress.²

Recognizing that the mere possession of structural power does not always equate to influence (Brass and Burkhardt, 1993), including in the U.S. Senate (Den Hartog and Monroe, 2011), we posit that an increase in structural power will, ceteris paribus, make a senator more influential. Our expectation is bidirectional in the case of majority / minority status since senators can experience both gains and losses of structural power defined by this indicator. It is unidirectional in the case of committee chair roles because senators rarely lose this designation, except if they retire or are voted out of office. Together, these arguments lead to the following expectations:

**Hypothesis 1a (H1a):** When a senator’s party shifts to being in the majority (minority), the senator will be able to enlist more (fewer) colleagues as co-sponsors on bills he or she originates.

**Hypothesis 1b (H1b):** Ascending to a committee chair role will enable a senator to enlist more colleagues as co-sponsors on bills he or she originates.

² A Congress refers to the two-year time period between Senatorial elections, and is the unit of time in our dataset.
IMPRINTING AND INFLUENCE

Having established the foundational expectation of a positive relationship between structural power and ensuing influence, we turn next to theorizing about the role of imprinting in moderating this effect. Imprinting is “a process whereby, during a brief period of susceptibility, a focal entity develops characteristics that reflect prominent features of the environment, and these characteristics continue to persist despite significant environmental changes in subsequent periods” (for a review, see Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013: 199). Much of the research on imprinting has operated at the community or organizational levels—for example, considering how the early founding of a nonprofit organization in a community affects the likelihood of the community forming a new nonprofit in a different domain (Greve and Rao, 2012), how the social technology available at their establishment shapes community-based intercorporate networks (Marquis, 2003), or how initial founding conditions affect firms’ subsequent organizational structure and management team composition (Johnson, 2007; Beckman and Burton, 2008) and the relative power of their subunits (Boeker, 1989).

Organization-to-Individual Imprints

In parallel, a growing body of work has shown the myriad ways in which organizational experiences can have leave lasting imprints on individuals and their careers (Higgins, 2005; Briscoe and Kellogg, 2011). People are especially susceptible to such influence during the formative period after their initial entry to an organization (Schein, 1971; Chatman, 1991; Cable, Gino, and Staats, 2013). For example, initial assignments to mentors affect the kind of knowledge that lawyers acquire and later influences how effective they are when they become partners (McEvily, Jaffee, and Tortoriello, 2012). Consistent with this finding, scientists tend to adopt their advisors’ orientations toward commercial science, and this imprint affects their later
patenting behavior (Azoulay, Liu, and Stuart, 2014). Similarly, past exposure to university peers who transitioned into entrepreneurship increases a focal individual’s likelihood of making a similar transition (Kacperczyk, 2013). Whereas much of the prior research has focused on organization-to-individual imprints that people acquire early in their careers, we propose that initial experiences in a new organization can also leave lasting imprints even when they occur at later career stages.

In some cases, initial organizational experiences can have adverse career consequences. For example, early exposure to extreme resource abundance or scarcity in an organization can deprive individuals of the problem solving and interaction skills needed for future career success (Tilcsik, forthcoming). Prior work experiences can also “bring rigidities that act as baggage, weighing down…responsiveness” to, and effectiveness in, new situations (Dokko, Wilk, and Rothbard, 2008: 4). Building on this insight, we theorize that initial organizational experiences with structural power, which make people more influential at the time they hold power, can also—paradoxically—create rigidities that can dampen their influence at later career stages.

**The Stamp of Power**

From its early days, research on power has called attention to its dark side—for example, power’s tendency to promote selfishness, aggression, and the devaluation of others (Milgram, 1963; Kipnis, 1972). A comprehensive account of how the experience of heightened or reduced power can change people appears in Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson’s (2003) Approach-Inhibition Theory of Power. They theorize that power activates the behavioral approach system, which increases sensitivity to rewards, while powerlessness galvanizes the inhibition system, which makes a person vigilant to threats.
This proposition has received consistent empirical support across a wide range of studies (Galinsky et al., 2012; Anderson and Brion, 2014). Those who feel more powerful tend to disregard others’ perspectives (Galinsky et al., 2006), overestimate the extent to which others are allied with them (Brion and Anderson, 2013), increase their demands of others (Sivanathan, Pillutla, and Murnighan, 2008), and build coalitions with similar (Pfeffer and Fong, 2005) and flattering others (Park, Westphal, and Stern, 2011). These behavioral changes occur in part because powerful people perceive greater social distance from less powerful others (Magee and Smith, 2013), which leads the former to objectify (Gruenfeld et al., 2008), disregard the advice of (See et al., 2011), and inhibit the voice of the latter (Ferguson, Ormiston, and Moon, 2010).

Insofar as these cognitive and behavioral shifts arising from the experience of power manifest in the period following entry to a new organization, they are apt to inhibit social learning and create rigidities that will persist over time. These rigidities, which we call the stamp of power, will then tend to make people less influential when they later experience shifts in structural power.

In the U.S. Senate, we anticipate that the stamp of power will manifest through structural power defined by majority / minority party status rather than power defined by committee chair roles. This expectation is based on the simple observation that first-term senators are very unlikely to be selected for committee chair roles. We therefore expect:

**Hypothesis 2 (H2):** Entering the Senate when his or her party is in the majority (minority) will impede (enhance) a senator’s subsequent ability to enlist colleagues as co-sponsors on bills he or she originates.
The Stamp of Conflict

Having argued that the stamp of power will negatively affect the conversion of structural power to influence, we turn next to proposing a positive contingent effect. To develop this argument, we begin with the observation that much of organizational life unfolds in the context of work groups. Though they may belong to a single subunit in the formal structure, people often participate in myriad work groups that constitute an organization’s semiformal structure (Biancani, McFarland, and Dahlander, 2014). Just as people vary in their experiences with structural power when entering a new organization, so we suggest that their initial experiences in work groups can have lasting career consequences.

One key dimension along which work groups vary is in the level of conflict among members (Simmel, 1955; Jehn, 1995; Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003). A vast literature has examined the question of whether conflict—based on tasks, relationships, and process—is harmful or beneficial for work group performance. These studies have surfaced a host of contingent factors, and meta-analyses of this work have yielded mixed empirical evidence (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; Jehn and Bendersky, 2003; de Wit, Greer, and Jehn, 2012). Abstracting from the debate about conflict’s positive or negative effects on group performance, we take from this literature a core insight: certain kinds of conflict can produce valuable social learning for members (Amason, 1996). In particular, cognitive conflict—that which arises from judgmental differences about how to achieve common differences—can be functional, especially when it is task oriented (Amason and Schweiger, 1994; Jehn, 1997a).

Work group experiences involving cognitive conflict can help people learn how to understand and synthesize divergent perspectives, engage in constructive debate, and manage disagreements (Rahim, 2002; Tjosvold, 2008). In other words, the experience of cognitive
conflict in work groups can yield positive social learning and enhance the capacity to manage work group conflict in the future. To the extent that this conflict is experienced in the sensitive period after a person enters a new organization, this positive social learning will tend to persist over time. This imprint, which we call the *stamp of conflict*, will then aid its bearers when they later acquire structural power by enabling them to diagnose and manage the conflicts that arise in the exercise of influence. In contrast to the stamp of power, we theorize that this stamp of conflict will arise through interactions in work groups and, insofar as it affects how influential a person is in the future, will do so in work group settings.

In our setting, the primary means for senators to experience and navigate group conflict is through the committees to which they are assigned. Within committees, senators debate, amend, and sometimes pass preliminary pieces of legislation, or bills, to the broader legislative body for consideration. Committee deliberations are often fraught with conflict. Though committee composition reflects the overall mix of parties in the Senate, committees still vary in the ideologies of their members and the tenor of their discussions. A key axis of variation is political division: some committees consist of senators with a track record of co-sponsoring bills extensively across party lines, while others have members who co-sponsor bills primarily within party lines (Liu and Srivastava, forthcoming).

We propose that members’ likelihood of experiencing conflict will be greater on committees with higher levels of past division. Senators who are assigned to more divided committees are therefore more likely to acquire the stamp of conflict when they first enter the chamber, and this imprint will enable them to be more influential later when they accumulate more structural power. Thus, we expect:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Being assigned to more (less) politically divided committees when first entering the Senate will enhance (impede) a senator’s subsequent ability to enlist colleagues as co-sponsors on bills he or she originates.

In sum, we anticipate that increases in structural power will, all else equal, translate to greater interpersonal influence. This effect will be dampened by the stamp of power and amplified by the stamp of conflict. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of these arguments.

*****Figure 1 about here*****

DATA AND METHODS

Empirical Setting: The United States Senate

To test these hypotheses, we examined power dynamics, interpersonal influence, and organizational imprints in the United States Senate. For reasons noted above, we believe that this setting was especially well suited to evaluating our theoretical arguments. Because senators’ structural positions, including committee assignments, and actions, such as bill co-sponsorships, are part of the public record, we could characterize every senator’s initial experiences with structural power and conflict and measure the extent to which these initial career imprints affected their subsequent degree of influence. Consistent with our hypotheses, our analyses, which spanned the years 1973 to 2009, were conducted at the individual unit of analysis. This time period included multiple shifts in structural power—for example, changes in the majority status of parties and ascension of multiple senators to committee chair roles—and many opportunities for senators to parlay that structural power into influence.
Dependent Variable

Bill co-sponsorships define a network of collaboration within the Senate. A focal senator originates a bill and then enlists support for the legislation from other senators. That support manifests in other senators’ choices to publicly co-sponsor or not co-sponsor the focal senator’s bill (Fowler, 2006a, 2006b). Bill co-sponsorships therefore provide a tangible, observable, and meaningful indicator of a senator’s interpersonal influence and how it varies over time. Thus, our time-varying dependent variable was a count of the number of co-sponsors a focal senator successfully enlisted on bills he or she originated in a given session of Congress. In network-analytic terms, this measure is also known as indegree centrality.

We restricted our analysis to bills with 12 or fewer co-sponsors because certain bills are disproportionately popular, garnering near-universal support. Support for these popular bills often reflects a symbolic display of unity rather than the outcome of person-to-person influence attempts. Choosing a cut-off of 12 or fewer co-sponsors eliminated the noise arising from symbolic displays of support without losing the signal: only 14.4% of bills were excluded by this restriction. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the resulting variable.

Independent Variables

To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we constructed two time-varying measures of a senator’s structural power. The first was an indicator for the majority or minority status of a senator’s party. The majority party wields significant power, setting the legislative agenda and deciding which bills are to be considered and voted upon. The majority can choose to suppress the bills of the minority party, using what has been called negative agenda control (Cox and McCubbins, 2005; Gailmard and Jenkins, 2007). Majority party members enjoy greater success in adding
amendments to bills (Den Hartog and Monroe, 2011), raising campaign funds (Cox and Magar, 1999), and allocating federal resources to their constituents (Balla et al., 2002).^3 Thus, our first measure of an individual’s structural power is Majority Party: a time-varying indicator set to 1 if a senator’s party was in the majority and to 0 otherwise. Figure 3 depicts the composition of parties in the Senate in each session of Congress and reveals six changes in majority party status during the observation period.

****Figure 3 about here****

Our second measure of structural power is Committee Chair: a time-varying indicator set to 1 for senators in the year they first ascended to a committee chair role and to 0 otherwise. Committee chairs command enormous power in the Senate: “[The chair] benefits from years of experience in dealing with the policy problems and constituencies of the committee, exercises considerable control over its agenda, schedules meetings and hearings, influences the scheduling of subcommittee meetings and hearings, normally names conferees, controls the committee budget, supervises a sizable staff, and often serves as a spokesperson for the committee and party on issues that fall within the committee’s jurisdiction. Consequently, the support of the full committee chair can be critical to bill sponsors” (Deering and Smith, 1997: 131). Moreover, a senator’s rise to committee chair is the outcome of a process governed by longstanding and closely guarded bureaucratic rules—for example, deference to seniority. We will return to these ascension rules in the section below on concerns about endogeneity.

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^3 These are just the directly observable consequences of majority party status. As Lee Hamilton notes: “Party status affects pretty much everything. The majority not only gets nicer spaces and meeting rooms, it also gets to determine which members and staff will go on overseas fact-finding trips, and enjoys all sorts of little perks that make life on Capitol Hill more pleasant.” Put differently, majority party status yields many intangibles that can be used in horse-trading, thereby enabling majority-party senators to exert more influence. [http://congress.indiana.edu/why-holding-the-majority-matters; accessed July 22, 2014]
Our theory suggests that the effects of a change in structural power on endorsements from others will be contingent on an individual’s initial experiences with power. Hypothesis 2 contends that, relative to senators who entered the organization when their party was in the minority, those who entered when their party was in the majority will be less apt to form effective coalitions and elicit others’ support for their bills. To test Hypothesis 2, we interacted a senator’s time-varying majority party status indicator with a time-invariant variable called *Party was in Majority in First Congress*, an indicator set to 1 if the senator initially entered the chamber as a member of the majority party and to 0 otherwise.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that a senator’s initial experiences with conflict will also shape their subsequent behaviors. As Deering and Smith (1997: 124) note: “[A]s new members join longstanding committees, they discover that the panels have ingrained moods, habits, and personalities that generally go unquestioned by the more senior members.” Our premise is that the nature of committees to which a Senator was initially exposed will shape his or her subsequent ability to exercise influence: we anticipate that Senators who began their careers in politically divided committees will have learned the skills needed to manage conflict and that these skills will make them more influential when they later assume roles that require the management of group conflict.

Consistent with prior research, we measured the level of political division in a committee by first generating the average number of bill co-sponsorships per dyadic pair on the committee and then separating out bill co-sponsorships that were within the same political party and those that were across party lines. For each committee-Congress, we then identified the ratio of within-party to cross-party co-sponsorships (Liu and Srivastava, forthcoming). Figure 4 shows the distribution of this variable. When it is close to 1, bill co-sponsorships are just as likely to occur
between senators from the same party as between senators from opposing parties, indicative of cross-party cooperation. By contrast, a ratio much greater than 1 indicates significant cross-party division within that committee. As the box-and-whisker plot shown in Figure 5 suggests, there is considerable variation in political division both across committees and within the same committee at different points in time.

****Figures 4 & 5 about here****

We first generated a time-invariant measure called Committees were Divided in First Congress, an indicator set to 1 if all committees to which a senator was assigned in his or her first session were above the median level of political division and to 0 otherwise. Although the level of committee division can change over time, this measure is time-invariant because we measure a senator’s exposure to political division at a single point in time, when he or she first entered the Senate. To test Hypothesis 3, we then examined the interaction of this variable with our second time-varying measure of structural power: Committee Chair.

**Estimation**

Because our dependent variable was a count measure, we estimated Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (PQML) regressions of bill co-sponsors on time-varying measures of structural power and their interaction with our two imprinting variables. Unlike traditional maximum likelihood Poisson, PQML estimates do not assume that the data are distributed with the mean equal to the variance of the event count. Because it only makes an assumption about the conditional mean of the data, PQML is generally preferred over negative binomial regression (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984; Wooldridge, 1997; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006;).

Formally, regression models were represented as:

\[ E[y_{it}|X_{it}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Structural Power}_{it} + \beta_2 X_{it} + \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}, \]
(2) \( E[y_{it} | X_{it}] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Structural Power}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Structural Power}_{it} \times \text{Imprint}_i + \beta_3 X_{it} + \delta_i + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}, \)

where \( y_{it} \) is the count of co-sponsors senator \( i \) accumulates in Congress \( t \), \( \text{Structural Power}_{it} \) indicates if senator \( i \) is (a) in the majority or (b) first ascended to committee leader in Congress \( t \), and \( \text{Imprint}_i \) indicates whether the senator (a) was in the majority or (b) was assigned only to divided committees in senator \( i \)’s first Congress. \( X_{it} \) is a vector of control variables, \( \delta_i \) represents fixed effects for each Congress, and \( \gamma_i \) corresponds to senator fixed effects. Equation (1) represents the models used to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, while equation (2) represents the models used to test Hypotheses 2 and 3.

Because we theorize that the stamp of power operates diffusely across interpersonal relations, we focused analyses related to Hypothesis 2 on changes in structural power defined by shifts in a senator’s majority party status. These shifts altered the power dynamics between a focal senator and all other senators. By contrast, because we theorize that the stamp of conflict operates in specific work group contexts, we focused analyses related to Hypothesis 3 on changes in structural power defined by senators’ ascension to a committee chair role. This change altered the power dynamics between a focal senator and the subset of other senators who were that individual’s co-committee members.

**Addressing Concerns about Endogeneity**

Importantly, the inclusion of senator fixed effects allowed us to examine within-senator variation and helped alleviate concerns about endogeneity arising from omitted variable bias. The individual fixed effect subsumes all time-invariant characteristics of senators—for example, gender, charisma, collegiality, and initial organizational experiences. To put it differently, these models enabled us to estimate how changes in a given senator’s structural power over time led to varying levels of influence as a function of his or her initial experiences. The inclusion of
Congress fixed effects accounted for unobserved time heterogeneity—for example, years in which the President was a Republican or Democrat.

Our analytical strategy depends on the assumption of exogenous variation in structural power and senators’ initial organizational experiences. We turn next to considering the plausibility of these assumptions. Our first indicator of structural power was a senator’s majority or minority party status. As Figure 3 indicates, no party was able to remain in the majority for more than four Congresses, and there were six shifts in majority party status. Given the relatively balanced representation of parties during this time period, we posit that shifts in majority party status were a function of a small number of elections whose outcomes were often uncertain and therefore difficult for any single individual to anticipate.\(^4\) Therefore, it is reasonable to think of shifts in structural power arising from majority / minority party changes as exogenous to the individual.

Our second indicator of structural power was whether or not a senator served as a committee chair. Longstanding tradition dictates that each party’s committee member with the longest tenure on that committee serves as chair or ranking minority member. This assignment procedure reduces interpersonal conflict within committees, ensures that committee leaders have sufficient experience, and buffers committee members from the influence of party leaders. Figure 6 displays, by senator tenure, the distribution of senators who were and who were not committee chairs. Given the seniority rule, it comes as no surprise that senators with longer tenure were generally more likely to hold committee chair roles. Yet the figure also reveals considerable variation in the tenure of committee chairs. For example, some senators even held committee chairs.

\(^4\) For example, circa August 2014, Democrats are in the majority with 53 seats. Republicans hold 45 seats. There are two Independents, who caucus (affiliate) with Democrats. Of these seats, 33 will be contested in November 2014. According to one forecast, accessed on August 20, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2014/senate-model/), Republicans have a 61% likelihood of being the majority party in 2015. That is, even the outcome of an imminent election remains highly uncertain.
chair roles during their first three sessions in Congress, likely reflecting an unusual number of retirements or lost elections among committee co-members in a process reminiscent of vacancy chains (White, 1970; Chase, 1991). Thus, the timing of ascension to the chair role also appears to be idiosyncratic and can therefore also be thought of as exogenous to the individual.

Next, there are reasons to suspect that initial organizational experiences were also largely outside the control of individual senators. An individual’s entry to the Senate as a majority or minority party member is based on the uncertain outcome of many other elections. These outcomes are even more uncertain at the time a given senator decides to launch an election campaign. Moreover, detailed accounts of the committee assignment process suggest that an entering senator’s choices are strongly constrained by available vacancies and subordinate to the choices of more senior senators and some other freshmen senators in their cohort (Fenno, 1989).

Finally, to establish that the observed effects are a function of imprinting, as opposed to other explanatory force, we conducted a supplemental analysis based on the tenure of senators. This analysis is predicated on the assumption that the effects of imprints tend to fade with time (Lee and Battilana, 2013). Based on this intuition, we examined the three-way interaction of structural power, initial career imprints, and senator tenure. With the stamp of power, we anticipate that the three-way interaction term will be significant and positive, since the negative effects of this imprint on influence will tend to diminish over time. By contrast, with the stamp of conflict, we expect the three-way interaction term to be significant and negative, since the positive effects of this imprint will also tend to erode with time.
RESULTS

We begin with a description of the data. Table 1 describes the characteristics of the 1,607 Senator-Congress observations in our dataset. Democrats and Republicans were nearly evenly represented, with third-party members constituting only 0.5% of observations. Female senators were also relatively rare (5% of observations). The typical senator joined in the 96th Congress and served for just over 6 Congresses (i.e., two terms).

Within a given Congress, the average senator recruited 35.7 co-sponsors on bills he or she originated, although there was wide variation in recruitment (see also Figure 2). Fifty-five percent of observations were of senators in the majority party. Just over one third of observations were of senators who were committee chairs. Lastly, sixty-two percent of individuals entered the Senate in the majority party. Given multiple committee memberships, 21% of senators were assigned only to committees that were politically divided in their first session.

*****Table 1 about here*****

Table 2 rank orders committees by their median level of political division. Overall, the median committee had a political division measure of 1.23. Thus, within a typical committee, the likelihood of a co-sponsoring within one’s own party was 23% more likely than co-sponsoring across party lines. As Figure 5 illustrates, however, there was significant variation both across committees and within committees over time. Indeed, 27 out of 35 committees (i.e., 77%) were both above and below the median level of dividedness at different points in time.

*****Table 2 about here*****

We test our hypotheses using two separate measures of structural power: majority / minority party status and ascension to committee chair. Table 3 reports results of analyses based
on the first measure. Model 1, a baseline with both Congress and senator fixed effects, reveals that the number of colleagues a senator successfully enlisted as a bill co-sponsor increased with tenure. For the median senator, a one-Congress increase in tenure increased the predicted number of co-sponsors by 14%.

In support of Hypothesis 1a, Model 2 indicates that being in the majority party, with its concomitant increase in structural power, allowed an individual to accrue more co-sponsors. Majority party status boosted the predicted number of co-sponsors by 15%, an effect comparable to a one-Congress increase in tenure. In support of Hypothesis 2, Model 3 indicates a negative interaction between current majority party status and entering the senate as a member of the majority. Indeed, a change in a senator’s majority party status led to a 22.4% change in the predicted number of co-sponsors for senators who entered the chamber in the minority. By contrast, the comparable shift produced only a 12.2% change in the predicted number of co-sponsors for senators who entered in the majority. This result is consistent with the notion of a stamp of power that makes a senator less influential following subsequent changes in structural power. Lastly, the positive three-way interaction in Model 4 indicates that the effects of the stamp of power fade over time.

To unpack the mechanisms underlying the stamp of power, we isolated the consequences of gaining power (i.e., moving from minority to majority party status) versus losing power (i.e., moving from majority to minority party status) for individuals with and without the imprint. Model 5 illustrates that those without the stamp of power (i.e., those in the minority in their first congress) gained 23.7% co-sponsors when they first ascended to majority party status. Similarly, those starting in the majority lost 21.1% co-sponsors when they first moved to the minority. In other words, following the first shift in power between the parties, the gain and loss of influence
were symmetrical between the two groups. A different pattern emerges following the second shift in power, as highlighted by Model 6. When individuals who started in the majority moved back to the majority following a period of being in the minority (i.e., second change in party status), they were predicted to gain 17.3% more co-sponsors. Individuals who started in the minority party and then moved to the majority, however, experienced no decline in influence when they fell back again to the minority position. That is, consistent with the stamp-of-power hypothesis, those who began their senate careers in the majority appeared to lose influence when they later lost structural power, whereas those who started in the minority did not experience a comparable loss of influence.

Table 4 reports results of analyses based on the second indicator of structural power: taking on a committee chair role. Model 7 indicates marginal support for Hypothesis 1b. Ascending to committee chair was positively associated with the number of co-sponsors, but the p-value associated with this effect was 0.071. In support of Hypothesis 3, Model 8 reveals a positive interaction effect between initially experiencing divided committees and the subsequent ability to exercise influence after becoming a committee chair. Relative to their counterparts who were not initially assigned to divided committees, those who experienced high levels of committee division when they entered the chamber were predicted to have 17.8% more co-sponsors when they become a committee chair. This result is consistent with the notion of a stamp of conflict, which boosts a person’s ability to convert future gains in structural power into influence. The negative three-way interaction in Model 9 indicates that the effects of this stamp of conflict erode as a senator’s tenure increases. Finally, a fully specified Model 10 illustrates that the stamp of power and the stamp of conflict appeared to have independent effects on a senator’s subsequent influence, although Committee Chair × Committee was Divided in First
*Congress* was only marginally significant in this specification. With the caveats noted above, these results, when considered together, indicate solid support for all three hypotheses.

**Robustness Checks**

We conducted two additional analyses to assess the robustness of our findings. We first considered the choice to restrict the dependent variable to bills with 12 or fewer co-sponsors. We argued that a cutoff was necessary to cull bills whose support reflected symbolic displays of unity rather than the effects of interpersonal influence. To assess how robust the findings were to the choice of cut-off, we generated dependent variables with alternative cutoffs, ranging from 10 to 15. The results were materially unchanged when we used these alternative measures. With higher cutoffs, the distribution of the dependent variable shifted significantly, with several senators reaching the ceiling of 99 co-sponsors in a given Congress.

A second concern relates to a possible confounding effect related to Hypothesis 3 (the stamp of conflict). Committee assignments in the first session expose senators to a set of colleagues. When that senator later becomes a committee chair, he or she may simply reach out to these contacts for support. To assess whether the experience of conflict makes senators more influential when they become committee chair, one would ideally want to see them have greater influence on senators they were not exposed to through committee co-memberships in their first session. That would help rule out mere exposure to contacts as an explanation for their increased influence. Given this concern, we re-estimated our main models using a variant of the dependent variable that was based on co-sponsorships from senators who did not serve as committee co-members in the first session. Reassuringly, these analyses produced comparable results.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This article has sought to explain how and why gains in structural power lead to varying levels of interpersonal influence. We adopted a temporal, historical perspective on this question, arguing that early-career experiences with power and conflict can leave imprints that affect a person’s subsequent ability to convert structural power into influence. We first theorized that, all else equal, gains in structural power would lead to greater interpersonal influence. Next, we argued that the experience of structural power upon entry to a new organization can create enduring rigidities that make people less influential in the future. By contrast, early-career experiences with conflict can provide lasting learning benefits that make people more influential later in their careers. We evaluated and found support for these propositions in the context of the U.S. Senate from 1973 to 2009. Our results indicate: (1) senators became more influential when their party moved into the majority and when they became committee chairs; (2) entering the chamber as a member of the majority party impeded their subsequent ability to exert influence; and (3) being assigned to more politically divided committees in their first session enhanced their subsequent influence.

The Social Psychology of Power

These findings have important implications for social psychological research on power and influence. They help to reconcile the apparent incongruities about power that social psychologists have illuminated through a variety of laboratory studies. For example, Anderson and Brion (2014: 81) observed: “As the empirical investigations into power maintenance and loss accumulate, so too do the apparent contradictions in findings....Power holders appear to be simultaneously astute and aloof, prosocial and antisocial, self-assured and overconfident.” The present study suggests that one way to resolve these paradoxes is by considering the role of time.
Our work highlights at least three contingent effects of time on the social psychological consequences of power. First, it suggests that the susceptibility to the dark side of power can vary considerably over the course of a career. The subtle cognitive and behavioral shifts arising from the experience of power are more likely to have lasting consequences when they originate in the sensitive period following entry to a new organization than when they occur during more stable career periods. Second, our findings suggest that this stamp of power can persist in a person’s career backdrop for extended periods—several years in the case of many senators in our sample—and then move to the fore when a person later experiences a change in structural power. Finally, our models that included interaction effects with senator tenure indicated that stamps of power may be strong initially but also tend to fade over time. Together, these findings underscore the need to bring time more directly and forcefully into social psychological research on power and also point to the need to complement traditional laboratory studies with longitudinal field research.

In addition, our work highlights the need to move beyond dichotomous characterizations of power—for example, the powerful versus the powerless—that prevail in social psychological research. In our setting, the consequences of imprinting varied across different forms of structural power. The stamp of power was evident when senators experienced changes in structural power stemming from shifts in their party’s majority or minority status, while the stamp of conflict was operative when they gained structural power as committee chairs.

Finally, our study makes an empirical contribution to the broader literature on power by providing a concrete illustration of how structural power and influence can be analytically distinguished from one another. We derived separate indicators of structural power—based on majority / minority party status and ascension to committee chair role—and of interpersonal
influence—based on the number of co-sponsorships a senator successfully enlisted. Insofar as this empirical approach can be extended to other organizational settings, it can help illuminate the conditions under which people succeed or fail to translate structural power into influence.

**Conflict within Work Groups**

Our investigation also contributes to research on the relative merits of conflict in work groups. This literature has long recognized that conflict—whether task-, relationship-, or process-based—can have both positive and negative effects (Jehn, 1995; Jehn, 1997b; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale, 1999). Yet this work has predominately focused on the *contemporaneous* consequences for *organization- or group-level* outcomes, such as team performance. Meta-analyses of this research report mixed results (De Dreu and Weingart, 2003; de Wit, Greer, and Jehn, 2012). Our work suggests that previous accounts of the pros and cons of conflict have made an important omission: neglecting the potential *downstream* benefits of conflict for *individual-level* outcomes. In our setting, early-career experiences with conflict in Senate committees boosted senators’ subsequent levels of interpersonal influence when they ascended to committee chair roles.

The identification of a stamp of conflict also speaks to research on work group composition and its effects on learning and performance (Gibson and Vermeulen, 2003; Lau and Murnighan, 2005; Li and Hambrick, 2005). These studies have illuminated the conditions under which various forms of diversity—for example, task-related or demographic—promote or inhibit group effectiveness (for reviews see Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; Horwitz and Horwitz, 2007). Whereas many aspects of team diversity can be observed on the surface, deep-level composition variables—that is, underlying psychological characteristics such as personality factors, values, and attitudes—can also affect group outcomes (Harrison, Price, and Bell, 1998; Bell, 2007). Our
findings suggest the need to complicate these accounts of diversity and group performance by incorporating the role of a previously overlooked deep-level composition variable—group members’ formative experiences with conflict after organizational entry. The stamps of conflict that people bear and bring with them to their work groups may enhance or constrain their ability to influence one another in overcoming current conflicts. How they affect group-level performance remains to be explored.

Organizational Imprinting

Finally, the present study contributes to research on organizational imprinting by demonstrating that organization-to-individual imprints are not only acquired in the early stages of a person’s career. Senators, many of whom entered the chamber after long careers in multiple organizational settings, still appeared to be influenced by their initial experiences with conflict and power at the time of entry. Thus, it seems that organizations can leave their mark on entrants even when those individuals are already well established in their careers.

In addition, our work calls attention to the formative role of experiences within work groups and teams. Whereas prior imprinting research has examined how initial team characteristics—particularly those of founding or top management teams (Beckman and Burton, 2007; Beckman and Burton, 2008; Beckman and Burton, 2011)—create organization-level imprints, our findings demonstrate that team-level features such as the propensity to engage in contentious discourse can also produce imprints at the individual level. This insight relates to the notion of second hand imprinting (Tilcsik, forthcoming), whereby a focal individual is influenced by exposure to the imprints of veteran coworkers through team interaction. A core difference is that second hand imprinting involves the transmission of characteristics between individuals who come into contact with one another on teams, while the stamp of conflict

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represents the imprinting of group-level characteristics (i.e., the level of political division in a Senate committee) on individuals who participate in those groups. It suggests a previously overlooked mechanism by which individuals are shaped by features of the organizations in which they work.

**Limitations and Future Research**

Although the Senate represents a strategic research site for the study of power and influence, the chamber’s specific institutional features also raise questions about the generalizability of our findings. In two respects, however, this setting affords a conservative test of how imprinting might operate in other organizational contexts. First, senators are the embodiment of political elites (Moore, 1979), who are likely to be especially skilled in the use of power. As such, the correspondence between power and influence should be particularly strong for these individuals. Moreover, organization-to-individual imprints tend to be stronger at earlier, rather than later, life stages (Lee and Battilana, 2013). As noted earlier, newcomers to the Senate are typically seasoned veterans who have had considerably more prior work experience than typical organizational entrants. Thus, most senators arrive in the chamber already bearing the imprints of their past work experiences. Our results nevertheless suggest that they acquire new imprints as they get socialized in the Senate, and these layered-on imprints still have lasting effects.

Second, the stamp of power is less likely to be operative when the power holder feels highly accountable—that is, has a sense that his or her actions are personally identifiable and subject to the evaluation of others. Accountability constrains otherwise unbridled power. Leaders who feel accountable tend to pay closer attention to the social consequences of their choices and consider the perspectives of others (Tetlock, 1992; Lerner and Tetlock, 1993; Anderson and Brown, 2010). Relative to holders of structural power in a typical organization, senators are more
likely to feel accountable because their individual words and actions are part of the public record and closely scrutinized by the media, their constituents, fellow legislators, and even the President. Yet high levels of accountability did not appear to counteract the stamp of power’s effects in the Senate. In sum, our analyses would appear to provide conservative estimates of the extent to which stamps of power and conflict could affect interpersonal influence in other organizational settings where actors are not uniformly members of the elite.

In other respects, however, the Senate’s peculiar features may have increased the chances of detecting our theorized imprinting effects. For example, the dark side of power is more likely to infect leaders who are entrenched and therefore face little risk of falling from their perch. Such leaders become less vigilant and are therefore more likely to succumb to power’s negative psychological consequences (Anderson and Brown, 2010). Given the enormous financial resources required to win a Senate seat and macro-structural changes such as the geographic sorting of voters along party lines (Theriault, 2008), turnover rates in the Senate are relatively low and many senators face little risk of losing their seat. Thus, senators may be more susceptible to the stamp of power’s effects than are leaders in corporate settings. In addition, recent years have seen marked increases in political polarization within the Senate (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Theriault, 2013). Alongside the polarization of the two main political parties has been a sharp increase in inter-party conflict, which often occurs in the committee context. Indeed, Senate committees can be thought of as factional groups—defined as groups whose representatives belong to a small number (often two) of social entities. Factional groups are especially prone to experiencing intra-group task and emotional conflict (Li and Hambrick, 2005). Thus, to the extent that Senate committees experience significantly more conflict than that found in work groups in a typical organization, newcomers to the Senate may be at greater risk
of acquiring the stamp of conflict than typical organizational entrants. We see great potential in future research that explores how variation in these, and other, institutional features affects the strength, durability, and downstream consequences of power- and conflict-related imprints.
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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Summary of Conceptual Framework

- **H1a**: (+) Change in Structural Power at Later Career Stage...
  - From Shifts in the Majority / Minority Status of a Senator’s Party

- **H2**: Stamp of Power as Moderator: (-) Initial Career Experience with Structural Power
  - Degree of Interpersonal Influence

- **H3**: Stamp of Conflict as Moderator: (+) Initial Career Experience with More Conflict
  - From a Senator’s Ascension to Committee Chair Role
Figure 2: Distribution of Cosponsors of Bills Originated by Focal Senator

Note: The measure illustrates the number of senators who co-sponsored bills originated by the focal senator in a given Congress. This count was restricted to bills that had 12 or fewer co-sponsors to cull bills that garnered symbolic co-sponsorships. Raising or lowering this cutoff did not change our results.
Figure 3: Party Composition of Senate by Congress

Note: Darker bars tally the number of Democratic senators and lighter bars tally Republican senators. Numbers reported are for the first day of the Congressional Session, which spans a two-year period. When Democrats and Republicans do not sum to 100 (e.g., 110th Congress), the remainder are either Independents or the seat was initially vacant. For the 107th Congress, the Democratic Party was counted as the majority party because of the departure of Jim Jeffords from the Republican Party a quarter of the way through the Congress. For the 110th Congress, the Democratic Party was the majority party, as two independents caucused (i.e., aligned) with Democrats.
Figure 4: Distribution of Committees, by Political Division

Note: The ratio of same-to different-party bill co-sponsorships was used to measure how divided each committee was at a given point in time. Higher ratios, to the right in the histogram, indicated greater proportions of same-party bill co-sponsorships, consistent with a more divided environment within that committee.
Figure 5: Box-and-Whisker Plot of Political Division by Committee

Note: Data represent the level of division within and across each of 35 Senate Committees. Shaded areas represent the 25th-75th percentile range, with the median line denoted by the short horizontal line.
Figure 6: Distribution of Committee Chairs by Tenure

Note: The histogram represents 1,607 Senator-Congress observations. The significant overlap between the Not Chair and Is Chair distributions suggests a wide period of time when senators were at risk for ascending to a committee chair role.
Table 1: Descriptive Stats (N = 1,607)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<td>0.500</td>
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<td>Republican</td>
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<td>First Congress</td>
<td>96.28</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Last Congress</td>
<td>105.95</td>
<td>5.511</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
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<td>4.264</td>
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<td>Bill Co-Sponsors</td>
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<td>Committee Chair</td>
<td>0.350</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party was in Majority in First Congress</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>0.485</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committees were Divided in First Congress</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.407</td>
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</table>

Note: Only 1,182 observations for Committees Were Divided in First Congress.
Table 2: List of Senate Committees by Level of Division

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<th>Dividedness Rank</th>
<th>Committee Name</th>
<th>Median Dividedness</th>
<th>SD Dividedness</th>
<th># of Obs</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>1.558</td>
<td>0.228</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>1.498</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>1.406</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Post Office and Civil Service</td>
<td>1.378</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Interior and Insular Affairs</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>0.115</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Labor and Human Resources</td>
<td>1.331</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Foreign Relations</td>
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<td>Rules and Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.090</td>
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Note: Committees are listed by their median level of dividedness. We also tabulate the standard deviation of each committee’s dividedness as well as the number of senator-congress observations for each committee. The names of two committees, ranked 32 and 35 in dividedness, were not available in the data set.
Table 3: Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Bill Co-Sponsorships on Covariates: Structural Power based on Majority / Minority Party Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Majority Party</td>
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<td>0.202***</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority Party × Party was in Majority in First Congress</td>
<td>-0.108**</td>
<td>-0.132***</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party × Tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.015**</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party was in Majority in First Congress × Tenure</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Party × Party was in Majority in First Congress × Tenure</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Change in Party Status</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Change in Party Status × Party was in Majority in First Congress</td>
<td>-0.237***</td>
<td>-0.180***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Change in Party Status</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Change in Party Status × Party was in Majority in First Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.160**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
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<td>0.128***</td>
<td>0.129***</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
<td>0.137***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
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<td># of Senators</td>
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<td>253</td>
<td>253</td>
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</table>

Note: *Majority Party* is a time-varying indicator variable for a senator party’s majority/minority status at time *t.* *Party was in Majority in First Congress* is set to 1 if the senator’s party was in the majority in his or her first Congress. Senator tenure is measured in Congresses (i.e., every two years) and is mean-centered. *First Change in Party Status* and *Second Change in Party Status* represent the first and second times a senator experienced a shift of his or her party from or to the majority. Robust standard errors. Two-tailed tests. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 4: Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Bill Co-Sponsorships on Covariates: The Stamp of Conflict

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<th>(9)</th>
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<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.027</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee Chair × Committees were Divided in First Congress</td>
<td>0.163*</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.121†</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee Chair × Tenure</td>
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<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committees were Divided in First Congress × Tenure</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair × Committees were Divided in First Congress × Tenure</td>
<td>-0.095*</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.044)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority Party</td>
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<td>0.202***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majority Party × Party was in Majority in First Congress</td>
<td>-0.117**</td>
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<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.117***</td>
<td>0.116***</td>
<td>0.117***</td>
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<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
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<tr>
<td># of Senators</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Committee division is defined as the ratio of same-party to different-party bill co-sponsorships. Committees were Divided in First Congress is set to 1 if all committees to which a senator was assigned in his or her first Congress were above the median level of division. There are fewer observations in Table 4 than Table 3 because the data collated for this project did not include the information needed to measure committee division before the 93rd Congress, and senators who entered the chamber prior to the 93rd Congress are therefore not included in the analysis. Senator tenure is measured in Congresses (i.e., every two years) and is mean centered. Robust standard errors. Two-tailed tests. † p < .10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.